CODEL PENCE MEETING WITH PM BAKHIT AND FM KHATIB

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003346

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL JO
SUBJECT: CODEL PENCE MEETING WITH PM BAKHIT AND FM KHATIB


Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (U) Summary: CODEL Pence met May 6 with Prime Minister
Bakhit and Foreign Minister Al-Khatib to discuss regional
issues including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
situation in Iraq, and problems posed by Iran and Syria. End
Summary.


2. (U) U.S. Representatives Mike Pence (R-Indiana),Joseph
Pitts (R-Pennsylvania),Mike Ferguson (R-New Jersey),Lincoln
Davis (D-Tennessee) and Jim Costa (D-California) met with PM
Bakhit and FM Khatib May 8 in Amman. Also attending were
Ambassador, House International Relations Committee staff
members Sam Stratman and Allan Makovsky, military escort
Major Cameron O'Neil, and POLOFF (notetaker).

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict/Hamas
--------------


3. (C) Both PM Bakhit and FM Khatib told the CODEL that
U.S.-Jordan relations were a "top priority" for the GOJ, and
that Jordan greatly appreciated the financial assistance it
received from the U.S. Khatib said that Jordan faced many
tough challenges, but was most acutely concerned about the
situation in the Palestinian territories. "What happens in
Palestine is immediately felt here in Jordan and affects us
directly," he stated. Noting the "very negative mood" in
Israel and Israeli domestic support for a unilateral approach
toward the Palestinians, Khatib urged the U.S. and
international community to "empower" Palestinian Authority
(PA) President Abbas so as to enable him to negotiate with
Israel. Movement forward in the peace process through Abbas,
Khatib asserted, would strengthen Palestinian moderates at
the expense of Hamas.


4. (C) Bakhit emphasized that Jordan and the U.S. shared the
same objective regarding Hamas -- both wanted to see the
organization fail in governing the Palestinian territories.
Jordan might differ with the U.S., however, in how to achieve
this goal. Bakhit said that Hamas should "be given a chance"
for approximately three months to changes its behavior and
policies toward Israel before being completely isolated and
financially cut off by the international community.
(COMMENT: This opinion does not reflect the policy of the
King. END COMMENT.) This course of action would result in a
"win-win situation." If Hamas did renounce violence and
recognize Israel ) which Bakhit considered very unlikely )
this would be a major step forward in the peace process. If,
on the other hand, Hamas did not change its ways after this
period, the Palestinian people would blame Hamas for its
resulting failure to govern and provide resources, rather
than hold the West responsible. Bakhit asserted that under
current U.S. strategy, Palestinians would blame the U.S. and
Europe for their suffering and not abandon Hamas. He added
that Fatah would need time to tackle its corruption problems,
and that an immediate new election in the West Bank and Gaza
would result in even more votes for Hamas.

5. (C) Bakhit complained that the Israeli government was
"doing nothing" to support PA President Abbas. It had
refused, for example, to authorize training and equipment for
security forces under Abbas, direct control. Bakhit urged
the U.S. to permit the payment of the salaries of Palestinian
government employees ) most of who were affiliated with
Fatah, he stressed - including the approximately 50,000
members of the security services who might pose a major
threat to security if left unpaid. (COMMENT: This opinion
also does not reflect the policy of the King. END COMMENT.)


IRAQ
--------------


6. (C) Emphasizing that Jordan "strongly supported" the
political process in Iraq, Bakhit told the CODEL that the new
Iraqi government needed to include all principal groups to
achieve stability. If the government attempted to exclude
fair participation by Sunnis, Kurds, or others, "major
problems" would result that could further fuel the
insurgency.

IRAN
--------------


7. (C) Bakhit claimed that Iran was attempting to
"infiltrate" southern Iraq by sending in undercover troops,
intelligence agents, and cash. This was part of a plan to
expand Iranian influence throughout the region, which Tehran
wanted to use as "bargaining power" with the U.S. Despite
the major threat posed by Iranian ambitions, Bakhit said that
a U.S. military strike against Iran was a "bad option." He
asserted that there was still time to solve the Iranian
nuclear issue through diplomacy, and recommended that the
U.S. and Europeans consider joining with a "neighbors group"
to pressure Tehran in a united front, and to fashion a
package of economic and other incentives to go along with the
threat of sanctions. Under no circumstances should the U.S.
permit Iran to "go nuclear," Bakhit stated, as it might
trigger a nuclear arms race between Turkey, Egypt, and "God
forbid, Saudi Arabia."

SYRIA
--------------


8. (C) Asked about relations with Damascus, Bakhit replied
that Jordan continued to have problems with weapons and other
contraband smuggled into Jordan from Syria. While noting
that the SARG could not "completely control" the shared
border, he said that Damascus could "certainly do more" to
prevent infiltration into Jordan and blamed the Syrian
military for being easily bribed to "look the other way."
Syrian President Asad, he continued, was not in full control
of the country as he was constricted by the powerful security
apparatus.


9. (C) Military action against Syria, Bakhit warned, could
result in "chaos." As the only organized opposition, the
Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would most likely come to power if
the Allawite regime were to collapse ) a result that neither
the U.S. nor Jordan wanted to see. Bakhit said that while
the SARG appeared to be forging or strengthening alliances
with Iran, Hizballah and Hamas, this was "somewhat deceiving"
as the Syrians had differences with all three to varying
degrees and could turn on them quickly if it served their
purposes.

Saudi Arabia
--------------


10. (C) Responding to a question on Saudi Arabia's
reluctance to pursue needed reforms, Bakhit advised the U.S.
not to apply too much pressure on Riyadh and to take a
country-by-country approach in promoting reform in the
region. Saudis are "deeply conservative" and cautious about
change, he said, and would likely react &unfavorably8 to
aggressive tactics by the U.S. and others. "Keep some
pressure on them, but be careful," he remarked. Khatib said
that destabilization of the House of Saud could lead to a
takeover by the religious establishment and the formation of
a theocracy, which the Iranians would seek to exploit.

An Appeal for Aid
--------------


11. (C) Bakhit told the CODEL that Jordan was the "last
strong outpost" for the U.S. in the immediate region. "Look
at what is happening all around us )- we are in a very
difficult position but continue to stick by you," he stated.
Bakhit described how the GOJ had recently taken the very
unpopular decision to further cut fuel subsidies, and how
Jordan continued to pursue political reforms ) despite
having Islamist MPs "who are more Hamas than Hamas itself" )
that included holding municipal elections in 2006 and
national parliamentary elections in 2007 under improved
legislation. Jordan needed additional financial aid from the
U.S. at such a critical time, Bakhit stressed, to strengthen
its security and ensure the success of its reforms. U.S.
efforts to persuade the oil-rich, cash-heavy Gulf states to
provide assistance would also be greatly appreciated, he
added.


12. (U) CODEL Pence did not have an opportunity to clear on
this message.

Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
HALE