EAST BANKER VIEWS ON HAMAS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001364

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL KPAL JO
SUBJECT: EAST BANKER VIEWS ON HAMAS

REF: A. AMMAN 1177


B. AMMAN 1175

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (S) Summary: Three political thinkers from Jordan's East
Bank establishment shared with us their views ) ranging from
alarmist to confident ) on the "Hamas effect" and Jordan's
internal politics. In a separate meeting, the chief of
Jordan's security service expressed confidence that the GOJ
could contain and manage any near-term bounce in radicals,
strength in Jordan. All agreed, however, that Hamas' victory
has boosted the self confidence of the more radical elements
of Jordan's legal Islamist movement, and that we should
expect a season of more assertive Islamist rhetoric, that,
while not threatening the GOJ, would add to the pressure on
it. End summary.


2. (C) Three East Bank analysts debated the implications for
Jordan of the Hamas victory over lunch at the Ambassador's
residence February 21. Musa Keilani, editor of the daily
newspaper "Al Urdun," a former Ambassador to Bahrain, and a
respected observer of the Islamist political scene was the
most alarmed of the three. Keilani only half-jokingly said
he wished Palestinian security forces loyal to Fatah had
"aborted" the recent elections before the results had been
announced. He warned that Hamas' victory in the Palestinian
areas would strengthen admirers of Hamas ) especially West
Banker radicals within Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood ) and
that these forces "no longer had the respect" for the
Hashemites that an earlier generation of Islamists did.
Keilani contested the view, prevalent within the GoJ, that
the GoJ wins whether Hamas holds to its militant principles
and suffers isolation as a result; or compromises and accepts
the two-state formula. Keilani made little effort to
distinguish between actual members of Palestine's Hamas and
of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front, even
though the Jordanian organizations have a record of
non-violence (ref A). Any strengthening of political
Islamists in Jordan, he said, had the potential to snowball
into a threat to the regime. (Note: Musa Keilani's brother
Ibrahim Keilani is a respected figure in the Muslim
Brotherhood's traditional East Bank establishment; another
brother, the late Muhammad Rasoul Keilani, was a director of
Jordan's senior security service. End note.)


3. (C) Muhammad Sawalha, a former Secretary General of
Jordan's parliament and currently President of the Jordanian
Association of Political Scientists, countered that whatever
the fate of the Hamas government across the river, Jordan's
Islamists and Palestinians did not have an interest in
radically altering their current posture toward the GOJ.
Meanwhile, Jordan's East Bank establishment ) in government,
society, and within the Muslim Brotherhood itself ) would
resist radicalization. Sawalha thought it likely that
regime-friendly moderates within the Jordanian Muslim
Brotherhood would prevail in the caucuses that the movement
is currently conducting. (Note: In a development that
seemed to support Sawalha's analysis, on February 21 local
media reported that a leading radical, Humam Sa'id had been
defeated in an attempt to win re-election to the
Brotherhood's Shura Council. However, Sa'id will have a
second opportunity to win a seat later this month. End note.)
He argued, however, that it was in the long-term interest of
the East Bankers and of the Jordanian regime to do more to
integrate Palestinian Jordanians into Jordan's society and
power structure. He thought the GOJ would feel more pressure
from the Islamist movement to meet publicly with Hamas
representatives once a Palestinian government was in place.


4. (C) Kamil Abu Jaber, Foreign Minister from 1991 to 1993
and currently head of Jordan's diplomatic training institute,
agreed with Sawalha that radicals would find it hard to
translate the Hamas victory on the West Bank into any
dramatic advances here on the East Bank. He argued that
Jordan needed to make more progress toward integrating
Palestinian-Jordanians. He agreed that the recent public
statements of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders -- about the
movement's readiness to re-enter or even "lead" the
government, and in support of Hamas -- were more assertive
than Jordanians were accustomed to; he expected to hear more
of this in coming months.


5. (SBU) All three analysts agreed that the "Hamas effect",
whatever its strength, will complicate the already difficult
challenges facing the Bakhit cabinet in 2006: security; the
cut in fuel subsidies scheduled for March; other efforts to
address the GOJ's fiscal gap; and proposals to liberalize
political life and the media.

GID Chief on Hamas and Jordan's Islamic Movement
-------------- ---


6. (S) The chief of Jordan's General Intelligence
Directorate, Muhammad Dhahabi, struck a confident note with
Ambassador in a February 19 conversation about Hamas. He
said the GID had good visibility into the caucuses now under
way within Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood and its political
wing, the Islamic Action Front (ref A). The GID would be
using its influence to support the movement's current East
Bank leadership, in order to ensure that more radical (and
largely Palestinian-Jordanian) tendencies in the movement do
not take control.
HALE