SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF JORDAN,S KING ABDULLAH

S E C R E T AMMAN 006933 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: PREL UN IS LE IZ JO SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF JORDAN,S KING ABDULLAH REF: A. AMMAN 6724 ¶B. AMMAN 6519 ¶C. AMMAN 6335 ¶D. AMMAN 6179 ¶E. AMMAN 6023 ¶F. AMMAN 5963 ¶G. AMMAN 6542 ¶H. STATE 147035 ¶I. AMMAN 6329 ¶J. AMMAN 6932 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) King Abdullah will be in New York for the General Assembly opening and will meet with U.S. and other officials its margins. ¶2. (C) During the Israel-Hizballah hostilities, the King's stock plunged among both ordinary Jordanians and elites (refs a-f) because of his early public criticism of Hizballah and his close identification with the U.S. Even before the Lebanon conflict, most Jordanians viewed the GOJ's relationships with the U.S. and Israel as an unpleasant necessity at best; the violence in Lebanon unleashed emotions so intense that it seems most came to view Jordan's ties with the U.S. and Israel as matters for national shame. Nasrallah and Hamas are regarded as heroes, and the course of moderation viewed as discredited and obsolete. The King is unapologetic about his stance, but believes moderate Arab leaders need to be strengthened now. He believes moderate Arab states are seriously undermined because they are unable to show results from their peace efforts, while extremists of Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas are setting the regional agenda and - to Arab eyes - putting Israel on the defensive for the first time in decades. He fears that the failure of moderates to address the roots of conflict and instability in the region could lead to fundamental shifts in the region in favor of extremists and paralyze reformists who are being viewed as irrelevant to Arabs' core concerns, which are being successfully defined by the rhetoric of the likes of Al-Jazeera and Ahmadinejad. The King therefore views effective and serious USG peace efforts in the region to repair moderates' standing at home as essential. He recognizes that for there to be progress, Abu Mazen needs to form a government that meets Quartet conditions, and is working toward that end. He also opposes Arab League efforts to take the issue to the UNSC as an ineffective, counterproductive gimmick. ¶3. (U) Other issues that may come up in the King's meetings with the USG: Lebanon's Recovery -------------- ¶4. (C) The GOJ, Jordanian NGOs and private donors have provided considerable relief supplies to Lebanon. The Jordanian military provided its own air transport, pilots for other governments' relief aircraft, and engineers for reconstruction work. In addition, Amman's international airport has been serving as an inspection gateway so that commercial flights could reach Beirut while the Israeli blockade was in place. The GOJ reacted with tetchy denials when some Arab media accused Jordan of permitting "Mossad agents" to inspect aircraft (ref G),or otherwise helping implement Israel's blockade. ¶5. (S) Even before the July 12 outbreak of hostilities, King Abdullah was seeking USG approval and support for his ideas on bolstering Lebanese government security forces. He has now made rifles available to the LAF (ref H) and will support other USG efforts to generate international security assistance for Lebanese national forces. Iraq -------------- ¶6. (S) The GOJ is worried that the USG and GOI are losing the battle to impose control on Iraq. Visits to Jordan by senior U.S. military leaders like General Abizaid (and General Casey, due here September 12) have gone some way toward helping the King understand U.S. strategy to address the situation, but he has nevertheless told several U.S. and European officials that he feels he must plan for "worst case scenarios" in Iraq that include the breakup of the country. ¶7. (SBU) Jordan's Prime Minister Maarouf Bakhit and seven other Jordanian cabinet members visited Baghdad August 17, and at the same time a Jordanian Ambassador presented his credentials. Bakhit returned to Jordan with an Iraqi promise to provide Jordan discounted oil, though there is skepticism here about Iraq's capability to comply in the near term (ref I). Iran -------------- ¶8. (S) Jordan's leadership views Iran's ambitions in the region with suspicion and alarm, and as the main strategic threat in the Middle East. For several years King Abdullah and his top advisors have been expressing concern about an Iranian play for regional dominance using cards that include the nuclear standoff, Iraqi Shia parties, the Syrian government, Hizballah, and some Palestinian groups. A viable Israeli-Palestinian peace process is, in the King's view, essential in order to strengthen moderate Arabs' ability to reverse Iranian inroads, which in part stem from the perception that Iran is the Palestinians' greatest champion. ¶9. (SBU) As on many other issues, however, ordinary Jordanians' views diverge considerably from their leaders'. The prospect of a Shia-dominated Iraq still worries most here. But the Jordanian "street" now in large part welcomes Iran's other regional gambits - including its nuclear program. A tribal leader summed up the mood when he told poloff that in the wake of Lebanon "we would welcome Satan himself if he confronted Israel." Reform -------------- ¶10. (SBU) King Abdullah convened Jordan's 700 top political, business and cultural personalities for a retreat in July that forged a consensus on the next steps in his push for reform. Thanks in large part to this and other Palace efforts, the normally reform-adverse parliament is making progress toward passing much of the government's ambitious agenda of reform legislation. The municipal government bill, if passed, will provide for local elections within six months; some opponents of the measure as currently drafted warn that the Muslim Brotherhood will scoop up most of Jordan's local governments. The cash-strapped GOJ hopes that municipal government reform and other political reforms will win it MCC compact funding. Champions of reform, however, feel weakened and vulnerable in the face of public hostility toward anything associated with the U.S. While until now, Jordanian officials were loath to link progress on reform with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, their views changed this summer. Without urgent activity to resolve the Palestinian problem, figures such as Bassam Awadallah argue, moderate reformists will be dismissed as irrelevant and the gap between the "street" and elitist reformers will widen further. Jordanian Candidate to Succeed Kofi Annan -------------- ¶11. (S) Jordan nominated September 5 its PermRep at the UN, Prince Zeid bin Raad, to succeed Kofi Annan. The GOJ appears to have secured Arab League endorsement of the Prince's candidacy (ref j.) Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ HALE