NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 AMMAN 000483

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB/SHARON GARNER AND NEA/ELA
DOD FOR OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL JO CWC BWC CBW
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
CHALLENGE INSPECTION AGREEMENT - JORDAN

REF: 05 AMMAN 9631

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C-Rel Jordan) An interagency team led by Dr. David
Cooper, Director for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, met December 13 in Amman with
Jordanian officials to work toward conclusion of a U.S. -
Jordan Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Host Country
Agreement (HCA). With inclusion of additional text that
reinforces the reciprocal nature of the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU),both sides were able to reach ad ref
agreement, with the understanding that the HCA would be
finalized as soon as feasible.
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NEGOTIATIONS
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2. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanian side opened the discussions
by expressing concern that the MOU would change or interfere
with meeting Jordan's CWC obligations during a challenge
inspection event. Jordan also indicated concern that the
U.S. may have a hidden agenda regarding its efforts to
conclude an agreement as soon as possible. However, after
the U.S. delegation provided an in-depth explanation of the
USG's strategic motivations for seeking an agreement, the GOJ
delegation asked for a joint "line-by-line" review of the
text.


3. (C-Rel Jordan) During the line-by-line review, the
Jordanian side inquired about challenge inspections at
diplomatic sites and whether applicable provisions under the
Vienna Convention would continue to apply. The U.S.
delegation noted that the MOU was not intended to conflict
with any treaty, including the Vienna Convention.

4. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanian delegation expressed its
concern that the MOU arrangements appeared not to apply to
both parties equally, suggesting that the main beneficiary of
the arrangement would be the United States and not
necessarily Jordan. Therefore, Jordan requested additional
language be formulated to depict the reciprocal nature of the
agreement more effectively. The U.S. delegation drafted text
that was added to Part II, paragraph 1 that repeats the
existing sentence, but reversing the Participants, names so
as to reinforce the reciprocal nature of the arrangement.

5. (C-Rel Jordan) Jordan's delegation requested confirmation
of its understanding that Part II, paragraph 5 meant that the
terms of the MOU should be consistent with the Convention.
The U.S. side confirmed that understanding.

6. (C-Rel Jordan) Jordan,s delegation asked the U.S.
delegation to confirm its understanding that the MOU would be
"politically binding" but not "legally binding." The U.S.
delegation confirmed that understanding.

7. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanians questioned whether two-hour
notification of a challenge inspection under Part IV,
paragraph 1(c) was too short. The U.S. delegation responded
that the short notification was necessary to ensure that CWC
timelines would be met.

8. (C-Rel Jordan) In Part IV, paragraph 3(b),the Jordanian
delegation questioned the role of the liaison officer. The
U.S. delegation noted that if Jordan is the inspected State
Party and, during the course of inspection a U.S. asset is
included, U.S. liaison officers would act as advisors
concerning access to the asset.

9. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanian side asked for clarification
of Part IV, paragraph 6(a),which addresses escort
responsibilities. The U.S. delegation explained that the CWC
makes both parties responsible during a challenge inspection
and that Jordan would provide escort to a U.S. facility. The
U.S. delegation explained that the MOU provisions did not
impose additional financial burdens on Jordan nor interfere
with Jordan's sovereignty.

10. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanian delegation asked for
clarification of Part IV, paragraph 4(b),which provides for
consultations on the list of inspectors and inspection
assistants. The U.S. delegation referred to the CWC, which
provides for each State Party,s acceptance or non-acceptance
of inspectors and inspector assistants whom the Technical
Secretariat designates for challenge inspections. The CWC

SIPDIS
restricts the ability of inspectors and inspector assistants
whom a State Party has not accepted to participate in
verification activities at any place under the jurisdiction
or control of such State Party. The delegation explained
that it was possible for Jordan and the U.S. to have two
different accepted inspector lists. The Jordanians
questioned whether this conflicted with the CWC,s
confidentiality provisions. The U.S. delegation responded

SIPDIS
that it did not believe that this situation would create a
problem as inspector names are public. Further, the MOU does
not supercede CWC provisions.

