KAZAKHSTAN: A/S BOUCHER MEETS CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALMATY 001455 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EB/ESC; SCA/PO (MANN); SCA/CEN (MUDGE) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015 TAGS: KZ PGOV PREL SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: A/S BOUCHER MEETS CIVIL SOCIETY LEADERS Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN ORDWAY FOR REASONS 1.4(B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 9 meeting with A/S Boucher, Kazakhstani civil society leaders argued that the February murder of opposition politician Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly had touched off an "intra-elite struggle" which was, at its heart, a competition over who would succeed President Nazarbayev. The group cautioned the U.S. against placing too much emphasis on Kazakhstan's macroeconomic success, pointing out the country's weaknesses on the micro side, including weak institutions, the absence of an independent judiciary, and widespread corruption. As constituted, they opined, the Democratization Commission would serve only to "let off steam" among competing factions of the ruling elite; however, if the opposition were better represented, and could be convinced to participate, the Commission could serve a useful purpose. Internews' Oleg Katsiyev lamented the near-absence of independent media in Kazakhstan; even the most independent outlets, he argued, avoided reporting on sensitive subjects. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Meeting Participants: SCA A/S Richard Boucher, Senior Advisor Caitlin Hayden, USAID Director Chris Crowley, USAID Democracy Officer Sean Roberts, Energy Officer Jim Loveland (Notetaker),Yevgeniy Zhovtis (Kazakhstan International Bureau of Human Rights),Nurbulat Masanov (Polyton Discussion Club),Oleg Katsiyev (Internews). The Post-Sarsenbaiuly "Intra-Elite" Crisis -------------- ¶3. (C) Responding to A/S Boucher's invitation to assess Kazahstan's progress in implementing economic and political reform, Masanov characterized the country as undergoing an "inter-elite crisis." While the crisis had been made public by the murder of opposition politician Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly, he said, it was really about the issue of presidential succession and the struggle to restore a political balance disrupted by the December presidential elections. Just as during the last crisis, in 2001, he explained this conflict was over economic interests and personalities, not differences in strategy for Kazakhstan's development. (Note: the 2001 "crisis" was instigated by Presidential son-in-law Rakhat Aliev's clumsy, and often brutal, attempt to consolidate his own power, and ended with Aliev's four-year exile abroad as Kazakhhstan's Ambassador to Austria and the OSCE. End Note.) However, Masanov continued that, on the plus side, the crisis could serve as a catalyst for economic and political change, just as it had in 2001. He noted that for at least a brief period of time, the opposition had been able to establish a dialogue with Nazarbayev and persuade him that members of his family were engaged in wrongdoing. ¶4. (C) Asked by A/S Boucher to describe the origins of the current ruling elite, Masanov described them as a combination of the old Soviet elite, new regional elites, Nazarbayev's family, and those who were close to the President "in spirit." Most of the current opposition leaders arose from the same ranks, he said. Upon splitting with the President, he added, they had tended to ignore the existing opposition, only to repeat the same mistakes as their predecessors. ¶5. (C) A/S Boucher asked if any political leaders had been successful at creating regional "popular bases." The political center carefully managed its power in the regions, Masanov answered, appointing its own people to important regional positions. The overall effect, he concluded, was a carefully-balanced, though dynamic, network of influence and power which revolved around Nazarbayev. Then ultimately, A/S Boucher concluded, "the only real source of power is the favor of the President." "Correct," said Masanov. Even though people want institutional guarantees, he added, the President says, "I am your only guarantee." Kazakhstan's Institutional Weaknesses -------------- ¶6. (C) Zhovtis described the accomplishments and shortcomings ALMATY 00001455 002 OF 003 of Nazarbayev's long rule: on the positive side, the economy was growing, structural reforms had been more-or-less successful, and management of the macroeconomy had been "good." On the negative side, microeconomic reform lagged; and Kazakhstan lacked institutions, established "rules of the game," and an independent judiciary. The lack of solid legal foundations, Zhovtis argued, prevents the development of small and medium enterprises, and serves as a source of potential instability. ¶7. (C) Zhovtis also identified what he termed an ominous trend in Kazakhstan's official rhetoric, telling A/S Boucher that, in recent