KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALMATY 003065 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016 TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM MEETS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER TOKAYEV Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum and Ambassador Ordway held a wide-ranging discussion with Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in Astana on August 25. Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would continue to press its bid for the 2009 OSCE chairmanship. Feigenbaum responded that the United States does not and will not support Kazakhstan for 2009. The meeting also covered a range of bilateral and regional issues. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Kazakhstan to Continue Pursuing OSCE Chairmanship in 2009 -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The heart of the meeting occurred in its final minutes, when discussion turned to Kazakhstan,s bid to chair the OSCE in 2009. Tokayev urged the United States to acknowledge Kazakhstan,s progress in democratization, especially relative to its neighbors in the Central Asian region. He drew special attention to the State Committee for Democratization, which he predicted would produce tangible results. He noted Kazakhstan,s upcoming regional elections and proposed expansion of the Parliament. These steps, said Tokayev, constitute tangible evidence of the GOK,s commitment to democratic reform. In light of such steps, he expressed his hope that the United States would revisit its position and support Kazakhstan,s 2009 bid as a signal that the United States recognizes Kazakhstan,s progress toward democracy. Tokayev said he understood U.S. reservations on the matter, but it was important to focus on progress rather than shortcomings. He added that, in his view, democratic reform would become more difficult in Kazakhstan if the United States did not support the 2009 bid. In the event, domestic proponents of reform would be weakened politically. ¶3. (C) Feigenbaum responded that Tokayev,s remarks were deeply disappointing. After the foreign minister,s July 6 meeting with Secretary Rice in Washington, there had been considerable interest in the United States throughout July and August as to whether and how Kazakhstan would resolve the issue in a mutually agreeable way. Last week, Washington had heard Tokayev,s clear message to Ambassador Ordway that Kazakhstan would not, in fact, stand down. As a result, the U.S. position had become even more firm: the United States does not and will not support Kazakhstan,s bid to chair the OSCE in 2009. Reiterating earlier USG messages, Feigenbaum explained that Kazakhstan does not yet meet the OSCE,s standards for a chairman in office. ¶4. (C) Following Tokayev,s July 6 meetings, Feigenbaum continued, it was believed in Washington that the two countries had reached an understanding that Kazakhstan would defer its bid. In return, the United States would go out of its way not to embarrass Kazakhstan, focusing instead on affirmative steps that could be taken jointly to help Kazakhstan pursue the chairmanship at a future date. Kazakhstan,s position now put the U.S. into the unfortunate position of having to discuss with other countries its thoughts on Kazakhstan,s suitability for the OSCE chairmanship ) precisely the position the United States had tried to avoid in the spirit of partnership. Feigenbaum added with regret that Kazakhstan,s position meant the two countries would be working at cross-purposes on this issue in the run-up to President Nazarbayev,s visit to Washington. ¶5. (C) Feigenbaum then reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to democratic reform in Kazakhstan. He drew attention to the list of ideas provided by the USG to assist Kazakhstan in its reform process. He reiterated the U.S. commitment to an affirmative conversation on democratization. The United States, concluded Feigenbaum, still stands ready to assist the GOK in that regard. ¶6. (C) Foreign Minister Tokayev responded that merely by communicating its position to other OSCE countries, the U.S. would, in effect, embarrass Kazakhstan, all the more so given Nazarbayev,s visit in September. Still, he said, Kazakhstan ALMATY 00003065 002 OF 004 would not withdraw its bid for 2009. By his vote count, Kazakhstan had already secured the support of 70 percent of OSCE members, including all of the CIS member-states. That support from third countries, he said, gave Kazakhstan the &political and moral right8 to press ahead. He added that Washington was mistaken if his July visit had given it hope that the GOK would defer its bid. He insisted he never agreed to or even mentioned the possibility of withdrawing Kazakhstan,s bid. ¶7. (C) Tokayev proposed the two countries focus on how to minimize embarrassment. He noted that there was still time to talk about the issue, and asked the U.S. not to go public with its views. He added that talking to European governments was tantamount to going public, as the U.S. position would quickly find its way into the media. In response, Feigenbaum reiterated his regret that the U.S. had been forced into this position. -------------- Assessing the Bilateral Relationship -------------- ¶8. (C) Until the exchange on Kazakhstan,s OSCE bid, the meeting had been uncontroversial. Tokayev began by emphasizing the importance of the upcoming Nazarbayev visit to Washington. Feigenbaum noted ongoing USG planning. Tokayev informed DAS Feigenbaum that a draft joint statement had been sent to Kazakhstan,s Embassy in Washington. He said he had directed Ambassador Saudabayev to work with all relevant USG agencies to ensure that the document fully reflects the robust nature of the bilateral relationship. ¶9. (C) He stated that all talks between the two presidents must be positive. This would not be difficult, he suggested, given what the two countries had accomplished together in the past 2-3 years. Tokayev plainly stated his belief that there were no negative aspects in