Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06AMMAN2325
2006-03-30 17:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Amman
Cable title:
CODEL MCCAIN MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH
how-toVZCZCXRO9676 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHAM #2325/01 0891714 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 301714Z MAR 06 ZDK ALL FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9291 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002325
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2026
TAGS: PREL OVIP KPAL IS IZ JO
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH
AMMAN 00002325 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002325
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2026
TAGS: PREL OVIP KPAL IS IZ JO
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH
AMMAN 00002325 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. ( S ) Summary: King Abdullah briefed Codel McCain on his
proposal to help pacify Anbar province, discussed Iraq, Iran,
Hamas, and his effort to convene a conference of Iraqi
religious leaders. He accused Syrian intelligence of giving
&a green light8 to terrorists seeking to carry out attacks
in Jordan. End summary.
2. ( C ) Senator McCain,s delegation met with King Abdullah
at his private office in Amman on March 26. The delegation
also included Senators Feingold and Thune; Congressmen Udall,
Kirk, and Schwarz; and Governors Pawlenty (Minnesota),
Huntsman (Utah),and Riley (Alabama). Queen Rania, Farouk
Kasrawy and Abdullah Woreikat of the King,s office, Rania
Attallah of the Queen,s office, and Ambassador also
attended.
3. ( C ) McCain told the King that the U.S. was grateful for
Jordan,s friendship and for its support for U.S. efforts on
Iraq, on Hamas, and on counterterrorism. McCain said he
understood the King,s disappointment that a proposal for
additional assistance for Jordan had not made it into the
recent supplemental budget.
Iraq
--------------
4. ( C ) McCain had just left Iraq hours earlier, and told
the King the situation was difficult there. He urged key
Iraqi politicians to form a unity government; they needed to
show progress within weeks. Ambassador Khalilzad was doing
&a great job,8 but Iraqi leaders weren,t doing their part.
&I was honest with them ) support for the U.S. effort in
Iraq is slipping in the U.S.8 Senator McCain said the
process of recovery in Iraq had been moving slowly. Oil
production was weak; the U.S. was now launching a major
effort to address this, &but why did it have to wait three
years?8 McCain said the morale of U.S. troops was high,
even though in the Sunni triangle and other areas they were
&in a very tough situation.8
5. ( C ) The next six months would be critical. Senator
McCain said the American people may not appreciate the
catastrophic consequences if the U.S. were to fail in Iraq.
Governor Riley agreed that most Americans didn,t understand
why there had been so much delay in forming a unity
government; the U.S. effort in Iraq was &losing support at
home.8
6. ( C ) The King agreed that achieving a national unity
government was key. It was particularly important that Iraq
have new, non-sectarian defense and interior ministers. The
King was worried about the influence of the Badr forces in
Iraq,s security services. Senator McCain asked about
Jordan,s border with Iraq. The King expressed confidence
that the GOJ was deterring or intercepting Jordanians and
others who might want to cross directly into Iraq to join the
insurgency; the GOJ was also watching out for military age
men who might try to travel via Syria. Another priority was
preventing further terrorists entering Jordan. Jordan was
checking all vehicles entering from Iraq. He said a &Badr
commander8 at the Iraq/Jordan border crossing point was of
particular concern.
The King,s Anbar Plan
7. ( C ) Governor Huntsman observed that governments with an
interest in events in Iraq ) especially in the GCC ) had
not contributed sufficiently to the effort there. The King
replied that many wanted to help, but weren,t sure where to
do it. In Anbar, there were many potential opportunities to
assist ) for instance at a phosphates mine that could
provide many jobs ) but security was always the problem.
What was needed was an integrated political, military and
reconstruction plan. With security, it would be possible to
create positive momentum. The King said that during his
January 2006 visit to Washington he had proposed such a plan
to U.S. officials, which he described to the delegation.
8. ( C ) The King said that last fall the GOJ made contact
&with responsible governments in the region8 who had
influence in Iraq ) Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait
) and coordinated with moderates in Anbar among the Sunnis.
&I think we had an impact8 on Sunnis, participation in the
December general elections.
To Contain Iran, Rebuild Iraq; Pressure Hamas and Syria
-------------- --------------
9. ( C ) Senator Feingold complemented the King for his
leadership, and asked for his thoughts on Iran. The King
said that of the chief challenges facing the region --
AMMAN 00002325 002.5 OF 002
Al-Qaeda, Iraq, oil, nuclear proliferation, Syria,s
behavior, Hizballah, and Hamas ) Iran,s &thumbprint8 was
on them all except for Al-Qaeda. The Iranians &have an
obsession8 controlling the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and
Karbala; these towns had turned into a strategic matter for
them. The best way to contain Iran was to build an
independent, capable Iraq.
10. ( C ) In order to respond to Iran,s challenge on this
range of fronts, support for Hamas needed to be cut off. The
international community &needs to make it fail.8 Hizballah
should also be isolated, and the Syrian regime further
weakened.
