A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000568 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG SY IR IZ IS JO SUBJECT: A/S SILVERBERG'S MEETING WITH KING ABDULLAH REF: 05 AMMAN 8823 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) A/S Kristen Silverberg met with King Abdullah on January 18. Jordanian participants included Deputy Prime Minister Ziad Fariz, Foreign Minister Abdelelah al-Khatib, Royal Court advisor Abdullah Woreikat, and Rania Atallah, the King's communications director. The A/S was joined in the meeting by the Ambassador. Discussions focused on Iraq, Syria, Iran, the peace process, and Jordanian domestic issues. IRAQ: Anbar Proposal -------------- ¶2. (S) The King outlined a three-part proposal on Iraq, which he plans to present to the President during his upcoming visit to Washington in early February. The King said that his proposal will focus on building bridges between Sunni and Shia by focusing on Arab identity, developing political unity among moderates, and then focusing Iraq,s factions on the Iranian threat. The proposal would start in Anbar, where Jordan thought it had the greatest potential leverage. As political unity developed, the plan would involve security forces liberating the countryside from the sway of insurgents, village-by-village. Once stability and security were improving, the last piece of the plan would entail rapid reconstruction work, "a mini-Marshall plan." SYRIA -------------- ¶3. (C) King Abdullah said Bashar and his clique remained firmly in control and it was doubtful they were willing to open up or change the nature of their rule. The King said there was regional anxiety about succession should Bashar depart the scene, and that Saudi reluctance to pressure the Syrians was motivated by fear of the consequences of regime change. If international pressure continues, there was a chance of an Alawite "quiet coup" that would push Bashar aside but retain Alawite rule. Jordan continued to support strongly implementation of UNSCRs, and a transparent UN investigation to determine who was responsible for the assassination of Hariri. The King also commented that close coordination between France and the U.S. was critical to success. The King said that he had seen many initiatives aimed at persuading the Syrians to change, but that these initiatives had never gotten off the ground. He "didn't see any light at the end of the tunnel," i.e. he had no expectations the Syrians would provide meaningful cooperation to the UN investigation. He described the Syria/Iran/Hizballah relationship as a "complicated web," and said it was important to get Lebanon back on its feet and to develop a strategy to contain Hizballah. When asked about Iranian-Syrian relations, the King pointed to the extensive freedom that the Iranians had gained in Syria; he believed the Syrian regime did not know all that the Iranians were up to in Syria. IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM -------------- ¶4. (C) The King said it was clear that Iran was going ahead with its nuclear program and that Iran was the region,s long-term strategic problem. The King commented that the contest for regional influence was playing itself out inside Iraq. Former Iranian President Khatami was a pleasant mask on a bad regime; now with Ahmadinejad, we were seeing the real face. PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶5. (C) The King described the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as in a "wait and see mode." He expressed strong support for the roadmap as the only viable vehicle we had to work with. Abu Mazen is sincere, but is being undermined from within Fatah. He emphasized the importance of an economic assistance package to counter Hamas. The King appreciated Quartet Special Envoy Wolfenson,s ideas. JORDAN - DOMESTIC ISSUES -------------- ¶6. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Fariz discussed the National Agenda (reftel) and its impact on efforts to foster a stronger democratic culture in Jordan. According to Fariz, the government was planning three elections in the 2006-7 timeframe, first to choose reformed municipal councils, then assemblies for the three or four new regional administrations being planned, and finally for a new national parliament. The government was continuing consultations with representatives of civil society over the specifics of these reforms. At the same time, the Bakhit cabinet planned to press ahead with its priorities of reducing the budget deficit, improving the tax system, and eliminating subsidies. He reviewed the problems for Jordan,s government budget and for the wider economy posed by increased oil costs, the overall decline in foreign aid, and the challenges of poverty and unemployment. Jordan would maintain the momentum of economic reform, enhance investment and trade, and accelerate privatization of the telecoms, phosphate, and energy sectors, but additional U.S. assistance was needed in particular to reduce its balance of payments deficit. ¶7. (U) A/S Silverberg has cleared on this cable. Hale