A/S WELCH MEETING WITH JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

S E C R E T AMMAN 004175

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG JO IS IR
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH MEETING WITH JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

REF: AMMAN 3954

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: NEA A/S David Welch met June 5 with
Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) chief
General Muhammad Dhahabi in Amman. Their discussions focused
on Iranian intentions and activities in the region, Hamas,
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. End Summary.

Iran and Hamas
--------------


2. (C) Dhahabi told A/S Welch that the head of Iranian
external intelligence had recently come to see him after
visiting Bashar al-Asad in Damascus. According to Dhahabi,
the Iranian clearly gave the impression that Tehran considers
itself to be the "guardian" of Syria (including President
al-Asad),of the Shia community in Iraq and elsewhere in the
region, of Hizballah, and of Khaled Mishaal. The Iranian
argued that Jordan had never publicized past Hamas attempts
to smuggle weapons through Jordan, and asked why the GOJ had
now decided to publicly air its grievances against Hamas
activities in the country. Dhahabi said that he had given
his Iranian counterpart "a very hard time" during a meeting
that went over six hours, and had emphasized to him that
Hamas had to play by "new rules" given that it had formed a
government and was no longer "just a movement." Past
Jordanian silence on attempts by Hamas to stockpile weapons
in Jordan, send Jordanians to Syria "for training," and
infiltrate the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood would now be
dealt with forcefully by the GOJ and GID.


3. (C) Dhahabi said that he had firmly rejected an Iranian
offer to arrange a trilateral meeting between Jordan, Iran
and Hamas to try and resolve Jordan's complaints against
Hamas. He stated that he had told the Iranian intelligence
chief to "forget" such talks, or the sending of a Hamas
delegation to Amman, until Hamas had revealed the location of
all the weapons it had stored in Jordan. Dhahabi said he
also asked why Tehran was so intent on protecting Khaled
Mishaal, and warned that Mishaal was just "using" Iran and
could not be trusted. Dhahabi told A/S Welch that Sudanese
President Omar Bashir had sent his Foreign Minister, Mustafa
Ismail, to talk to him and King Abdullah on behalf of Hamas,
and that the Russian Ambassador in Amman had also asked him
to "resolve" Jordan's issues with Hamas.


4. (C) Rather than being a unified body, Dhahabi said that
Hamas had five different, and sometimes competing, parts:
"external" Hamas (closely linked to Iran),the Hamas-led PA
government, Hamas prisoners in Israeli jails, a West Bank
Hamas, and a Gaza Hamas. Hamas had recently asked the GID to
pressure Jordanian banks in the West Bank to provide loans to
Palestinian Authority (PA) employees. Dhahabi said that he
had refused the request on the grounds that it was a "private
business matter," and had then advised the banks not to give
such loans as doing so could "create problems."

Iranian Nuclear Program
--------------


5. (C) A/S Welch informed Dhahabi on the package of measures
agreed upon by the P-5 plus Germany to address the Iranian
nuclear issue. He said that the U.S. wanted to keep the
package private so that Javier Solana could discuss it in
Tehran; a more thorough briefing on the details could be
provided later. A/S Welch stressed that while the U.S. hoped
for a positive Iranian response, it was prepared to pursue
meaningful sanctions if necessary. The U.S. and its allies
were not interested in Iran's posturing about its regional
influence, but would focus in talks solely on Iran's nuclear
program.


6. (S/NF) Dhahabi replied that he hoped Solana would deliver
a very firm and tough message in Tehran. He continued that
Iran wanted to join the committee of six regional
intelligence services on Iraq, most likely to seek the
committee's "acknowledgment" of Iran's zone of influence so
as to legitimize its control of southern Iraq. Dhahabi
assured A/S Welch that Jordan thought this was "a very bad
idea," and that Turkey shared this view. Dhahabi also
rejected Syrian participation in the committee, as this would
legitimize the SARG's support of terrorist organizations.
Recent accusations by Syria that it was the victim of takfiri
extremists armed with U.S. weapons by a neighboring country
were "a joke."

Limiting Iranian Power
--------------


7. (C) Countering Iran's efforts to expand its power in the
region required two things, according to Dhahabi. First,
Iran must not be allowed to complete its nuclear weapons
program. Jordan, however, could offer little help in
accomplishing this. Second, the U.S. and its friends in the
region must try and "undo" Iran's developing alliance with
Syria and Hamas. Bashar al-Asad was under the mistaken
impression that only Iran could "protect" him from negative
UN action related to the UNIIIC investigation of the Hariri
assassination. Arab and European countries needed to dispel
him of this notion, and make him understand that Iran also
could not protect the Syrian regime from terrorism, the
Muslim Brotherhood, Israel and other potential threats to its
survival, he continued. In Iraq, the U.S. and others could
work against Iran by pushing for a "true" unity government
that would reject Iranian interference. The Badr Brigade,
Dhahabi added, "must be disbanded."

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
--------------


8. (C) Dhahabi urged the U.S. to "strengthen" Abu Mazen, and
said that the Palestinian President could be a &genuine
partner.8 Dhahabi had also encouraged the Israelis to
empower Abu Mazen ) "though we disagree how" ) and asked
for their help in uniting Fatah while undermining Hamas so
that Hamas would lose the next parliamentary elections.
Israel must recognize that there are "bigger issues" in the
region than its plan to unilaterally determine its borders,
he said. While Israel might succeed in gaining "short term
benefits" from its convergence plan, it risked "replacing Abu
Mazen with Khamenei."


9. (C) Hamas was losing popular support, Dhahabi claimed,
and was very worried that the proposed referendum on the
prisoners' document would pass if put before the Palestinian
people. Hamas was accordingly considering a boycott of the
referendum in order to "kill it." Dhahabi counseled that
international observers should be sent to monitor the
referendum to give it added credence. Asked what would be
the result if the referendum passed, Dhahabi replied that
Hamas would be "forced" to recognize and communicate with
Israel. If Hamas leaders do not abide by the demonstrated
will of the people, "Abu Mazen will move against them."
Dhahabi speculated that Israel would be "comfortable" with
former Palestinian finance minister Salam Fayad as the new
Prime Minister.


10. (C) Dhahabi said that Jordan had not provided weapons to
security forces controlled by Abu Mazen "because he hasn't
asked yet." Israel, he continued, expected Abu Mazen to do
"too much" without the necessary manpower and equipment.
Dhahabi warned that Hamas and other Islamic extremists were
trying to "use democracy to destroy the system from within."
If Hamas succeeds in increasing its influence in the
Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and new parliamentary elections
are held, he added, Hamas would have strong support in the
Jordanian parliament.


11. (C) Also participating in the meeting were Ambassador,
SIMO chief, and poloff (notetaker).

12. (U) A/S Welch has cleared on this cable.

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