Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS950
2006-05-25 11:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:  

BOUTEFLIKA CHANGES PRIME MINISTERS, CABINET

Tags:  PGOV KDEM AG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7428
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHAS #0950/01 1451131
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251131Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1176
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000950 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA CHANGES PRIME MINISTERS, CABINET
SHAKEUP TO FOLLOW

REF: A. ALGIERS 935


B. ALGIERS 916

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000950 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA CHANGES PRIME MINISTERS, CABINET SHAKEUP TO FOLLOW REF: A. ALGIERS 935 ¶B. ALGIERS 916 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Marc Sievers, Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (U) The Algerian press agency announced at 1800 hours local on May 24 that Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia had submitted his resignation and President Bouteflika had accepted it. This news was followed five minutes later by a second announcement that Bouteflika had appointed Minister of State and National Liberation Front Secretary General Abdelaziz Belkhadem to replace Ouyahia. Bekhadem stated that he would announce changes to the cabinet shortly, but as of the drafting of this message, he has not yet announced which ministers will be replaced. Belkhadem also informed the media that his primary focus will be on amending the constitution (see reftels) and raising the minimum wage for public sector workers and government employees, both issues on which Belkhadem had differed sharply with Ouyahia over the past year. BELKHADEM NO TECHNOCRAT -------------- ¶2. (C) Ouyahia's resignation was widely expected, but Belkhadem's appointment has come as somewhat of a surprise to Algerian commentators as well as foreign observers, since the Algiers rumor mill had pointed to Bouteflika's desire for a technocratic prime minister, such as Water Resources Minister Sellal, to serve as a neutral caretaker in the run-up to next year's parliamentary and local council elections. Instead, the President selected Belkhadem, the head of Algeria's largest political party and a man known for his strongly nationalist views and Islamist leanings, in sharp contrast to the pro-business, pro-Western and staunchly anti-Islamist Ouyahia. A cartoon on the front page of El Watan, one of Algeria's leading French-language dailies, May 25 shows a bar owner rushing to instruct a worker to take down a sign over the entrance to his establishment reading "The Friends' Bar" and replace it with a sign reading "The Brothers' Creamery, Milk and Dates." Some Algerian women contacts have already expressed alarm that Belkhadem -- whose wife and daughters are among the rare women family members of the Algerian elite to wear full facial veils -- will lead Algeria in an Islamist conservative direction. One columnist May 25 termed Belkhadem "an Islamist in a suit." BELKHADEM ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTER OF BOUTEFLIKA'S
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Differences over Constitutional amendments and public sector wage increases aside, the main point of divergence between Belkhadem and Ouyahia is their varying attitudes toward Bouteflika's National Reconciliation program. As Prime Minister, Ouyahia had to support the release over 2,000 former terrorists and efforts to convince hundreds of armed terrorist to turn themselves in, but as a former advocate of "eradicating" Islamist terrorists, Ouyahia projected a marked lack of enthusiasm for what Bouteflika clearly sees as his historic legacy. Belkhadem, on the other hand, was considered by the military to be a sympathizer with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) before that party was banned, and he played a prominent role last fall in engaging former FIS leaders abroad in an effort to gain their support for National Reconciliation. At least one interpretation of Bouteflika's decision is that he felt more comfortable with a Prime Minister whose enthusiastic support for National Reconciliation he could count on. HOW SIGNIFICANT A CHANGE? -------------- ¶4. (C) We will know more about Belkhadem's political intentions when he announces the changes in the cabinet. The moderate Islamist Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP) will almost certainly be a primary beneficiary, since its leader Aboulguerra Soltani served as Belkhadem's ally in pushing out Ouyahia, and Soltani and Belkhadem share similar views on many issues. There is press speculation that Belkhadem may bring in the harder line