11. (C-Rel Jordan) Jordan,s delegation requested a
clarification of Part VII on public affairs, noting its
vagueness. The U.S. delegation explained that since public
affairs is a sensitive issue, the Participants should consult
to prevent them from contradicting each other through the
press.

12. (C-Rel Jordan) The Jordanian delegation requested
clarification of Part VIII on the protection of information.
The U.S. delegation explained that the paragraph calls for
consultations in a situation where inspectors request
classified Jordanian documents that might reveal sensitive
U.S. information.

13. (C-Rel Jordan) Jordan,s delegation expressed its
satisfaction with all the clarifications provided, and with
the additional text drafted for Part II, paragraph 1 of the
agreement. The draft was agreed in substance pending review
by respective authorities of each government.
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TEXT AGREED TO AD REF WITH REVISIONS
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14. (C-Rel Jordan) The following is the agreed (ad ref)
version of the MOU:

(begin text of MOU)

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of Jordan
concerning the conduct of challenge inspections pursuant to
the Convention on the Prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on
their destruction.

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Jordan, bearing in mind the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature on 13 January 1993 (hereinafter referred to As the
Convention),including in particular Article IX of the
Convention and its Parts II and X of the Annex on
Implementation and Verification (hereinafter referred to as
The Verification Annex); desiring to develop procedures to
apply in cases in which a challenge inspection may affect the
interests of both the United States of America and Jordan;
have reached the following Understanding, which is intended
to guide their conduct in such a challenge inspection:

Part I: Definitions.


1. The terms used in this Memorandum of Understanding
(hereinafter referred to as the memorandum) have the same
meanings as in the Convention.


2. In addition to the terms defined in the Convention, for
Purposes of this memorandum:

a. "Participant(s)" refers to the Government of Jordan
(hereinafter referred to as Jordan) and the Government of the
United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the
United States) or collectively to both. unless the context
indicates otherwise, the term, "other Participant" refers to
the Participant that is not the inspected State Party.

b. "Government sovereign vessels or aircraft" refers to
public vessels (including warships, as defined under
customary international law as reflected in Article 29 of The
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Or
other ships owned or operated by a State and used only for
Government noncommercial service) or State aircraft (as
referred to in the Convention on International Civil Aviation
of 1944).

c. "Asset(s)" refers to any facility, equipment, area,
building, location or government sovereign vessel or aircraft
owned, operated, occupied by or under the control of the
government of a Participant to this memorandum. This includes
any facilities or areas utilized by the United States
Government by agreement with Jordan;

d. "Inspectable area" refers to the area within the
perimeter (requested, alternative or final) and includes the
50 meter band measured outward from that perimeter.

Part II: Principles and Scope


1. The principles and procedures in this memorandum apply to
the conduct of any challenge inspection conducted in the
territory of Jordan, or in any other place under its
jurisdiction or control (hereinafter referred to as the
territory of Jordan),in which the assets of the United
States may be within or in the vicinity of the inspectable
area. The principles and procedures in this memorandum apply
to the conduct of any challenge inspection conducted in the
territory of the United States, or in any other place under
its jurisdiction or control (hereinafter referred to as the
territory of the United States),in which the assets of
Jordan may be within or in the vicinity of the inspectable
area.


2. Based on the principle of territorial sovereignty, which
is a basic principle reflected in the Convention and its
integral parts, Jordan should exercise the rights and fulfill
the obligations in the Convention as the designated inspected
State Party or as the host State, as appropriate. For
inspections within the scope of this memorandum, the United
States, with regard to assets of the United States, should
exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of an
inspected State Party in accordance with the Provisions of
the Convention for those assets.

3. The Participants consider the effective implementation of
challenge inspections a central element of the Verification
regime under the Convention. Consequently, the Participants
should apply the principles and procedures
herein in keeping with this objective.


4. The Participants intend to cooperate closely and
trustfully to ensure compliance with the relevant Provisions
of the Convention.


5. Nothing in this memorandum should be interpreted as
altering in any way any agreements in force between the
Participants. This memorandum should be interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with the Convention and any
agreements entered into between either Participant and the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
In the event there is a conflict between the Provisions of
the Convention or any agreement between either Participant
and the OPCW and this memorandum, the Provisions of the
Convention or such agreement with the OPCW should take
precedence.