years, Kazakhstani officials had been "sliding back toward Russia" in their tendency to lie, to use language designed to manipulate public opinion, and to posit conspiracy theories to explain the actions of the regime's opponents. ¶8. (C) Like Masanov, Zhovtis also described the issue of Nazarbayev's succession as paramount. In order for Kazakhstan to progress toward democratization, he said, it had to resolve three fundamental questions: (1) How to legitimate the results of privatization in the court of public opinion (the public, he said, thinks the state assets were stolen); (2) How to make those who stole money or property during that era legally accountable (without this, Zhovtis added, the country's legal institutions lacked legitimacy); and (3) How to manage Nazarbayev's succession. These three questions, Zhovtis concluded, "influence everything." As the President gets older, he added, the intra-elite fighting will only grow stronger. The "political question is number one." Role of the Press -------------- ¶9. (C) A/S Boucher asked Zhovtis why Kazakhstan's microeconomy lagged so far behind the macroeconomy: had necessary laws not been passed? Was it a problem of corruption? Zhovtis replied that the civil law was actually not bad; the problem lay in the interpretation of the law by poorly-qualified and corrupt officials. A/S Boucher then asked if the press reported on incidents of corruption. Katsiyev responded that one source of the current regime's power was keeping the media under control. Almost all of Nazarbayev's family are large media owners, he said, and even bankers and oligarchs own national networks. About 70% of the media is owned by those close to the President, he concluded, "and the other 30% can be intimidated." ¶10. (C) Katsiyev acknowledged that private, independent news outlets existed, particularly among the regional print media. However, he said, the largest are often bought out. And remaining owners learn to practice self-censorship in order to avoid losing their business. Even "opposition" newspapers are not objective, he lamented. When we speak of "solid, private media," he explained, we are referring to media which aren't obliged to praise the authorities. However, even they avoid reporting on certain, sensitive subjects. Democratization Commission -------------- ¶11. (C) A/S Boucher asked if the Democratization Commission was serious and effective, as constituted -- and if not, what could be done to improve it. Masanov replied that Nazarbayev had created the Democratization Commission primarily as a mechanism to "let off steam" from the intra-elite struggle. For the commission to truly be effective, he said, the opposition should be involved. However, he added, to date the opposition had approached the Democratization Commission as a public relations opportunity, and not as a venue for true political participation. ¶12. (C) Zhovtis suggested that, in theory, the Democratization Commission could play an important societal role by replacing an ineffective Parliament as a forum for minority representation and open debate. However, at ALMATY 00001455 003 OF 003 present, the Commission's mandate wasn't clear -- was it a venue only for discussion, and an opportunity to let off steam; or was it charged with making concrete recommendations to the government for furthering democratization? If the latter, the opposition would have to be better-represented; if not, the majority rule of the ruling elite would guarantee the preservation of the status quo. ¶13. (C) Zhovtis told A/S Boucher that, in his opinion, the opposition would not participate in the Commission without "pre-conditions": official registration of the Alga party, more-or-less equal access to national mass media, an end to "political persecution," the rehabilitation of political "criminals," a resolution of the "Kazhegeldin question," and a transparent trial and full accountability in the Sarsenbaiuly murder case. An Appeal for a "Principled" U.S. Foreign Policy -------------- --- ¶14. (C) Offered a last word, Zhovtis urged A/S Boucher to help ensure that the U.S. took a "principled" position toward Kazakhstan's bid to chair the OSCE. The U.S. position should be clear, Zhovtis argued, and the U.S. should not let geopolitical concerns outweigh issues of democratic development and human rights. For his part, Masanov urged the U.S. to do whatever it could to integrate Kazakhstan into Western institutions, whether it was the OSCE or the EU. Get Kazakhstan involved in as many Western institutional processes as possible, he said. If, by contrast, he warned, Kazakhstan is isolated, further deterioration is inevitable. A/S Boucher replied to Zhovtis that U.S. policy toward Kazakhstan sought to strike a balance among various interests. "I hope you will see us stand up for human rights in Kazakhstan," he said. There was no doubt, Boucher concluded, that Kazakhstan's long-term stability had to be based on openness and democratic development. ¶15. (U) A/S Boucher has cleared this cable. ORDWAY