Islamist Islah Party and the far left Labor Party, but including those parties in the governing coalition could make it impossible for Belkhadem to govern. Belkhadem will likely need to govern from the center with an eye to expanding the FLN's base of support for the 2007 elections, and he will be carrying out the broad policy lines of President Bouteflika, who remains committed to privatization, WTO accession, cleaning up corruption, and attracting foreign investment. That said, a Belkhadem/Soltani government will have a strongly populist ALGIERS 00000950 002 OF 002 undertone and may slow the already uneven reform process further. ¶5. (C) On foreign policy, when Belkhadem was Foreign Minister from 2000 to 2005, he was at times a difficult interlocutor, for example defending the Sudanese Government over Darfur and insisting that the conflict there was little more than clashes between villagers and nomads. On Iraq, he has expressed sympathy for Sunni insurgents, though not for Zarqawi's terrorists, and he has repeatedly insisted that Algeria will never establish ties to Israel until there is an independent Palestinian state. There are also persistent reports that Belkhadem has ties to Iran. Nonetheless, Belkhadem owes his political survival and current position to Bouteflika, and he is unlikely to challenge Bouteflika's foreign policy of developing relations with the United States while simultaneously expanding Algeria's relations with key Asian, African and Latin American countries. One telling example was the several diplomatic exchanges we conducted with Belkhadem as Foreign Minister in 2003 over our request for an Article 98 exemption, which Belkhadem resisted strongly until he was overruled by Bouteflika, at which point he quietly went along. WHERE IS THE MILITARY? -------------- ¶6. (C) Ouyahia was seen as the generals' man, and another factor in his fall from Bouteflika's good graces may have been reports that the military was grooming Ouyahia to succeed the President if Bouteflika's health did not permit him to serve out his second term. Belkhadem's pro-Islamist sentiments and his Arab and Islamic foreign policy orientation have long made him suspect in the eyes of the generals, and they will be watching carefully as he puts together his new government. Since Algerian prime ministers serve at the pleasure of the President, and Bouteflika retains the confidence of the military as far as we can tell, the military is unlikely to intervene overtly. Yet the generals have many ways to make their views known behind the scenes, and they will be watching Bouteflika's health more carefully than ever, since their real concern must be that Belkhadem is positioning himself to succeed Bouteflika either at the end of his term in 2009, or sooner if the President's health fails. As for Ouyahia, he may still intend to run for President in 2009, but at least one source reported that he was so discouraged by what he considered the shabby way he had been treated that he intended to withdraw from politics entirely. BIOGRAPHIC NOTE -------------- ¶7. (C) Abdelaziz Belkhadem was born on November 8, 1945 in the central Algerian province of Laghouat. He received a high school education and began his government career in 1964 as a financial inspector. He then became a teacher before becoming deputy director of international relations in the Presidency from 1972-77, while Houari Boumediene was president. In 1977 he was elected to the National Popular Assembly (APN) as an FLN deputy. From 1988-1990, Belkhadem was Vice President of the APN, then became President of the APN until it was dissolved by the military in 1992. Belkhadem was a member of the FLN's political bureau from 1991 to 1997. After Bouteflika was elected President in 1999, Belkhadem became Foreign Minister in 2000, a post he occupied until last year. Belkhadem led the effort in 2003-2004 to remove Ali Benflis, then Bouteflika's rival, from his position as head of the FLN. Belkhadem, while still Foreign Minister, emerged as the head of the rival branch of the FLN, a position he used to push Benflis aside with the backing of the courts. Belkhadem was elected Secretary General of the "reunified" FLN in February 2005. In May 2005, he was replaced as Foreign Minister by Mohammed Bedjaoui, becoming instead Minister of State and Bouteflika's Personal Representative. The latter position enabled Belkhadem to continue to shape Algeria's Arab and Islamic policies, while leaving relations with the rest of the world to Foreign Minister Bedjaoui. Belkhadem speaks Arabic and French, but prefers to use Arabic, much to the consternation of many Western diplomats in Algiers who are unaccustomed to doing business in Algeria's national language. SIEVERS

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -