Q1 AND Q2 FRAUD SUMMARY - ALMATY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ALMATY 002370

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, INL/HSTC PASS TO KCC
POST FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS KCRM CPAS CMGT ASEC KZ
SUBJECT: Q1 AND Q2 FRAUD SUMMARY - ALMATY

REF: A. STATE 205073, B. ALMATY 355, C. ALMATY 1476


1. A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Since independence in 1991, the
economic situation in most of Kazakhstan has improved. In
the larger cities, such as Almaty, Astana, and Atyrau, the
oil and gas industry has provided an economic boom.
However, the improvement in living conditions is uneven and
in many rural areas there are still pockets of extreme
poverty and economic hardship. The economic situation is
aggravated by corruption, which motivates much of the visa
fraud encountered by post. Many visa applicants have
unofficial jobs as produce sellers or goods traders. It is
difficult to verify income from these jobs, let alone
establish strong ties to entice applicants to return.

Most visa applicants desire to travel to Brooklyn and Rego
Park, NY, where there are very large Russian-speaking
populations. There also appears to be a growing group of
Kazakhstani religious refugees in the Seattle, WA area.
Students from the region often seek to study English in
Houston, TX or Omaha, NE. A significant number of ethnic
Russians have sought to leave Kazakhstan since independence.
The government and other organizations here are actively
promoting study and use of the Kazakh language, and also
focusing on indigenous culture. However, in both areas the
process here has been slower than in neighboring Central
Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan.

While the number of Kazakhstani immigrants to the United
States is increasing, it is still fairly low.

Fraudulent documents, especially invitation letters,
employment letters and other bona fides are available and
easy to come by. However, it is unusual to see fraudulent,
official Kazakhstani documents such as passports and birth
certificates. On the other hand, it is common to see
fraudulent official documents from neighboring countries.
The most common occurrence of official document fraud is the
switching of nationalities from neighboring countries in
Central Asia. Due to historic, ethnic and cultural ties
among Central Asian populations, it is easy to switch
nationalities.


B. NIV FRAUD: Embassy Almaty processes NIV visas for
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. The most widespread incidence of
consular fraud in Kazakhstan is related to NIV applications,
featuring false job and invitation letters. Recently, post
has seen more sophisticated attempts to fraudulently obtain
visas, including P and O petitions and H2B petitions. The
current NIV refusal rate is 18% and more than twice that for
Tajiks.

For a number of months, Post received applications from
groups of Tajik athletes intending to compete in the United
States in various competitions. The sports ranged from Tae
Kwon Do to Arm Wrestling. Nearly all of the applicants were
unqualified -- their only travel outside of Tajikistan was
their trip to Almaty for their visa interview.

Post has recently uncovered P petition fraud perpetrated by
Tuscan Art, Inc. (reftel C). Of 15 applicants claiming to be
part of two nationally-known performing groups from
Tajikistan, only 6 were actual performers. The remaining
were "hangers-on". An in-depth investigation by Post
determined that the petition has submitted many similar
petitions in CIS countries.

Additionally, Post has seen an increase in the number of H2B
applicants over the past quarter. It would appear that as
petitioners are unsuccessful in obtaining workers from
Europe and the Caucasus, they are moving further east to
Central Asia.

As the Summer Work and Travel season has started, Post has
begun to see job offers from particular parties of concern.
When discussing with applicants about how they obtained
their job offers, the number one answer is "on the
Internet." It also appears that a small group of students
have paid for their job offers. Post is flagging particular
applications for follow-up in the fall, based on comments
received from our 2005 Summer Work and Travel season
validation study (septel to follow).

Student visa fraud (F visas) still remains rare in
Kazakhstan. The majority of Kazakhstani students are
qualified for their visa. Those who are not usually do not
provide fraudulent documents. However, post also
adjudicates visas from Tajikistan, where many students
remain unqualified to study in the United States because of
their inability to provide proof of sufficient financial
means to pay for their first year of study.

Post is seeing an increasing number of Third Country
Nationals applying from the region and beyond, including
Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Israel, who often
have difficulty proving ties to either Kazakhstan or their
home country. Many times, these applicants have previous
refusals from their home countries or neighboring posts.

Post does not see significant or noticeable fraud in other
visa categories, including R, A, G, or H1B.


C. IV FRAUD: Post processes immigrant visas for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Approximately 60% of
post's IV cases are from Uzbekistan. Beginning in Summer
2006, Embassy Tashkent will process Uzbek IV applications.

Recently Post has seen multiple K-1 petitions filed for
the same person by different petitions. In one such
case, the beneficiary met both male petitioners through
an Internet dating site. She maintained correspondence
with both at the same time and even met both of them in
Istanbul, Turkey, albeit at different times. The I-129F
fiance petitions were filed within two weeks of one
another, although neither petition knew about the
other. The email correspondence and description of the
"meeting" for both petitioners reads like a script.
After a long fraud interview, the applicant admitted
that she was engaged to both American men. The
petitions were sent for revocation, but interestingly
enough, even though the petitioners were advised of the
situation, one still professed his intention to marry
the beneficiary. In an odd turn of events, the
beneficiary stated that she would not marry this
petitioner after all.