11. ( C ) &We all need to make sure that Hamas does not get
off the hook8 and avoid the pressure to meet the
international community,s three conditions. In the King,s
analysis, Hamas must inevitably either transform itself into
a legitimate governing party, or go back to its &old
tricks8 of terrorism and political action in tandem. The
King thought the latter course more likely.
12. ( C ) (NOTE: CODEL McCain,s meeting with the King was
two days prior to Israeli elections. END NOTE.) The Israeli
elections would be key. The King had praise for Olmert, whom
he thought in a good position to win, but it was hard to make
reliable predictions about Israeli politics. Olmert was &a
man of peace,8 an ally in the peace process. &If Bibi were
to win8, though, the region would find itself with &a more
radical Israel8 at the same time it had a radical Hamas in
the ascendant; this could only mean more trouble.
13. ( C ) It would help the situation considerably if aid
could be channeled to Abu Mazen -- &he,s ready now8 )
and organizations under his control, through &a system with
checks and balances8 to ensure money didn,t get to Hamas.
The King said he would soon present the U.S. with a paper
with ideas on how this might be done. There are 150,000
Palestinian civil servants who might go unpaid if Hamas
defies the international community. Hamas didn,t care,
though; &they were all loyal to Fatah.8 The King remained
confident Hamas would fail. This would show the people of
the Middle East the true face of the region,s religious
extremists, he said.
Syria
--------------
14. ( S ) The Syrian border was a problem. The GOJ had
intercepted several explosives belts being smuggled in from
Syria. The GOJ had discovered six caches of dangerous
materials, and had information that four would-be suicide
bombers are now in Syria looking for a chance to cross into
Jordan. McCain expressed surprise that the Syrians weren,t
worried about &backlash8 against them. The King said the
SARG wants instability to distract the U.S. He claimed
Syrian intelligence was now giving a green light to
terrorists to mount operations across the Jordanian border.
Moderate Islam
--------------
15. ( C ) The delegation praised the King,s speech in
February at the National Prayer Breakfast Luncheon in
Washington. The King replied that he planned to build on the
November, 2004 Amman Message on moderate Islam, and on the
conferences that followed it, with a new initiative, a
conference of Iraqi religious leaders that would convene in
Amman soon. The King,s aides were working out the
communiqu in advance with the leading participants; it would
give Iraqi religious leaders a prominent platform from which
to stress that Iraqis are one people, opposed to violence.
The King hoped to get advice from the delegation in the
coming weeks on how he could extend to American Muslims his
campaign of &outreach in the name of moderate Islam.8 The
King wanted to help Muslim moderates throughout the world
counter extremists.
16. ( U ) Codel McCain did not have an opportunity to review
this message.
HALE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2026
TAGS: PREL OVIP KPAL IS IZ JO
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN MEETS WITH KING ABDULLAH
AMMAN 00002325 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. ( S ) Summary: King Abdullah briefed Codel McCain on his
proposal to help pacify Anbar province, discussed Iraq, Iran,
Hamas, and his effort to convene a conference of Iraqi
religious leaders. He accused Syrian intelligence of giving
&a green light8 to terrorists seeking to carry out attacks
in Jordan. End summary.
2. ( C ) Senator McCain,s delegation met with King Abdullah
at his private office in Amman on March 26. The delegation
also included Senators Feingold and Thune; Congressmen Udall,
Kirk, and Schwarz; and Governors Pawlenty (Minnesota),
Huntsman (Utah),and Riley (Alabama). Queen Rania, Farouk
Kasrawy and Abdullah Woreikat of the King,s office, Rania
Attallah of the Queen,s office, and Ambassador also
attended.
3. ( C ) McCain told the King that the U.S. was grateful for
Jordan,s friendship and for its support for U.S. efforts on
Iraq, on Hamas, and on counterterrorism. McCain said he
understood the King,s disappointment that a proposal for
additional assistance for Jordan had not made it into the
recent supplemental budget.
Iraq
--------------
4. ( C ) McCain had just left Iraq hours earlier, and told
the King the situation was difficult there. He urged key
Iraqi politicians to form a unity government; they needed to
show progress within weeks. Ambassador Khalilzad was doing
&a great job,8 but Iraqi leaders weren,t doing their part.
&I was honest with them ) support for the U.S. effort in
Iraq is slipping in the U.S.8 Senator McCain said the
process of recovery in Iraq had been moving slowly. Oil
production was weak; the U.S. was now launching a major
effort to address this, &but why did it have to wait three
years?8 McCain said the morale of U.S. troops was high,
even though in the Sunni triangle and other areas they were
&in a very tough situation.8
5. ( C ) The next six months would be critical. Senator
McCain said the American people may not appreciate the
catastrophic consequences if the U.S. were to fail in Iraq.
