SHIITE INSIDER DISCUSSES IRAQI POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 001289

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KISL JO IZ
SUBJECT: SHIITE INSIDER DISCUSSES IRAQI POLITICAL
RELATIONSHIPS, SUGGESTS OUTREACH TO SISTANI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DAVID HALE, REASONS: 1.4 (B &D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) London-based Al-Khoei Foundation Director Ghanem
Jawad gave Emboff a run-down on past political intrigues and
current political ambitions of several prominent Iraqi
political figures, including Ahmed Chalabi, Ibrahim Ja'afari,
Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, and Jalal Talabani. Jawad Ja'afari's
support from Moqtada al-Sadr in part to an alleged promise by
Ja'afari to engineer the dropping of all charges against
Sadrites (including Moqtada's nephew) for the 2003 Najaf
murder of Abdel Majid al-Khoei. Jawad also suggested that
Ja'afari's PM candidacy is not too pleasing to Ayatollah
SISTANI, and speculated that some in 555 may privately work
to undermine Ja'afari's ability to form a new government.
While acknowledging that he had not "pre-cleared" this
suggestion with SISTANI, Jawad recommended that U.S.
Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad consider sending a private
letter to SISTANI outlining U.S. goals in Iraq, and perhaps
seek arrangements for periodic confidential USG consultations
with a SISTANI-nominated associate outside Iraq. End
Summary.


2. (C) Emboff met on February 12 with London-based Al-Khoei
Foundation Director Ghanim Jawad, a prominent member of the
anti-Saddam opposition, long-time USG contact close to
circles around the Ayatollah SISTANI, and the former
assistant and confidante of 'Abdel Majid al-Khoei, murdered
in Najaf in 2003, allegedly on the orders of Moqtada al-Sadr.
Jawad maintains close personal contacts with many key Shiite
and Kurdish figures, ranging from Ahmed Chalabi (with whom he
lived for several years) to the circle around Ayatollah
SISTANI. During the conversation, Jawad made the following
comments:

Ahmed Chalabi
--------------


3. (C) Jawad claimed that Ahmed Chalabi is hoping to
continue his current role as a de facto "Energy Czar"
overseeing the Ministries of Oil and Electricity in the new
government. Jawad claimed that Chalabi wants to use this
position to recapture the confidence of the USG, and develop
a new "pro-Chalabi" lobby in the U.S. based on support from
major oil companies. In this context, Jawad said, Chalabi
will actively support energy sector privatization and seek to
promote U.S. corporate interests. Jawad added that Chalabi
is also attracted to this lucrative sector as a source for
personal gain, but called this secondary to the above plan.
According to Jawad, Chalabi wants to replace Iyad Allawi as
the USG's "favorite" Iraqi, and feels like "a fish out of
water" without USG support.


4. (C) Jawad said that Chalabi is close to some Iranian
figures, and said that Chalabi has long been impressed by the
Iranians' cleverness and sophistication in pursuing their
goals. Jawad added that Chalabi has been flirting with
Iranian officials since at least the mid-1990's. According
to Jawad, in the 1990,s Chalabi worked with Aras Habib, a
Kurdish Shiite, to facilitate Iranian intelligence
infiltration into Iraq, most of which (Jawad said) targeted
the Mujahideen al-Khalq. Jawad claimed that Chalabi had
mused to him in the past about becoming a mediator between
the Americans and the Iranians (specifically the Rafsanjani
circle),but never won the Iranians, confidence, and may
have given up this goal for now as impracticable. Jawad
stressed that he considers Chalabi a close personal - but not
political - friend. He claimed that Chalabi has great gifts
but is completely self-serving, and endorsed the joke that
"Ahmed Chalabi knows exactly what needs to be done, and will
do exactly the opposite."

Ja'afari and al-Hakim
--------------


5. (C) Jawad claimed that Ja'afari and al-Hakim have a
deep-seated, intense dislike for each other that goes back to
the 1980's, when both were exiles in Iran. According to
Jawad, Ja'afari was involved in a plot to smear Al-Hakim,s
brother, Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al-Hakim, to the Iranians as
an agent of Saddam (Jawad claimed that the Iranians were
already suspicious of al-Hakim because he had cooperated with
the Shah). Jawad said that Ayatollah Khamenei, who then had
responsibility for the Iraq portfolio, ordered the arrest of
al-Hakim's chief assistant, who was imprisoned for a month
before the truth came out that there was no substance to the
allegation.


6. (C) Jawad claimed that this incident, not ideological

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objections to the Islamic state (as he claims),is what led
to Ja'afari's exit from Iran and relocation to London.
According to Jawad, subsequent attention from the US and the
UK governments ultimately helped Ja'afari re-establish
himself in Iranian eyes as a useful political leader.