D. DV FRAUD: Post processes immigrant visas for Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Post works closely
with neighboring consular sections to verify the validity of
documentation. Approximately 80% of post's DV cases are
from Uzbekistan. Beginning in Summer 2006, Embassy Tashkent
will process Uzbek DV applications.

Post has encountered a number of suspicious Affidavits of
Support and notarials provided by ethnic Russian Americans
located in Chicago, Illinois and Brooklyn, New York. It
appears that a translation Agency OMEGA LLC, located in
Samarqand, Uzbekistan at Ziyokor St. Apt. 31, Samarqand,
Uzbekistan 703033; along with its translators Nina
Vyacheslavovna Pogosyan and M. Abduhamedova assist in the
completion of Diversity Visa package paperwork and the
search for potential "financial sponsors" for Uzbekistani
nationals. They advise DV winners what documents they should
acquire to improve their chances of getting a visa, usually
a new passport, a military service book, or a new birth
certificate. For these services, they charge 400,000 UZB
SUMs, about $400 (8 month's salary.)

Many applicants serviced by Agency OMEGA have provided
Affidavits of Support notarized by Leonard Schwartz of
Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Schwartz himself has been a sponsor
for a number of DV cases processed in Almaty over the past
year. The Americans sponsoring these DV winners were based
in Chicago, but the applicants provided a Brooklyn address
for their permanent address. It remains unclear what the
connection is or the relationship to fraud, but it certainly
raises questions as to the validity of the information.


E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: ACS fraud is extremely low in
Kazakhstan. To date, post has not had major problems with
mala fide applicants trying to obtain genuine U.S. passports
or Consular Reports of Birth Abroad from the consular
section.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD: Post processes over 500 adoptions a year,
the fifth largest provider of adopted children for Americans
adopting abroad. To date, post has not registered problems
with fraudulent documentation or fraudulent cases.


G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Post assists DHS
Moscow, the Department and the BCIS District offices in the
United States with verifying documents for refugee and
asylum cases. In most instances, these documents turn out
to be fraudulent.


H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Cooperation
with the Kazakhstani government authorities is mixed. MFA
is in the capital of Astana and normally requires a
diplomatic note before responding to official requests.
However, post has good relations with the MFA representative
in Almaty. There is a noted lack of cooperation or
organization among Kazakhstan's ministries and regional
departments. Despite this, post is usually able to receive
immediate assistance with verification of documents and
border crossings, most notably during the so-called "Tulip
Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan last spring.

Post has developed strong relationships with adoption
processing authorities. We also have good ties with the
Ministry of Education--the government agency that oversees
the processing of dossiers.


I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Kazakhstan's geographic
location makes it a transit point for alien and drug
smuggling, particularly from South Asia to Western Europe.

In Summer 2006 Uzbek IV/DV processing will be transferred to
Embassy Tashkent.

In Summer/Autumn 2006 Tajik NIV processing is scheduled to
be transferred to Embassy Dushanbe.

In September 2006, the Embassy will move from Almaty to
Astana. Almaty will maintain a consular section with two
American officers and eight FSNs. All IV processing,
including regional processing except for Uzbeks will remain
in Almaty. Embassy Astana will open a consular section in
September 2006 with one officer, a Consular Associate and at
least two FSNs. Astana will process only NIVs and share the
ACS workload with Almaty. The Chief of the two Consular
Sections will remain in Almaty.


J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Almaty Consular Section Chief Jeff
Lodinsky and Vice Consul Anne Baker share the workload of
Fraud Prevention Manager. Post has one full-time DV Fraud
Investigator, Ilya Pyuro. NIV fraud prevention is the
responsibility of FSN Zhanna Lim.

Jeff Lodinsky attended the Small Post Consular Leadership
Development Course (PC-108) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopa in May

2006.

Anne Baker attended the Fraud Prevention for Consular
Manager's course (PC-541) at FSI in May 2005, the Small Post
Consular Leadership Development Course (PC-108) in Mainz,
Germany in November 2005, and the EurAsia Regional Fraud
Prevention Conference in Istanbul in April 2006.

Ilya Pyuro attended the Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSNs
(PC-542) at FSI in November 2005. Mr. Pyuro also spent
three days at Embassy Tashkent at their Fraud Prevention
Unit in April 2005.

Zhanna Lim attended the NIV FSN Workshop (PC-121) at FSI in
January 2004 and the EurAsia Regional Fraud Prevention
Conference in Istanbul in April 2006.


ORDWAY