AMMAN FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000713 SIPDIS STATE FOR CA/FPP AND INL/HSTC DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC ATHENS FOR DHS POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGER SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: CVIS CPAS KFRD KCRM CMGT ASEC JO IZ SUBJECT: AMMAN FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGEMENT REPORT SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER 2005 REF: A) 2005 SECSTATE 205073 B) 2005 AMMAN 8117 C) 2005 AMMAN 9956 The following is submitted in response to the Department's request in REF A. Country Conditions ================== ¶1. (SBU) Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources and high unemployment and poverty rates. While the economy has made significant gains in recent years, the poverty level remains at or near 30 percent and estimated unemployment ranges from 15 to 30 percent. There are roughly 5.3 million Jordanians, 1.8 million registered Palestinian refugees (many holding Jordanian passports), and an estimated 600,000 Iraqis who have fled Iraq. The large Iraqi community in Jordan and the general ease of access for Iraqi nationals to Jordan have served to make Iraqi nationals a considerable portion of the consular workload, constituting one-fifth of NIV applicants and half of IV applicants in 2005. While Jordanian documents can confidently be verified with the issuing authorities, the documents presented by Iraqi applicants pose a concern since it is difficult to determine their authenticity. An overview of consular efforts to combat fraud was also provided in REF B. NIV Fraud ========= ¶2. (SBU) For the calendar year of 2005, the overall NIV refusal rate for Jordanian nationals stood at 54.8 percent and at 66.5 percent for Iraqi nationals. NIV fraud committed by Jordanian nationals is generally limited to poor quality documents used to establish stronger ties, typically bank statements and support letters. Fraud by Iraqis is, generally speaking, equally unsophisticated. However, Post has found a recent trend of H1b fraud committed by Iraqis claiming Chaldean affiliation to work as accountants or financial analysts in the U.S. (REF C). These cases are presented with entirely false school certificates, fake letters of prior employment, and scripted answers to common interview questionS. Post has identified the trend and developed enhanced interview procedures to disrupt it. Turnarounds reported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) show that Jordanian nationals as a group continue to overstay at a high rate, normally to work illegally in the U.S. Post and DHS have also noted a steady number of cases where Jordanians are traveling to the U.S. for the sole purpose of giving birth, often on public assistance. Post has continued to take notice of this information and to alter interview techniques. IV Fraud and DV Fraud ===================== ¶3. (SBU) On the immigration side, malafide cases often include sham divorces to facilitate marriages of convenience between Jordanian men and American women. Post has found that the American citizen petitioner is often employed in the U.S. by a family member of the beneficiary (often a gas station or convenience store). The family member in the U.S. usually pays for all of the expenses of the trip and allows unusually long periods of vacation for the employee to complete the months-long IV process in Jordan. Post has also seen a rising number of arranged marriages between American and Iraqi Chaldeans for I-130 filings, K-1 visas, and K-3 visas. In these cases, Post has found identical individuals, jewelry, and apartments in photos from supposedly unrelated cases. For example, the same elderly woman was found in three separate engagement ceremonies, which were all conducted in the same apartment. However, the beneficiaries in each one of these cases stated that this was their grandmother or aunt but would then claim not to know each other. While Post does process Diversity Visas for Jordanian and Iraqi nationals, Post has not detected significant fraud, as most who apply have the equivalent of a high school diploma, reflecting the high levels of secondary education in both countries. The Consular Section appreciates the assistance of the Regional Security Office in investigating and evaluating suspect documents, particularly Iraqi passports, and coordinating with local law enforcement. Their assistance is invaluable in deterring and preventing immigration fraud. ACS and Passport Fraud ====================== ¶4. (SBU) ACS fraud is low in Jordan. The limited cases that pose concern are the ability of individuals to transmit citizenship and cases of first-time claim of citizenship utilizing very old documents. These issues are dealt with thorough interviews and document verification when necessary. Asylum and DHS Benefit Fraud ============================ ¶5. (SBU) Post does issue transportation letters in asylum following-to-join and refugee cases, but has no instances of fraud to report. At the request of DHS, the FPU regularly and successfully investigates marriage and divorce decrees for change of status cases in the U.S. In the majority of these cases, Post finds that Jordanian men have committed bigamy by remaining married or remarrying their Jordanian wives but claiming marriage to American citizens for immigration benefit. In addition, through Post's work and relationships with officials at the airport, we have found a pattern of persons using fake "green cards" or parole letters to attempt travel to the U.S. The airlines, in particular, have become very good at detecting these documents, denying the passenger boarding, and referring them to the Embassy. In many of these cases, the traveler refuses to appear at the Embassy with the suspect document. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities ============================================ ¶6. (SBU) Post's relationship with the Government of Jordan is strong and is complemented with our active participation in the local Fraud Control Group, made up of European and North American embassies and airline liaison officers who share information on documents and fraud trends. We have no difficulties in approaching Jordanian government offices to verify documents or to gain access to malafide travelers and their documents at the airport. However, there are two developments of concern in the anti-fraud relationship which Post is monitoring. First was the cancellation of the annual interdiction exercise at Queen Alia International Airport in 2005 due to a recent change in leadership of the immigration staff there. Traditionally, Post has cooperated with European embassies and airline liaison officers in conducting this exercise to improve training and build rapport. Second, the immigration officials continue to return fraudulent documents to the bearers to ease their deportation from Jordan. In most cases, the respective Embassy is contacted and allowed to cancel the document; however, Post is aware of uncancelled documents being returned to malafide travelers to continue their travels. To resolve this issue, Post is working with like-minded foreign missions on efforts to educate Jordanian immigration officials on the benefits and obligations of the International Civil Aviation Organization Convention, to which Jordan is a signatory. Areas of Particular Concern =========================== ¶7. (SBU) Jordan is a potential transit point in the Middle East for malafide passengers traveling to Europe and North America. In 2005, the national carrier, Royal Jordanian Airlines, increased the destinations (New York, Chicago, and Detroit) and frequency of direct flights to the U.S. to meet passenger demand. Fraud identified at Amman's Queen Alia International Airport consists of partially- counterfeit to completely counterfeit travel documents, as well as genuine passports used by imposters. Most of these cases involve travelers who are not Jordanian but are of Iraqi, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, and Sudanese nationality transiting the airport. Many malafide travelers are attempting to take advantage of Visa Waiver Programs in the U.S. and Europe. Post's Fraud Prevention Unit has established close working relationships with the Jordanian authorities and the airlines. This has led to the interception of improperly documented passengers from various nationalities and has allowed Post to provide valuable information to DHS and the Department. Staffing and Training ===================== ¶8. (SBU) Post's Fraud Prevention Unit is currently staffed by one second-tour consular officer, Matthew Eussen, who conducts full-time NIV interviews and serves as the program's manager, and one FSN investigator, Hussam Haddad, who also covers NIV duties. The manager has not taken the Fraud Prevention Manager's course but has attended prior regional training provided by FPP in Chennai, India; he is in a rotational position and due to rotate out in April ¶2006. The FSN investigator has completed fraud prevention training at the Foreign Service Institute. He regularly liaises with Royal Jordanian Airlines and Government of Jordan officials at Queen Alia International Airport on an overtime basis, with occasional visits by the American officer. The Regional Security Officer and his four Assistant Regional Security Officers provide timely assistance in conducting fraud investigations and arranging arrests with local law enforcement when necessary. Our anti-fraud operation has won praise from DHS Athens and DHS Rome, other posts, and USG offices in the U.S. HALE