CODEL PENCE MEETING WITH PM BAKHIT AND FM KHATIB

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 003346 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016 TAGS: PREL KPAL JO SUBJECT: CODEL PENCE MEETING WITH PM BAKHIT AND FM KHATIB Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) Summary: CODEL Pence met May 6 with Prime Minister Bakhit and Foreign Minister Al-Khatib to discuss regional issues including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Iraq, and problems posed by Iran and Syria. End Summary. ¶2. (U) U.S. Representatives Mike Pence (R-Indiana),Joseph Pitts (R-Pennsylvania),Mike Ferguson (R-New Jersey),Lincoln Davis (D-Tennessee) and Jim Costa (D-California) met with PM Bakhit and FM Khatib May 8 in Amman. Also attending were Ambassador, House International Relations Committee staff members Sam Stratman and Allan Makovsky, military escort Major Cameron O'Neil, and poloff (notetaker). Israeli-Palestinian Conflict/Hamas -------------- ¶3. (C) Both PM Bakhit and FM Khatib told the CODEL that U.S.-Jordan relations were a "top priority" for the GOJ, and that Jordan greatly appreciated the financial assistance it received from the U.S. Khatib said that Jordan faced many tough challenges, but was most acutely concerned about the situation in the Palestinian territories. "What happens in Palestine is immediately felt here in Jordan and affects us directly," he stated. Noting the "very negative mood" in Israel and Israeli domestic support for a unilateral approach toward the Palestinians, Khatib urged the U.S. and international community to "empower" Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas so as to enable him to negotiate with Israel. Movement forward in the peace process through Abbas, Khatib asserted, would strengthen Palestinian moderates at the expense of Hamas. ¶4. (C) Bakhit emphasized that Jordan and the U.S. shared the same objective regarding Hamas -- both wanted to see the organization fail in governing the Palestinian territories. Jordan might differ with the U.S., however, in how to achieve this goal. Bakhit said that Hamas should "be given a chance" for approximately three months to changes its behavior and policies toward Israel before being completely isolated and financially cut off by the international community. (COMMENT: This opinion does not reflect the policy of the King. END COMMENT.) This course of action would result in a "win-win situation." If Hamas did renounce violence and recognize Israel ) which Bakhit considered very unlikely ) this would be a major step forward in the peace process. If, on the other hand, Hamas did not change its ways after this period, the Palestinian people would blame Hamas for its resulting failure to govern and provide resources, rather than hold the West responsible. Bakhit asserted that under current U.S. strategy, Palestinians would blame the U.S. and Europe for their suffering and not abandon Hamas. He added that Fatah would need time to tackle its corruption problems, and that an immediate new election in the West Bank and Gaza would result in even more votes for Hamas. ¶5. (C) Bakhit complained that the Israeli government was "doing nothing" to support PA President Abbas. It had refused, for example, to authorize training and equipment for security forces under Abbas, direct control. Bakhit urged the U.S. to permit the payment of the salaries of Palestinian government employees ) most of who were affiliated with Fatah, he stressed - including the approximately 50,000 members of the security services who might pose a major threat to security if left unpaid. (COMMENT: This opinion also does not reflect the policy of the King. END COMMENT.) IRAQ -------------- ¶6. (C) Emphasizing that Jordan "strongly supported" the political process in Iraq, Bakhit told the CODEL that the new Iraqi government needed to include all principal groups to achieve stability. If the government attempted to exclude fair participation by Sunnis, Kurds, or others, "major problems" would result that could further fuel the insurgency. IRAN -------------- ¶7. (C) Bakhit claimed that Iran was attempting to "infiltrate" southern Iraq by sending in undercover troops, intelligence agents, and cash. This was part of a plan to expand Iranian influence throughout the region, which Tehran wanted to use as "bargaining power" with the U.S. Despite the major threat posed by Iranian ambitions, Bakhit said that a U.S. military strike against Iran was a "bad option." He asserted that there was still time to solve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, and recommended that the U.S. and Europeans consider joining with a "neighbors group" to pressure Tehran in a united front, and to fashion a package of economic and other incentives to go along with the threat of sanctions. Under no circumstances should the U.S. permit Iran to "go nuclear," Bakhit stated, as it might trigger a nuclear arms race between Turkey, Egypt, and "God forbid, Saudi Arabia." SYRIA -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked about relations with Damascus, Bakhit replied that Jordan continued to have problems with weapons and other contraband smuggled into Jordan from Syria. While noting that the SARG could not "completely control" the shared border, he said that Damascus could "certainly do more" to prevent infiltration into Jordan and blamed the Syrian military for being easily bribed to "look the other way." Syrian President Asad, he continued, was not in full control of the country as he was constricted by the powerful security apparatus. ¶9. (C) Military action against Syria, Bakhit warned, could result in "chaos." As the only organized opposition, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would most likely come to power if the Allawite regime were to collapse ) a result that neither the U.S. nor Jordan wanted to see. Bakhit said that while the SARG appeared to be forging or strengthening alliances with Iran, Hizballah and Hamas, this was "somewhat deceiving" as the Syrians had differences with all three to varying degrees and could turn on them quickly if it served their purposes. Saudi Arabia -------------- ¶10. (C) Responding to a question on Saudi Arabia's reluctance to pursue needed reforms, Bakhit advised the U.S. not to apply too much pressure on Riyadh and to take a country-by-country approach in promoting reform in the region. Saudis are "deeply conservative" and cautious about change, he said, and would likely react &unfavorably8 to aggressive tactics by the U.S. and others. "Keep some pressure on them, but be careful," he remarked. Khatib said that destabilization of the House of Saud could lead to a takeover by the religious establishment and the formation of a theocracy, which the Iranians would seek to exploit. An Appeal for Aid -------------- ¶11. (C) Bakhit told the CODEL that Jordan was the "last strong outpost" for the U.S. in the immediate region. "Look at what is happening all around us )- we are in a very difficult position but continue to stick by you," he stated. Bakhit described how the GOJ had recently taken the very unpopular decision to further cut fuel subsidies, and how Jordan continued to pursue political reforms ) despite having Islamist MPs "who are more Hamas than Hamas itself" ) that included holding municipal elections in 2006 and national parliamentary elections in 2007 under improved legislation. Jordan needed additional financial aid from the U.S. at such a critical time, Bakhit stressed, to strengthen its security and ensure the success of its reforms. U.S. efforts to persuade the oil-rich, cash-heavy Gulf states to provide assistance would also be greatly appreciated, he added. ¶12. (U) CODEL Pence did not have an opportunity to clear on this message. Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ HALE