Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06AMMAN6742
2006-08-31 11:18:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Amman
how-toVZCZCXYZ0006 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHAM #6742 2431118 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 311118Z AUG 06 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3723 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0426 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1354 RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUMICEA/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCPA// IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS AMMAN 006742
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, R/MR, I/GNEA, B/BXN,
B/BRN, NEA/PPD, NEA/IPA FOR ALTERMAN
USAID/ANE/MEA
LONDON FOR TSOU
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KMDR JO
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON LEBANON
Editorial Commentary
-- "Strategic Review"
Columnist Basem Twaisi writes on the op-ed page of centrist,
independent Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/31): "In theory, active
parties in the Middle East, from within and from without, should be
now conducting strategic reviews in light of the new facts on the
ground.... The Israeli aggressive war against Lebanon and its
open-ended and vague potential repercussions would not be the reason
for conducting such a review, but rather that crisis that has been
around for more than three years, of which the war was only one of
its aspects.... The region has not seen this current state of
political void since 1967. The possibilities of war and peace are
absolute.... The regional players are now running without a compass
and direction. The current political void means the inability of
regional and international parties and their lack of maturity of
will to conduct immediate and radical surgical operations for the
region's problems.... The most significant aspects of the political
void - with which the United States and Israel react by attempting
to make their own games on their own - could be seen in the behavior
of Arab axes and their complete closure and in Iran's behavior
towards Arab causes and its stinginess in opening channels of
dialogue with the Arab parties. This void can be seen in the
behavior of each of the Palestinian presidency and the government
vis-`-vis one another and vis-`-vis the requirements of the
Palestinian cause, as well as in the behavior of Hizbullah and the
other Lebanese powers. The most important thing about these aspects
is misjudging other parties' stands, their capabilities and their
reactions."
-- "From Nasrallah's apologetic talk"
Columnist Jamil Nimri writes on the back-page of centrist,
independent Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/31): "Hizbullah did not expect
the Israeli reaction; that was possible to conclude from previous
remarks made by Nasrallah. But for the man to say a few days ago
that he would not have ordered the operation had he known the volume
of the reaction, this is the climax and as such requires a
re-discussion of the issue.... Hizbullah miscalculated. Yet, the
party's courage and fine combat performance as well as the solidary
and unity of all the Lebanese forces and the internal front have all
sent Israel's arrogance back to where it came from, despite the fact
that the price on Lebanon was quite high. Therefore, no one wants
to blame Hizbullah, and then again no one wants to stand up and
gloat about the victory."
-- "Nasrallah's realism"
Columnist Samih Al-Maitah writes on the back-page of centrist,
independent, Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/29): "Hizbullah's Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah did well when he gave an objective
evaluation void of exaggeration and embellishments to one of the
aspects of the Zionist aggression against Lebanon. Nasrallah said
in a television interview the day before yesterday that if he had
known that capturing the two Israeli soldiers would lead to
Lebanon's destruction, he would not have ordered it. This is a
professional and objective confession that the capture operation was
not accompanied by a sound estimation of the volume of the Israeli
reaction, and that the price that Lebanon paid as a result was too
high.... Sheikh Nasrallah's realistic and rational words constitute
a point in his favor.... This bold talk from Sheikh Nasrallah
however does not undermine the steadfastness of the resistance in
the face of the aggression and does not nullify the fact that Israel
suffered in that aggression...."
HALE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, R/MR, I/GNEA, B/BXN,
B/BRN, NEA/PPD, NEA/IPA FOR ALTERMAN
USAID/ANE/MEA
LONDON FOR TSOU
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KMDR JO
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON LEBANON
Editorial Commentary
-- "Strategic Review"
Columnist Basem Twaisi writes on the op-ed page of centrist,
independent Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/31): "In theory, active
parties in the Middle East, from within and from without, should be
now conducting strategic reviews in light of the new facts on the
ground.... The Israeli aggressive war against Lebanon and its
open-ended and vague potential repercussions would not be the reason
for conducting such a review, but rather that crisis that has been
around for more than three years, of which the war was only one of
its aspects.... The region has not seen this current state of
political void since 1967. The possibilities of war and peace are
absolute.... The regional players are now running without a compass
and direction. The current political void means the inability of
regional and international parties and their lack of maturity of
will to conduct immediate and radical surgical operations for the
region's problems.... The most significant aspects of the political
void - with which the United States and Israel react by attempting
to make their own games on their own - could be seen in the behavior
of Arab axes and their complete closure and in Iran's behavior
towards Arab causes and its stinginess in opening channels of
dialogue with the Arab parties. This void can be seen in the
behavior of each of the Palestinian presidency and the government
vis-`-vis one another and vis-`-vis the requirements of the
Palestinian cause, as well as in the behavior of Hizbullah and the
other Lebanese powers. The most important thing about these aspects
is misjudging other parties' stands, their capabilities and their
reactions."
-- "From Nasrallah's apologetic talk"
Columnist Jamil Nimri writes on the back-page of centrist,
independent Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/31): "Hizbullah did not expect
the Israeli reaction; that was possible to conclude from previous
remarks made by Nasrallah. But for the man to say a few days ago
that he would not have ordered the operation had he known the volume
of the reaction, this is the climax and as such requires a
re-discussion of the issue.... Hizbullah miscalculated. Yet, the
party's courage and fine combat performance as well as the solidary
and unity of all the Lebanese forces and the internal front have all
sent Israel's arrogance back to where it came from, despite the fact
that the price on Lebanon was quite high. Therefore, no one wants
to blame Hizbullah, and then again no one wants to stand up and
gloat about the victory."
-- "Nasrallah's realism"
Columnist Samih Al-Maitah writes on the back-page of centrist,
independent, Arabic daily Al-Ghad (08/29): "Hizbullah's Secretary
General Hassan Nasrallah did well when he gave an objective
evaluation void of exaggeration and embellishments to one of the
aspects of the Zionist aggression against Lebanon. Nasrallah said
in a television interview the day before yesterday that if he had
known that capturing the two Israeli soldiers would lead to
Lebanon's destruction, he would not have ordered it. This is a
professional and objective confession that the capture operation was
not accompanied by a sound estimation of the volume of the Israeli
reaction, and that the price that Lebanon paid as a result was too
high.... Sheikh Nasrallah's realistic and rational words constitute
a point in his favor.... This bold talk from Sheikh Nasrallah
however does not undermine the steadfastness of the resistance in
the face of the aggression and does not nullify the fact that Israel
suffered in that aggression...."
HALE