IRAQ: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES MOD NEEDS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003375 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2016 TAGS: PGOV MCAP PTER IZ SUBJECT: IRAQ: AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD DISCUSSES MOD NEEDS, FUTURE WITH IRAQI GROUND FORCES COMMANDER Classified By: DANIEL RUBINSTEIN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During a May 9 meeting in Amman with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, Lt. General Abdel Al-Qadir, Iraqi Ground Forces Commander, underlined the need for an experienced professional as the next Iraqi Minister of Defense. Al-Qadir negatively assessed the ability of the Iraqi Army (IA) to function independently, particularly in the area of logistics. While the Lt. General appeared confident and informed discussing needed improvements within the Iraqi Army and MOD, he was more hesitant and vague when asked to prescribe a strategy to deal with insurgent groups and militias. End Summary. ¶2. (C) During a May 9 meeting in Amman with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, Lt. General Abdel Al-Qadir, the Iraqi Ground Forces Commander, expressed consternation over the state of the IA,s supply system, the drain from troops assigned to personal security, and counter-productive overlap between the Iraqi MOD and Joint Headquarters (JHQ). The Lt. General assessed current MOD performance as "very bad." He strongly criticized duplication of responsibilities between the Ministry and the Army JHQ, citing this as a source of considerable policy confusion. Al-Qadir also opined that at least 30,000, and perhaps as many as 60,000, Iraqi soldiers (out of the official strength of about 130,000) are providing personal security to Iraqi government officials, and are therefore unavailable to conduct counter-terrorist or other field operations. Noting that these personal security troops are a major drain on the MOD budget, Al-Qadir suggested creating a separate organization outside MOD for protection services. ¶3. (C) While noting improvements in IA command and control, Al-Qadir portrayed the Army,s logistics system as woefully inefficient, alleging that the IA "would collapse with a week" if comprehensive U.S. and Coalition logistics support (including fuel and food aid) were withdrawn. Al-Qadir described fixing this logistics deficiency as the "biggest problem" faced by the incoming Minister of Defense. The Lt. General stated that the system of contracting support services is not appropriate for the IA and leads to corruption. He suggested instead that the IA become self-sufficient, noting that some units in Al-Anbar already are. In terms of materiale, Al-Qadir added that the Army badly needs more Humvees, and would benefit greatly from heavy equipment sufficient to outfit one mechanized battalion per brigade. ¶4. (C) In addition to dealing with the diversion of troops for personal security and rectifying the relationship between MOD and the JHQ, the Ground Forces Commander noted the need to improve intelligence gathering and evaluation capabilities. However, he offered no specific suggestions on how to accomplish this beyond reorganizing the MOD operations center, which he sees as ineffective. The Lt. General also noted that IA and other Iraqi Security Forces must begin to conduct operations at night, when, in his opinion, forces largely ignore the actions of insurgents and militias. ¶5. (C) Al-Qadir had much less to say in response to Ambassador Khalilzad,s questions on the causes of the current rash of sectarian killings, and possible remedial security measures. He blamed ex-Ba,athists for carrying out many of the killings. He also repeated "rumors" that several Baghdad-area commanders have a secret agreement with the Mahdi Army that restricts Iraqi military and police movements in Mahdi Army-dominated areas. He called for stepped-up joint operations against "terrorist strongholds" northwest of Baghdad. While condemning the killings, he offered little else in the way of comments or ideas concerning their cause, or possible solutions. ¶6. (C) Al-Qadr urged that experienced professionals (not a civilian) be appointed to head both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior. In that context, he stressed that the MOD needs to be headed by "someone who knows the soldiers." He added that the next Minister of Defense must be someone who is willing to resist inappropriate (e.g, sectarian-motivated) guidance. ¶7. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Khalilzad. HALE