TFLE01: JORDANIAN FM ON AL MINISTERIAL AND DRAFT

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005889 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS UN LE IS JO SUBJECT: TFLE01: JORDANIAN FM ON AL MINISTERIAL AND DRAFT UNSCR REF: A. STATE 128442 ¶B. STATE 128426 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. ( C ) Summary: Jordan welcomes the draft UNSCR, but FM Khatib warns the Arab League ministers may feel a need to endorse Siniora,s seven points without amendment. Khatib plans to work for a communique that glosses over differences between the draft UNSCR and the seven points. A UNSC vote before the AL ministerial would simplify the situation. End summary. ¶2. ( C ) Ambassador met August 6 with Foreign Minister Abdelillah al-Khatib to present ref demarches on the upcoming August 7 Arab League ministerial in Beirut and on the draft UN Security Council resolution on Lebanon. PolCouns (notetaker) accompanied. ¶3. ( C ) Khatib said there was little divergence between the U.S. and Jordanian approaches. Jordan,s goal at the ministerial would be to bolster the Siniora government and Lebanese national unity; a split in the Siniora cabinet would be &disastrous.8 Khatib expected to collaborate in this effort with the Egyptians and Saudis; &Qatar and Syria are the question.8 The Sudanese and Yemenis were another, though lesser, concern. ¶4. ( C ) He agreed the draft UNSCR was &a good text8, but expected the Arab League FMs to focus on elements that allegedly diverge from Siniora,s seven points. He understood some Arab governments saw divergence in the draft UNSCR,s lack of: -- an explicit call for Israeli withdrawal to the Blue Line -- reference to interim UN &jurisdiction8 in the Shebaa Farms area -- operative reference to Lebanese prisoners. ¶5. ( C ) Ambassador countered that the draft opened a clear path toward ending the violence and extending effective Lebanese sovereignty to the Blue Line; the draft stated at several points that the GOL should control Lebanese territory and non-UN foreign forces should depart, language that clearly contemplated Israeli withdrawal. The language on Shebaa Farms went well beyond expectations. Khatib concurred; Jordan welcomed the draft, and was making these points with other Arabs. But he was worried about the possibility for Syrian and Qatari mischief using these &weak points.8 -------------- Danger AL Might Embolden Qatar at UN -------------- ¶6. ( C ) Khatib also worried that an AL ministerial that is critical of the UNSCR draft may further embolden the Qataris to break with consensus in the Security Council. The best way to avoid this, he said, was for the GOL to tell the Arab foreign Ministers that it was moving toward the draft UNSCR language; in that case there would be little danger of the AL ministers being &more Lebanese than the Lebanese.8 Khatib wanted to avoid those sorts of problems and keep the language of any Beirut declaration very general and positive, although to include embrace of the seven points. It would further simplify the situation if the UNSCR draft came to a vote before the AL ministerial. -------------- AL Ministerial Logistics -------------- ¶7. ( C) Khatib told Ambassador that the Egyptian and Jordanian governments were each arranging ) with some difficulty - for Israeli permission to send aircraft to Beirut. All the Arab League FMs would be traveling to Beirut via Cairo or Amman on one or the other of these flights. The GOJ would transport the Iraqi FM and most of the Gulf ministers; the others would fly to Beirut with the Egyptian FM. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ Hale