Ja'afari and Talabani
--------------


7. (C) Jawad traced alleged bad blood between Jalal Talabani
and Ja'afari to an incident in 1999, in which Talabani felt
manipulated and tricked by Ja'afari at an opposition meeting.
According to Jawad, their relationship started downhill
after this meeting and has deteriorated since. Jawad
asserted that former Ja'afari aide Laith Kubba is also
strongly disliked by Talabani and was recently ejected from
his official position and membership in the Ja'afari circle
in part as a gesture to Talabani prior to government
formation negotiations.

Ja'afari and al-Sadr
--------------


8. (C) Jawad claimed that some time ago, Ja'afari recruited
al-Sadr political associate Baha al-Araji to be his
representative within the al-Sadr bloc. Araji, whom he said
used to operate a shoe shop, was won over by a combination of
money and promised help with the freeing of his brother,
Hazem al-Araji, who was a prisoner of the coalition forces.
Jawad said that al-Araji has since been quite open in his
advocacy of an alliance between al-Sadr and Ja'afari, to the
extent that Moqtada al-Sadr jokingly refers to him as "Baha
Ja'afari." According to Jawad, the deal that won Ja'afari
the al-Sadr group's support for the Prime Ministership
consists of three to four ministries, distribution of
millions of dollars to al-Sadr associates, plus a promise to
quash (including through subvention of witnesses) all charges
against al-Sadr supporters for the murder of 'Abdel Majid
al-Khoei, and the release of Moqtada's former chief assistant
and his nephew from prison. (Embassy Baghdad Comment: Jawad
is not a disinterested observer in the al-Khoei murder case.
End Embassy Baghdad Comment).

Jaffari as Prime Minister
--------------


9. (C) Jawad expressed dismay at the designation of Ja'afari
as the 555 candidate for PM, (although he did not like Abdel
Mahdi either for this post). He said that Ja'afari never
listens to anyone, and "can't even run a cabinet meeting,"
much less a government. Jawad claimed that Ayatollah SISTANI
was also unlikely to be pleased with this result, as SISTANI
wants someone who can bring together all Iraqis into an
effective government, and feels that Ja'afari can't do this.
Jawad opined that Fadhila party leader Nadim al-Jabiri would
have been the best choice, but said that SISTANI cannot
endorse him even indirectly due to a conflict with Jabiri,s
spiritual mentor Ayatollah al-Yaqubi, a former chemical
engineer whom, Jawad said, SISTANI believes is not qualified
to hold the title of Ayatollah. Jawad speculated that some
in the 555 coalition, including al-Hakim and Jawad al-Maliki
within Da'wa, will be privately pleased if Ja'afari
ultimately fails to form a government.

Recommended USG Approach to SISTANI
--------------


10. (C) While Jawad asserted that "the Ayatollah SISTANI is
not opposed to U.S. objectives in Iraq," he cautioned that
"many factors affect his thinking," including an alleged
close relationship between his son and Iran. Jawad
recommended that U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad draft a
confidential letter to SISTANI in Arabic outlining the U.S.

SIPDIS
agenda and strategic goals for Iraq, and requesting SISTANI's
opinion. Jawad suggested that this letter be hand-delivered
directly to SISTANI through the Ayatollah Hussein Sadr of
Baghdad. Jawad said that preliminary talks on this approach
should be opened by the U.S. Embassy with Ayatollah al-Sadr
to choreograph what Jawad opined could be a significant and
constructive exchange of letters. Jawad suggested that we
also use this or a similar trustworthy channel to seek
regular consultations through a person designated by SISTANI
to meet with US officials on a regular basis outside Iraq.
Note: Jawad characterized this proposal as his own idea, and
said that it was not "pre-cleared" with Ayatollah al-Sadr or
SISTANI. End Note.

Bio Notes
--------------


11. (C) Ghanem Jawad was the Iraqi National Congress's

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(INC's) first human rights coordinator. He subsequently left
the INC, he claims over Chalabi,s leadership style, though
he retains his personal friendship with Chalabi, with whom he
lived in the 1990's in Iraqi Kurdistan. Jawad currently
supports Iyad Allawi politically. Jawad took Laith Kubba,s
place at the al-Khoe,i Foundation when Kubba came to the
United States in 1995-1996. Ghanem shared 'Abdel Majid
al-Khoei,s vision of moderate democracy with the support of
personally religious Iraqis, and (as a result of al-Khoe'is'
murder) is strongly opposed to Muqtada al-Sadr. Ghanem,s
daughter works for a foundation associated with the British
Foreign Office; his sister is a professor at Baghdad
University in the same faculty as Nadim al-Jabiri, and
according to Jawad, sometimes serves as an informal
go-between between him and al-Jabiri.


12. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Baghdad.
HALE