A/S WELCH'S MEETING WITH KING'S ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005250

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV JO
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S MEETING WITH KING'S ADVISOR

REF: AMMAN 5192

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID HALE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams met with Bassem Awadallah,
director of the King's office, in Amman July 12. Awadallah's
political director Jafar Hassan, Ambassador, and polcouns
(notetaker) joined. Discussions focused on that day's
Hizballah capture of two Israeli soldiers, the Gaza crisis,
and Iran.

Israel and Hizballah


2. (C) Welch reviewed U.S. action to address the developments
that day on the Israel-Lebanon border. Awadallah agreed that
the Israelis could not be expected to "sit there" but urged
the U.S. to continue pressing Israel to focus its military
response on Hizballah itself. Welch stressed that Arab
friends needed to join the U.S. in pressing the Lebanese
government to issue a good statement. They also needed to
warn the Syrians that their posture ) exemplified by FM
Shara's statement praising the Hizballah action ) was very
dangerous. The Arab League emergency meeting expected July
15 needed to avoid the kind of condemnation of Israel that
the League usually produced in the name of "balance."
Awadallah agreed; "this is an Arab matter" and Jordan would
join others in pushing for a flat condemnation of militias
initiating conflicts that "none of the Arab states want."


3. (C) Beyond the immediate crisis, Welch said, the U.S. and
its Arab partners should think about where they want to be
when it is contained, and have a common understanding on how
to deal responsibly with the Palestinian question and the
threat of Iran. We agreed on the need to empower Abu Mazen,
and agreed Iran was now a hegemonic threat. How to address
that threat's manifestation in Damascus should be at the top
of the agenda.


4. (C) Awadallah agreed the moderate Arabs needed to send a
unified message to Damascus aimed at defusing the latest
crisis. Egypt would not be patient with Bashar. Awadallah
urged the U.S. for its part to call firmly for Israeli
restraint. Welch said the USG was doing this already, but
needed to know what Jordan's message to Damascus was.
Awadallah reviewed recent GOJ-SARG conversations, and
insisted Jordan had used them all to press Damascus to move
away from Iran. In Awadallah's assessment, Iran wanted to
deny Arabs any meaningful role. Iran was driving the Arabs
into a situation that resembled the eve of the 1967 war.

Israel and Hamas


5. (C) Awadallah reported that Abu Mazen complained to King
Abdullah in Amman July 11 that the Israelis were not hurting
Hamas in Gaza, only ordinary Palestinians. Khaled Mishaal
provoked the crisis in Gaza on the advice of Hizballah,
Awadallah claimed. Mishaal wants to become "the destination"
for anyone who wanted to defuse tension in the region, and
Iran stood behind him. The GOJ saw Hizballah's capture of
the two Israeli soldiers that day as Iranian inspired )
"another card in Iran's pocket before it sits down with the
U.S." He reviewed King Abdullah's efforts to forge an
anti-Iran Arab coalition (reftel). Some Arabs were
responsive; others, like Qatar, were for appeasement; they
were playing the role of "Neville Chamberlain." Saudi Arabia
was reluctant to take a leading role, and had a divided
government.


6. (C) Welch said the USG and its partners should use the
present crisis to reach a new consensus for dealing with the
problems of the region. There was already agreement that we
needed a weaker Hamas and Hizballah, and a strengthened Abu
Mazen. We should look to upcoming meeting opportunities )
such as UNGA, or the GCC Summit ) to act jointly.

Iran


7. (C) The U.S. and its Arab partners also needed an agreed
action list for dealing with Iran, Welch said. Awadallah
called this "music to Jordan's ears." It was necessary, the
Jordanian said, to start the "Abu Mazen track" so that the
Arabs can join the U.S. in confronting Iran. This will help
with public opinion, an emerging problem for U.S. friends.
"But only the U.S. President" could move the Israelis and
Palestinians to re-engage. The U.S. also needed to address
Arab concerns that a resolution between Iran and the powers
on the nuclear issue would leave the GCC states exposed as
Iran tries to strike a deal; Welch and Abrams replied by
briefing Awadallah on the current state of play on the Iran
nuclear issue.


Hale