A/S WELCH'S MEETING WITH INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

S E C R E T AMMAN 002541

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR IR IZ JO
SUBJECT: A/S WELCH'S MEETING WITH INTELLIGENCE CHIEF

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A/S Welch and Jordanian intelligence chief
Dhahabi discussed Iran's ambitions in the region, and how to
deal with Hamas. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Assistant Secretary for NEA David Welch met with
Muhammad Dhahabi, the chief of Jordan's General Intelligence
Directorate (GID),in Amman April 2. Also attending were
Centcom J-5 RADM Thomas Moeller, Ambassador, SIMO chief,
DATT, and PolCouns (notetaker).

Iran


3. (C) A/S Welch explained that he and Admiral Moeller were
visiting U.S. partners in the region to encourage
consultations between them on diplomatic, economic and
security cooperation to address the threats posed by Iran.
The U.S. and others were working within the Security Council
to focus the international community on the danger of Iran's
nuclear program. Just as worrying as Iran's nuclear drive,
however, were its role in Iraq, and its links to groups like
Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Dhahabi agreed and
added "I would put Hamas ahead of PIJ." A/S Welch explained
that the U.S. had been available for some time for
discussions with Iran about our concerns over Iranian
behavior in Afghanistan and Iraq. Tehran recently went
public about U.S. availability to discuss Iraq, but not about
Afghanistan. If discussions on Iraq do come about, the USG
would brief Jordan and its other friends in the region.



4. (C) Dhahabi said "Iran's men" on the Iraqi political scene
were giving Ambassador Khalilzad "a hard time;" he was doing
the best he could; &a national unity government is the name
of the game.8 Iraq's Interior Ministry forces and army
needed to be purged of "Iranian agents" and other sectarian
Shiites. The power of the militias needed to be broken. "It
is a zero sum game now in Iraq between you and Iran."


5. (S/NF) Dhahabi said he and his counterparts from Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Egypt and the UAE continued to work
as a committee to coordinate efforts to promote moderate
politicians inside Iraq. Egypt's service was playing the
most constructive role, according to Dhahabi. He claimed the
Saudis pledged full coordination of their activities in Iraq
through the committee, but Jordan had learned independently
that the Saudis were making significant uncoordinated
efforts, and as a result were sometimes backing "the wrong
people." For their part, the Turkish government was focused
on the Kirkuk issue to the exclusion of the larger picture in
Iraq. Kuwaiti intelligence activities in Iraq suggested the
GOK was not as fully committed to the ideal of Iraqi unity as
it claimed in public.

Hamas


6. (C) Welch outlined the emerging U.S. and Quartet
approaches to the new Palestinian Authority government. He
hoped Hamas would accept the Quartet's three principles, but
did not expect it to. Those interested in stability
therefore needed to be ready to isolate Hamas, while
facilitating aid to the Palestinian people. Dhahabi agreed;
"we need to squeeze" Hamas and "make sure it fails." Hamas
was only secondarily a Palestinian movement; first and
foremost it was an Islamic movement with regional ambitions,
including in Jordan. "I won't allow this," Dhahabi said.
The GOJ would ensure that neither funds nor weapons reached
Hamas in the West Bank/Gaza through Jordan.


7. (C) Dhahabi assessed Abu Mazen as being "soft on Hamas;"
he needed to be prodded to fight. Egypt could be relied on
to isolate Hamas because Omar Suleiman did not want Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood to see a successful Islamist government in
Palestine.


8. (C) Dhahabi asked rhetorically what would come next if
Hamas did fail. Israel needed to help strengthen Abu Mazen.
Dhahabi and the GID retained good contacts with their Israeli
counterparts at all levels, and he would have his own senior
meetings with them soon on these issues.
HALE