Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALMATY601
2006-02-14 12:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Office Almaty
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO RESULTS OF 2005 MADRID

Tags:  PARM ETTC KSCA PREL TSPA KZ 
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VZCZCXRO6392
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHTA #0601 0451201
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141201Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4106
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 000601 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),EUR/PRA (J. CONLON),ISN/MTR
(P. DURHAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PARM ETTC KSCA PREL TSPA KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO RESULTS OF 2005 MADRID
MTCR PLENARY

REF: A. 05 STATE 224815


B. 05 ALMATY 833

Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALMATY 000601 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),EUR/PRA (J. CONLON),ISN/MTR (P. DURHAM) E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016 TAGS: PARM ETTC KSCA PREL TSPA KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO RESULTS OF 2005 MADRID MTCR PLENARY REF: A. 05 STATE 224815 ¶B. 05 ALMATY 833 Classified By: Amb. John Ordway, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Kazakhstan is frustrated that the U.S. does not support its application for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MFA is seeking expert-level discussions in order to obtain a better understanding of U.S. objections and to lay out its case. Post believes it would be useful to hold such discussions in advance of any Nazarbayev visit to Washington. End summary. ¶2. (C) Post delivered Ref A MTCR non-paper and Department translation to Olzhas Togyzbayev of the MFA Security Affairs department on January 19. Togyzbayev was informed that the information was considered confidential. ¶3. (C) In a meeting with POEC chief on February 8, Togyzbayev and Security Affairs deputy director Sergey Savelyev expressed disappointment that the U.S. position on Kazakhstan's desire for MTCR membership had not changed. Reiterating previous arguments (Ref B),Savelyev said that the GOK had a hard time understanding why Kazakhstan was not admitted when countries with less expertise in missile technology were. ¶4. (C) Savelyev expressed appreciation for the Ref A offer of consultations on MTCR in Washington. He indicated, however, that Kazakhstani Embassy personnel were not sufficiently familiar with MTCR to have productive discussions; it was important to have experts speak directly with experts. Savelyev invited a USG delegation to come to Astana to discuss the issue in detail. He underscored the importance of holding the discussions in Astana in order to permit dialogue with the full range of Kazakhstani ministries. Savelyev indicated that the GOK could send a small delegation to Washington for discussions if necessary, but considered that a less productive approach. ¶5. (C) Comment/request for guidance: Post believes it would be useful to have expert-level discussion of Kazakhstan's MTCR aspirations in advance of any visit to Washington by President Nazarbayev. During such a U.S. visit, Nazarbayev could raise MTCR during high-level meetings. We request guidance from the Department on prospects for a visit by MTCR specialists to Astana, or alternatively, meetings with Kazakhstani experts in Washington. End comment/request for guidance. ORDWAY

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