HAMAS CONSPIRACIES - MANY AREN'T BUYING IT

S E C R E T AMMAN 003507 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER KISL KPAL JO SUBJECT: HAMAS CONSPIRACIES - MANY AREN'T BUYING IT REF: A. AMMAN 3345 ¶B. AMMAN 3325 ¶C. AMMAN 2906 Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Many Jordanians are unconvinced by the GOJ's public charges that Hamas cached weapons and sent terrorists to Jordan with the goal of targeting the GOJ. Local media, however, which initially expressed some skepticism toward the GOJ's version, is now largely backing the government. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Many of post's contacts report that most Jordanians remain unconvinced by the GOJ's announcements over the past month that it has discovered Hamas arms and detained Hamas conspirators in Jordan. Many are especially skeptical toward the GOJ's assertions that Hamas was planning attacks against the GOJ. ¶3. (C) Member of Parliament Suleiman Abu Ghaith (West Banker, Madaba) told poloff that he and a delegation of twenty other pro-government MPs complained to Prime Minister Marouf Bakheet that most of their constituents did not believe the GOJ when it announced April 18 that it had cancelled the visit of Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Zahar because of the discovery of a Hamas arms cache in Jordan (ref C). Abu Ghaith, a pious Muslim who heartily dislikes both Hamas and Jordan's political Islamists, expressed concern to poloff that GOJ handling of this episode may actually have increased sympathy for Hamas in Jordan. ¶4. (C) Hamadeh Fara,neh, a Palestinian-Jordanian columnist and think-tank director, said most people believe the GOJ &reached into a drawer and found some weapons8 in order to provide a pretext for the cancellation of Zahar's visit. Many would have believed that Hamas had been smuggling arms through Jordan into the West Bank, he said. But few were ready to buy the GOJ's assertions that Hamas was targeting Jordan. Fara,neh, a leftist who has written critically about the resurgence of Islam in Jordan, expressed regret that the GOJ &did not produce a better play.8 ¶5. (C) Muhammad Kheir Mustafa, a liberal East Banker professor at the University of Jordan, told pol FSN that none of his students or colleagues believed the weapons caches were intended for use against Jordan. &Who would believe such a stupid story?8 he exclaimed. Mustafa noted that skepticism toward the official account crossed East Bank/West Bank lines. ¶6. (C) Jamal Tahat, another East Banker professor, told polcouns that his friend Nabil Kofahi, the communications director of Jordan's Islamic Action Front, was worried that the GOJ had fabricated the weapons finds in order to prepare the ground for a &confrontation8 between the GOJ and the Front. ¶7. (C) The Jordanian media, after a few skeptical opinion columns following the GOJ's April 18 announcement on the first arms cache (ref C),have moderated their tone. Throughout, news stories have been straightforward reports of GOJ statements and accusations, and of Hamas's rejection of the accusations. Particularly since Hamas's refusal to participate in joint GOJ-Palestinian talks on the issue and since the televised confessions May 11 of three of the accused (ref A),however, commentary in the media has firmly placed Jordanian national security as a non-negotiable issue. While still advocating a full, complete, and transparent GOJ investigation into the matter in order to establish whether Hamas or some unnamed third party was responsible for the weapons smuggling, commentators are also calling for more candor and a more cooperative attitude from Hamas. Ultimately, commentators agree that the issue of Jordanian national security trumps all other issues. This may be a manifestation of Jordanian patriotism, or it may be because this affair has now clearly become a high-profile GOJ national security matter in which public criticism would cross red lines. ¶8. (C) Comment: Senior GOJ officials, including spokesman Nasser Judeh, acknowledged to Ambassador shortly after the April 18 revelation that the GOJ needed to be more convincing, and this conclusion led to the GOJ's decision to televise the May 11 confessions of three Hamas plotters. Abu Mazen's public endorsement shortly afterward of the GOJ version of events further bolstered the case. However, it appears that the relatively weak evidence the GOJ presented April 18 pushed public opinion over into its skeptical default setting, and the GOJ is having a hard time pushing it back. Palace officials nonetheless identify a turn of public opinion in their favor this week. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ HALE