6. Notwithstanding any language used herein, this memorandum
does not create any rights or obligations for the
Participants under international law.

Part III: procedures for challenge inspections involving
assets of Jordan on the territory of the United States.

In the case of a challenge inspection in the territory of the
United States in which the assets of Jordan may be within or
in the vicinity of the inspectable area, the above mentioned
principles and the following procedures are expected to apply
mutatis mutandis.

Part IV: Pre-inspection activities.


1. Notification between Participants. Re. Section D (32),
Part II, and Section B (4, 6 & 11),Part X of the
Verification Annex.

a. If either of the Participants learns that
deliberations are ongoing in the OPCW for a challenge
inspection that would fall under the scope of this
memorandum, it should so notify the other Participant.

b. Upon receipt of a notification by the OPCW for the
conduct of a challenge inspection on its territory, if on the
basis of available information, the possibility cannot be
ruled out by Jordan that an asset of the United States may be
affected, Jordan should inform the United States within two
hours of receipt of the notification, by contacting the
United States nuclear risk reduction center (and the United
States central command joint operations Center). The United
States should promptly acknowledge receipt of the
notification from Jordan.

c. In the event that the United States is notified by
the OPCW that it is designated as the inspected State Party
for a challenge inspection within the territory of Jordan,
the United States should inform Jordan within two hours of
receipt of the notification, by contacting (name of Jordan
Organization). Jordan should promptly acknowledge receipt of
the notification from the United States.

d. In either case, at a minimum, such notification
between Participants should include the information
enumerated in section d(32(b)-(f)),Part II and Section B(4
and 7),Part X of the Verification Annex.

e. Any information described in subparagraph d above not
provided when the notification by the OPCW of the challenge
inspection is initially received should be provided to the
other Participant as such information is received. Any
notification or additional information provided by the OPCW
to a Participant before the scheduled arrival of the
inspection team at the point of entry should be provided to
the other Participant no later than one hour after receipt.


2. The inspected State Party. Re. Part I (12) of the
Verification annex.

a. The Participants retain their full sovereign rights
with regard to their Government sovereign vessels and
aircraft. When Government sovereign vessels and aircraft are
the sole object of an inspection, the Participant Owning or
operating such assets should be the inspected State Party. If
the Participant not owning these assets is designated the
inspected State Party, the Participants should advise the
OPCW that the Government vessel or aircraft is solely under
the jurisdiction and control of the other Participant and
that, therefore, the other Participant is properly the
inspected State Party.

b. Except for inspections solely of Government sovereign
vessels or aircraft, either Participant may properly be the
inspected State Party. However, if the assets within the
perimeter are under the control of a single Participant, that
Participant should be the inspected State Party.

c. If both Participants agree that the other Participant
should be the inspected State Party, the Participants should
advise the OPCW that the other Participant should be
designated the inspected State Party. if the inspection team
arrives at the point of entry and the inspected State Party
is not as the Participants advised, the inspected State Party
designated by the requesting State Party should take the lead
on pre-inspection activities, taking into account the
concerns of the other Participant.

d. If assets of the United States are affected by the
inspection and Jordan is the inspected State Party, both
Participants should advise the inspection team that the
assets of both Participants are within the inspectable area
and that the inspection affects the assets of both States
Parties. They further should advise the inspection team that
each should be responsible for inspection activities of their
respective assets.


