Sandia Workshop Works to Lower Bioterrorism Risks,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002916 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TBIO PTER XF JO SUBJECT: Sandia Workshop Works to Lower Bioterrorism Risks, Raise Awareness ¶1. Summary: An April 11-13 workshop sponsored by Sandia National Lab gathered thirty Middle Eastern lab scientists in Amman to discuss biosafety and biosecurity risks and risk reduction strategies at health and agricultural biology labs. Expert speakers outlined best practices for lowering risk of spreading toxins and pathogens by either deliberate theft for bioterrorism or by routine human error. End summary. -------------- Biological Dangers Still on Page One -------------- ¶2. With avian flu in today's headlines, and SARS and anthrax still vivid memories, the timing for this workshop, and its target audience, could not have been better. The workshop covered both biosecurity and biosafety, and the difference in the terms was one of the first topics of discussion. -------------- --- Biosafety: Avoiding Spreading Disease by Mistake -------------- --- ¶3. BACKGROUND: Biosafety is the use of appropriate equipment, protective gear, materials and techniques to prevent inadvertent spread of toxins and pathogens such as viruses and bacteria from the laboratory to the public. Several times during the SARS outbreak, lab researchers infected themselves, and in some cases their colleagues, health workers and family members, because of faulty lab procedures. That occurred during a time of peak awareness and scrutiny; mistakes are more likely to occur when the pressure is off and people are paying less attention. -------------- -------------- Biosecurity: Keeping Dangerous Items Out of the Wrong Hands -------------- -------------- ¶4. Biosecurity is a newer term, coined to describe the safe management and physical protection of lab materials to prevent theft and other deliberately malicious acts. This is not a theoretical threat; recent examples include the anthrax letters in the United States in 2001 and the use of sarin in the Tokyo subway system. The origins of the anthrax used in the famous "white powder" letters to politicians and journalists are still not determined, but that incident and the lack of management tools for biohazardous materials was the impetus to create biosecurity in American labs. -------------- -- Labs as a Source of Materials for Bioterrorists -------------- -- ¶5. Unsecured labs working with biological pathogens represent low-hanging fruit for bioterrorists. Biohazardous materials in the lab are normally labeled and can be found in suitable form and quantity for use in a bioterrorist activity. The lab is thus an inviting target for theft or other malicious acts. With the biohazardous substance in hand, the would-be bioterrorist can inflict direct harm, disrupt an economy, deny use of facilities, raise public levels of anxiety, or threaten any of the above. END BACKGROUND. -------------- - Workshop Reviewed, Discussed Current Practices -------------- - ¶6. At the Amman workshop, biosecurity specialists from Sandia, State, the UK's Ministry of Defense and the private sector reviewed best practices for safe and secure laboratory operations. Specialists also discussed laws and regulations on management and transportation of toxins and biohazardous substances. Much time was spent discussing incident response: what to do if an accident, theft or release occurs. Biohazardous substances include such organisms as plague, ebola, botulism, smallpox, and HIV. Not all substances in a lab are equally dangerous; part of a biosafety/biosecurity program is to assess the risk at individual sites and use the appropriate level of safety and security on them. -------------- Opportunities, Desire for Further Activities -------------- ¶7. In addition to classroom-style learning, the three-day workshop included many opportunities for discussion. USG participants summarized the discussions at the workshop as being very candid. The quality of laboratory practices varied widely. Participants frequently expressed their appreciation for the discussions and their interest in further training, visits to their labs, and consulting. Some noted specific practices they learned during this workshop as "take-home" lessons to apply at their own labs. Others said they were "overwhelmed" with the amount of information presented, and would need time to assimilate it all. ¶8. Some participants noted the lack of policy-level engagement on these issues, and were skeptical about what could be changed in the absence of that engagement. All of the participants, however, agreed that forming a regional biosafety/biosecurity society, as either a stand-alone organization or part of an already established one, was an important step. -------------- Participants from 13 Countries -------------- ¶9. Participants came from Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Morocco, Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Participants from the Palestinian Authority were un-invited by the hosting organization the Cooperative Monitoring Center - Amman at the request of Sandia in keeping with current USG policy on contact with the Palestinian Authority. ¶10. Comment: Given the relevance of the topic and the solid foundation laid by this workshop, follow-up activities would be productive. Support from within the region for these activities is strong. Supporting development of a regional biosafety association would be a good next step. ¶11. The U.S. delegation attending the workshop cleared this message in substance. HALE