the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. He thought it natural that on occasion difficult discussions would arise between the two governments, offering human rights and democratic reform as thematic examples. But in his opinion, such conversations were necessary and useful to Kazakhstan, and he encouraged the U.S. to continue to raise such issues. ¶10. (C) Feigenbaum assured Tokayev that the U.S. also places a great deal of importance on Nazarbayev,s visit. He noted the robust nature of the bilateral relationship, which now included security, economic, energy, and democracy baskets. The United States and Kazakhstan have a genuinely multidimensional relationship. He added that the chances of success would be greatly increased if, in the run-up to the visit, Kazakhstan could demonstrate a forward trajectory in the area of democratic reform. He referred to a list of tangible suggestions previously provided by the USG, adding that the USG was looking for affirmative steps. At the same time, Feigenbaum applauded the state of bilateral ties. Feigenbaum noted that U.S.-Kazakhstan cooperation was not only multidimensional but reached beyond the bilateral context. Strong and growing U.S.-Kazakhstan ties benefited the region and the world. -------------- -------------- Kazakhstani PRT Participation in Afghanistan Likely, But Not Assured -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Feigenbaum inquired about the possibility of Kazakhstan,s participation in a PRT in Afghanistan. Tokayev answered that the GOK was planning to send an interagency fact-finding team, i.e., a survey team, to Afghanistan to assess the security environment and weigh Afghan needs against Kazakhstan,s operational capabilities. He added that he had been working with Ambassador Ordway to move through these early stages. Tokayev predicted that the answer on Afghanistan would ultimately be positive. Kazakhstan,s participation will further demonstrate the strength of the bilateral relationship. But he warned that ALMATY 00003065 003 OF 004 it was premature to say anything for certain on a PRT, as Afghanistan was a difficult country in a difficult situation. (Note: Tokayev added that President Putin had recently asked him about the situation in Afghanistan. When Tokayev began to say that democracy was on the rise there, Putin replied, &Never talk to me about democracy in Afghanistan.8 End note.). -------------- U.S. Regional Presence and the SCO -------------- ¶12. (C) Tokayev then took a broader look at U.S. presence in the region. He said that if regional actors were to welcome the U.S. economic presence, they would have to acknowledge the political and military aspects of U.S. policy as well. He described the debate on this matter at the SCO,s June Summit in China, where he said Kazakhstan had argued that military operations in Afghanistan were still necessary and enhanced Central Asia,s security. Feigenbaum asked how this position had gone over with the other SCO members. Tokayev laughed and said it had been very controversial. ¶13. (C) Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s view of the SCO,s trajectory, noting the proliferation of multilateral groupings in Central Asia and questioning whether the SCO,s expanding agenda and membership would dilute the group. Tokayev characterized the SCO as an organization still in development. He noted that the geopolitical situation had changed since its creation, thus it was natural that the SCO,s agenda had evolved as well. Kazakhstan did not feel the time was right to admit new members for three reasons: no observer had formally accepted the guiding documents of the SCO; the legal framework of the organization was insufficiently developed for further expansion; and the GOK did not want to inject controversial issues into the SCO,s business (i.e., Kashmir if India and Pakistan joined, and Iran,s anti-western policies if Iran joined). -------------- -------------- Around the Horn: Tokayev,s Views on Iran, China, Uzbekistan -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Tokayev noted his contacts with Iran,s President Ahmadinejad. Feigenbaum asked for Tokayev,s assessment of the man. Tokayev did not answer directly, but opined that Iranian society was moving toward westernization. He gave his belief that young Iranians in particular desire more freedom and an end to their country,s isolation. With regard to Kazakhstan-Iran relations, Tokayev stated that while economic ties were increasing, difficulties remain. He mentioned that the two countries had explored the possibility of a presidential visit, but it had been postponed due to Iran,s unhelpful attitude toward the Caspian. Tokayev characterized Caspian delimitation as a difficult issue that would take years to resolve. Tokayev also predicted future problems in Iran,s energy sector, as its oil and gas infrastructure was becoming increasingly outdated. ¶15. (C) Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan-China relations as very good. He noted an upcoming Nazarbayev to Beijing, and possibly Hong Kong, in December, as well as President Hu,s recent stop in Kazakhstan. He opined, however, that Chinese companies were seeking access to Kazakhstan,s oil market on political rather than purely economic grounds. As such, he saw Chinese ownership of Kazakhstan,s energy sector as a security issue and thought their share in the Kazakhstani market should be capped at current levels. ¶16. (C) With regard to Uzbekistan, Tokayev saw its participation in the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty Organization as positive in that its absence had created a hole in these ostensibly ®ional8 organizations. When pressed by DAS Feigenbaum and Ambassador Ordway about Uzbekistan,s policies on visas, customs, and particularly on landmines, Tokayev admitted that Uzbekistan,s membership has come with its share of difficulties. But he suggested that Uzbekistan,s newfound ALMATY 00003065 004 OF 004 interest in these organizations was a signal that Karimov may be shifting his foreign policy in a positive direction. ORDWAY