Governor Riley agreed that most Americans didn,t understand
why there had been so much delay in forming a unity
government; the U.S. effort in Iraq was &losing support at
home.8
6. ( C ) The King agreed that achieving a national unity
government was key. It was particularly important that Iraq
have new, non-sectarian defense and interior ministers. The
King was worried about the influence of the Badr forces in
Iraq,s security services. Senator McCain asked about
Jordan,s border with Iraq. The King expressed confidence
that the GOJ was deterring or intercepting Jordanians and
others who might want to cross directly into Iraq to join the
insurgency; the GOJ was also watching out for military age
men who might try to travel via Syria. Another priority was
preventing further terrorists entering Jordan. Jordan was
checking all vehicles entering from Iraq. He said a &Badr
commander8 at the Iraq/Jordan border crossing point was of
particular concern.
The King,s Anbar Plan
7. ( C ) Governor Huntsman observed that governments with an
interest in events in Iraq ) especially in the GCC ) had
not contributed sufficiently to the effort there. The King
replied that many wanted to help, but weren,t sure where to
do it. In Anbar, there were many potential opportunities to
assist ) for instance at a phosphates mine that could
provide many jobs ) but security was always the problem.
What was needed was an integrated political, military and
reconstruction plan. With security, it would be possible to
create positive momentum. The King said that during his
January 2006 visit to Washington he had proposed such a plan
to U.S. officials, which he described to the delegation.
8. ( C ) The King said that last fall the GOJ made contact
&with responsible governments in the region8 who had
influence in Iraq ) Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Kuwait
) and coordinated with moderates in Anbar among the Sunnis.
&I think we had an impact8 on Sunnis, participation in the
December general elections.
To Contain Iran, Rebuild Iraq; Pressure Hamas and Syria
-------------- --------------
9. ( C ) Senator Feingold complemented the King for his
leadership, and asked for his thoughts on Iran. The King
said that of the chief challenges facing the region --
AMMAN 00002325 002.5 OF 002
Al-Qaeda, Iraq, oil, nuclear proliferation, Syria,s
behavior, Hizballah, and Hamas ) Iran,s &thumbprint8 was
on them all except for Al-Qaeda. The Iranians &have an
obsession8 controlling the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and
Karbala; these towns had turned into a strategic matter for
them. The best way to contain Iran was to build an
independent, capable Iraq.
10. ( C ) In order to respond to Iran,s challenge on this
range of fronts, support for Hamas needed to be cut off. The
international community &needs to make it fail.8 Hizballah
should also be isolated, and the Syrian regime further
weakened.
11. ( C ) &We all need to make sure that Hamas does not get
off the hook8 and avoid the pressure to meet the
international community,s three conditions. In the King,s
analysis, Hamas must inevitably either transform itself into
a legitimate governing party, or go back to its &old
tricks8 of terrorism and political action in tandem. The
King thought the latter course more likely.
12. ( C ) (NOTE: CODEL McCain,s meeting with the King was
two days prior to Israeli elections. END NOTE.) The Israeli
elections would be key. The King had praise for Olmert, whom
he thought in a good position to win, but it was hard to make
reliable predictions about Israeli politics. Olmert was &a
man of peace,8 an ally in the peace process. &If Bibi were
to win8, though, the region would find itself with &a more
radical Israel8 at the same time it had a radical Hamas in
the ascendant; this could only mean more trouble.
13. ( C ) It would help the situation considerably if aid
could be channeled to Abu Mazen -- &he,s ready now8 )
and organizations under his control, through &a system with
checks and balances8 to ensure money didn,t get to Hamas.
The King said he would soon present the U.S. with a paper
with ideas on how this might be done. There are 150,000
Palestinian civil servants who might go unpaid if Hamas
defies the international community. Hamas didn,t care,
though; &they were all loyal to Fatah.8 The King remained
confident Hamas would fail. This would show the people of
the Middle East the true face of the region,s religious
extremists, he said.
Syria
--------------
14. ( S ) The Syrian border was a problem. The GOJ had
intercepted several explosives belts being smuggled in from
Syria. The GOJ had discovered six caches of dangerous
materials, and had information that four would-be suicide
bombers are now in Syria looking for a chance to cross into
Jordan. McCain expressed surprise that the Syrians weren,t
worried about &backlash8 against them. The King said the
SARG wants instability to distract the U.S. He claimed
Syrian intelligence was now giving a green light to
terrorists to mount operations across the Jordanian border.
Moderate Islam
--------------
15. ( C ) The delegation praised the King,s speech in
February at the National Prayer Breakfast Luncheon in
Washington. The King replied that he planned to build on the
November, 2004 Amman Message on moderate Islam, and on the
conferences that followed it, with a new initiative, a
conference of Iraqi religious leaders that would convene in
Amman soon. The King,s aides were working out the
communiqu in advance with the leading participants; it would
give Iraqi religious leaders a prominent platform from which
to stress that Iraqis are one people, opposed to violence.
The King hoped to get advice from the delegation in the
coming weeks on how he could extend to American Muslims his
campaign of &outreach in the name of moderate Islam.8 The
King wanted to help Muslim moderates throughout the world
counter extremists.
16. ( U ) Codel McCain did not have an opportunity to review
this message.
HALE