3. Government representation of the Participants.

a. During any challenge inspection on Jordanian territory
for which the United States is the inspected State Party,
Jordan may, at its discretion, observe the conduct of the
inspection and participate in activities that affect its
assets.

b. If Jordan is the inspected State Party and, on the
basis of the available information, the possibility cannot be
ruled out that the inspection could also affect assets of the
United States, the United States may send liaison officers to
observe and participate in pre-inspection activities,
including the equipment inspection and perimeter
negotiations, where possible, and to assist in the
preparation and conduct of inspection activities affecting
its assets.

c. If the United States intends to send liaison officers,
the United States should inform Jordan and provide a
tentative list of these personnel within four hours of
receipt of the Jordanian notification to the
United States of a challenge inspection on Jordanian
territory.

d. Jordan should expedite the entry of the liaison
officers, and their equipment and materiel (possibly
including a mobile laboratory),into its territory,
including, but not limited to, the provision of visas,
aircraft diplomatic clearance, and assistance with customs,
so that, where possible, the liaison officers of the United
States may arrive at the point of entry and the inspection
site before examination of inspection equipment and perimeter
negotiations with the inspection team are initiated.

e. If an asset of the other Participant is in the
inspectable area, the inspected State Party should provide
the liaison officer of the other Participant with a copy of
the inspection mandate, as provided by the inspection team,
at the time the mandate is received. If no such
representative is present, the mandate should be provided
upon arrival of any representative of the other Participant.

f. Upon conclusion of the pre-inspection briefing, any
liaison officer of the other Participant may be free to stay
with the escort team.


4. Inspectors and inspection assistants. Re. Section A, Parts
II and X of the Verification annex.

a. If assets of the United States may be completely or
partially included in the inspectable area, the Participants
should, if prior to official notification of the inspection,
request that the OPCW inspection team consist only of
inspectors and inspection assistants approved by both
Participants.

b. Upon receipt of the list of inspectors and
inspection assistants, the Participants should inform each
other if any individuals on the list raise concerns. If an
inspector or inspection assistant included on the list raises
concerns, the Participants should consult on the degree of
access to be provided to that individual.


5. Requesting State Party observer. Re. Article IX (12) of
the Convention

a. The Participants should consult regarding whether to
accept the observer designated by the requesting State Party,
whenever assets from both the Participants are within the
inspectable area.

b. For assets belonging only to one Participant, that
Participant may limit an observer's access to those assets,
irrespective of the access provided by the other Participant
to the other Participant's assets.


6. Escorts and logistics. Re. Part I (9 and 25) and
Section C (26),Part II of the Verification Annex.

a. The responsibility of Jordan regarding the escorting
of inspection teams on Jordanian territory should begin with
the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and
should end with the departure of the inspection team from the
point of departure. In the case of inspections of assets of
the United States, the United States should have the escort
responsibility for the duration of the inspection at assets
of the United States including, inter alia, lodging, food,
transportation, communication means, working space, emergency
medical care, security, and emergency assistance.

b. Unless otherwise agreed, Jordan is expected to be
responsible for escorting and supporting the inspection team
and the observer outside the assets of the United States,
including, inter alia, provision of meals, lodging, working
space, transportation, communication means and, if necessary,
medical and other emergency care from arrival at the point of
entry until departure.


7. Inspection team equipment. Re. Section c (29),part ii of
the Verification annex.

a. The inspected State Party should inspect the
inspection equipment in the possession of the inspection team
to ascertain whether it meets the description of equipment
authenticated in any attached documents or devices provided
by the Technical secretariat in accordance with paragraphs
27-29 of Part II of the Verification Annex and whether it is
safe to use in the inspectable area, consistent with
paragraphs 40 and 43 of Part II of the Verification Annex.
Unless otherwise mutually determined, the inspected State
Party should exclude equipment not identified by those
documents or devices, including equipment that has been
altered. Such equipment should be stored at the point of
entry.

b. If an asset of the other Participant is, or may be,
included within the inspectable area, the representatives of
the other Participant may observe and participate in the
inspection of equipment. Consistent with the Convention, the
other Participant may prohibit or limit the use of such
equipment affecting its assets; such restrictions may be
different from limitations imposed by the inspected State
Party.


