KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO NSG DISCUSSION OF INDIA

UNCLAS ALMATY 001226 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN (J. MUDGE),ISN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL ENRG KSCA PARM KNNP ETTC IN KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN'S REACTION TO NSG DISCUSSION OF INDIA NUCLEAR INITIATIVE REF: A) VIENNA 248, B) STATE 42857 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Kazakhstan is open to further discussion of the India civil nuclear initiative, but is skeptical that the Nuclear Suppliers' Group will be able to reach consensus in the near future. India needs to provide much more information about the nature of its obligations and what is being done to meet them. The Kazakhstani delegation to the recent NSG meeting came away with the impression that any "exception" adopted by the NSG would apply only to the U.S. and possibly a few other major suppliers, preventing countries like Kazakhstan from cooperating with India. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) In an April 4 meeting with POEC chief in Astana, MFA security affairs deputy director Sergey Savelyev shared Kazakhstan's impressions of the March 23 Consultative Group (CG) discussion of the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative. Savelyev, who attended the CG, said that he found A/S Rademaker's presentation very informative and thought-provoking. Noting the number of detailed questions raised by Participating Governments (PGs),Savelyev said that his own discussions "in the corridors" revealed widespread concern about the possible impact of the initiative on the existing nonproliferation legal framework (including the 1995 RevCon conclusions),as well as the likely reaction of the DPRK and Iran. ¶3. (SBU) Kazakhstan's approach was more "flexible" than that of some other PGs, Savelyev said. It is open to further discussion of the initiative. The Kazakhstani delegation had raised a few key questions (Ref A); the main concern was how the initiative would be perceived internationally. Due to the number of questions raised at the CG, Savelyev predicted that the NSG would not be able to achieve consensus on the initiative in the near future (i.e. by the upcoming Plenary Session in Rio). He thought the U.S. would have to engage quite intensively with the most skeptical delegations, such as China and the Nordics, before consensus would be possible. Savelyev included Japan in the list of countries opposed to the initiative. The challenge might not be insurmountable, Savelyev said, but "much more information is needed." ¶4. (SBU) Savelyev complained that the Indian plan for separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs was circulated too late to allow careful review during the CG. Having now read the document carefully, he believes it lacks sufficient detail regarding India's obligations. As an example, he referred to the statement that India had adopted export control rules/lists meeting NSG and MTCR requirements. What information was available to substantiate the claim? Had the rules/lists been shared with the international community? Savelyev contrasted what he termed the lack of transparency vis--vis India with Kazakhstan's experience of developing its export controls in close coordination with Western partners and maintaining a continual dialogue. ¶5. (SBU) Savelyev asked for clarification of a comment by A/S Rademaker during the CG which gave the impression that only the U.S., and possibly other "major suppliers," would be able to use the NSG exception to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India. Savelyev indicated that many delegations had come away with this impression. Ireland had openly voiced the concern that the U.S., Russia, and France would dominate the market, he said. ¶6. (SBU) Savelyev also asked whether there was any truth to reports that Pakistan had prepared documents regarding its own adherence to NSG and MTCR rules in hopes of being included in the initiative. ¶7. (SBU) Comment: When Kazakhstan talks about "international perceptions" of the initiative, it is undoubtedly referring to the positions of its powerful neighbors Russia and China. The GOK is presumably under pressure from Russia to support the initiative and from China to oppose it. It is also a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC),where it would face criticism if it supported an initiative seen as harmful to Pakistan's interests. As a firm supporter of the international nonproliferation framework, which at the same time possesses vast uranium reserves that it could profitably export to India, Kazakhstan will likely remain on the fence until the situation develops further. End comment. ORDWAY