8. Perimeter negotiations. Re. Section B (13-21),Part X of
the Verification Annex.

a. The Participants should cooperate closely in order to
ensure the inspected State Party can fulfill its obligations
in the process of designating the alternative and the final
perimeters of the assets to be inspected. The inspected State
Party should take the lead in all contacts with the
inspection team regarding the designation of the perimeter.
b. If an asset of the other Participant is within the
inspectable area, including the 50 meter band, the inspected
State Party should in all cases consult the other Participant
regarding the requested and final perimeter. In addition, the
inspected State Party should obtain the concurrence of the
other Participant before:

(1) Proposing an alternate perimeter that would include
An asset of the other Participant within the inspectable area
that would not have been so included under the requested
perimeter, or

(2) accepting a final perimeter that would place an asset
of the other Participant within the 50 meter band.

c. If, before commencing perimeter negotiations with the
inspection team, it cannot be determined whether an asset of
the other Participant is included within the inspectable
area, the other Participant may, at its discretion and
through its liaison officers, observe perimeter negotiations
until a determination can be made as to whether an asset of
the other Participant is so included.

d. Whenever an asset of the other Participant is within
the inspectable area, the other Participant may, at its
discretion, take part in all negotiations with the inspection
team concerning the alternative and final perimeters, as it
affects that asset. The Participants should consult on the
implications of any proposals that might be made on an
alternative perimeter, and before any decision is made on the
final perimeter.

e. If the inspected State Party is not changed as the
Participants advised in accordance with Part IV(2)(c) of this
memorandum, the inspected State Party should recognize the
primacy of the other Participant in perimeter negotiations
and access to the other Participant's assets.

f. The liaison officers should support the escort team
in designating the final perimeter of the assets to be
inspected as well as in preparing and conducting the pre-
inspection briefing.

Part V: Conduct of perimeter and inspection activities.


1. General. Re. Section b (20 and 35-37) and Section C of
Part X of the Verification Annex.

a. The representatives of the inspected State Party
should not refer to or provide information on assets
belonging to the other Participant outside the inspectable
area without the consent of the other Participant. As
necessary, the Participants should consult during the
inspection regarding methods for minimizing the impact of the
inspection on activities or assets not included in the
inspectable area.

b. Transfer of samples for analysis outside of the
inspectable area. Re. Section E (55 and 57),Part II of the
Verification Annex. On the territory of Jordan,
transportation or mailing of samples for analysis at
laboratories should be consistent with the Convention and
subject to the relevant Jordanian legal provisions regarding
the transportation or mailing of hazardous substances. In the
event the United States is the inspected State Party, the
United States intends to advise the Technical Secretariat
about our preference for on-site analysis as well as
considerations in selecting appropriate OPCW- designated
laboratories, should we agree to that course of action for
assets under our control.

c. Extension of the period of inspection. Re. Section E
(59),Part II, and Section C (57),Part X of the Verification
Annex. A request for the extension of the period of
inspection should be granted or rejected by mutual agreement
between the Participants, if the assets of the other
Participant are affected by the inspection.


2. Assets belonging only to one Participant.

a. Each Participant should control all inspection
activities at its assets. All access to any Government
sovereign vessels or aircraft should be controlled by the
Participant owning that asset. The inspected State Party,
consistent with subparagraph (b) below, may observe the
conduct of an inspection with respect to an asset of the
other Participant.

b. Whenever an asset of the other Participant is
included, fully or partially, within the inspectable area,
the inspected State Party should permit the other Participant
to implement the Provisions specified in Section c of Part X
of the Verification Annex with respect to the other
Participant's assets in the perimeter and should permit the
other Participant to control access to its assets in the 50
meter band extending from the perimeter. The other
Participant may implement these provisions independently of
the manner in which the inspected State Party implements
these provisions under the Convention.

c. The inspected State Party should ensure that the other
participant has up to 108 hours from the inspection team's
arrival at the point of entry before the other Participant
must provide the inspection team access to its assets inside
the perimeter.

d. Throughout the inspection, the other Participant
should make every reasonable effort to ensure that the
inspected State Party can demonstrate its compliance with
Article IX of the Convention and Part X of the Verification
Annex.

e. Whenever an asset of the other Participant is in the
inspectable area, the inspected State Party should take into
account any recommendations of the other Participant
concerning ways to reduce or eliminate the potential impact
of inspection activities on assets of the other Participant.

f. At boundaries of facilities utilized by the other
Participant, or in the course of inspection activities inside
facilities utilized by the other Participant, the other
Participant has the right to manage photography and
video-taping consistent with paragraph 48 of Part II and
paragraphs 24, 26, and 47 of Part X of the Verification Annex.


3. Assets jointly owned, operated, occupied by or under the
control of both Participants.

a. The Participants should jointly decide on all
inspection activities with respect to joint assets before
determining the extent and nature of the inspection team's
access to, or before providing information about, the asset.

b. The inspected State Party should take the lead in all
contacts with the inspection team with regard to access or
information to be given to the inspection team relating to
the asset.

Part VI: Post inspection activities.


1. Inspection reports. Re. Section d (59),Part X of the
Verification Annex. In the case of any challenge inspection
in which any part of an asset of the other Participant is
within the inspectable area, the inspected State Party should
provide the other Participant with a copy of the preliminary
inspection report within 24 hours of receipt and a copy of
the draft final inspection report within 48 hours of receipt
from the Technical secretariat. The other Participant may
identify any information and data in the draft final
inspection report not related to chemical weapons that are,
in its view, of a sensitive character. The inspected State
Party should propose to the Technical Secretariat those
changes requested by the other Participant to protect this
information. The other Participant should submit timely
comments and proposed changes to the draft final inspection
report. Such comments should be submitted as soon as
possible, but in no case later than six days after receipt of
the report from the inspected State Party. The Participants
should consult on the incorporation of such comments by the
inspected State Party.


2. Reimbursement of costs. Re. Section C (25, 26),Part II,
and Section C (56),Part X of the Verification Annex.

a. The Participants should consult on any inspection
costs.
b. Following consultations and reconciliation, the other
Participant should submit its claims for remuneration to the
inspected State Party for inclusion in the inspected State
Party's submission to the OPCW.
c. The inspected State Party should seek reimbursement of
any costs recoverable from the OPCW in relation to the
inspection.


3. Following the completion of an inspection, the
Participants should consult to consider the need for any
changes to the procedures under this memorandum.

Part VII: Public affairs.

The Participants should consult to consider joint or
independent statements to the press, the requesting State
Party, the Executive Council, the Conference of the States
Parties, the Technical Secretariat, or other States Parties
to the Convention. The Participants should also discuss
relations with the media.

Part VIII: Protection of information.

No information provided by one Participant to the other
Participant, pursuant to this memorandum should be made
available publicly without the consent of the Participant
providing the information.

Part IX: Implementation coordination.

The Participants should designate an official channel to
address and resolve any questions or disputes that may arise
concerning implementation of this memorandum.

Part X: Conclusion.


1. The principles and procedures in this memorandum may be
modified by written agreement of the Participants.


2. This memorandum is effective upon signature.


3. This memorandum may be terminated by either Participant
upon 90 days written notice to the other Participant.

Signed at this day of 2006, in the English
and Arabic languages.

For the Government of the For the Government of
United States of America Jordan

(end text of MOU)


15. (U) The Jordanian delegation included:

a. Prof. Hasan Al-Salah, Governor for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons Department, Ministry of the Interior.
b. Mr. Jeorge Nozha, Lawyer Consultant, Ministry of the
Interior.
c. Akram S. Harahsheh, Foreign Ministry.
d. Saker Malkawi, Foreign Ministry.
e. Col Ahmad Mhedat, Army Force.
f. Left Col. Han Mahameed, Civil Defence.
g. Left. Col. Odah Khalayla, Public Security.
h. Ms. Ida Alhysen, Ministry of Justice.


16. (U) U.S. delegation officials included:

a. Dr. David Cooper, Director, Nonproliferation
Policy, International Security Policy, OASD.
b. COL Rick Smart, Special Assistant and Senior Policy
Analyst, Nonproliferation Policy for Chem/Bio Weapons.
c. Dr. Deborah Ozga, J5 (WTO),Joint Staff.
d. Ms. Christine Choi, Department of Defense Office of
General Counsel, International Affairs.
e. Mr. Michael D. Shaw, Combating WMD Division, U.S.
Central Command
f. Mr. Mark Petzolt, poloff, U.S. Embassy Amman
Hale