IMMINENT CABINET RESHUFFLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000935

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG
SUBJECT: IMMINENT CABINET RESHUFFLE


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

LATE NOTE: After the drafting of this cable, Turkish
Ambassador told Ambassador on the margins of the May 23
official lunch for PM Erdogan that their delegation was
informed that a new prime minister would be named May 24.

CABINET RESHUFFLE LIKELY SOON
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1. (C) A Counselor to the Prime Minister phoned our senior
political FSN May 21 and informed her that President
Bouteflika had decided not to wait until August to reshuffle
ministerial portfolios. (Note: August marks the end of the
period under National Peace and Reconciliation during which
terrorists can surrender themselves to authorities and
reintegrate into society, provided certain conditions are
met. End Note.) The shuffling, according to this
well-placed source, is now likely to occur around May 26 or

27.


2. (C) The Counselor to the Prime Minister added that two
possible scenarios were under discussion with respect to
Prime Minister Ouyahia's staying on in his current capacity.
Since President Bouteflika, according to this source,
considers the infighting among the presidential coalition
parties of Parliament to be "shameful," he could step in and
stop the attacks on Ouyahia by the FLN and MSP. The other
scenario under consideration would involve a major reshuffle
of ministerial portfolios and the President's naming a
technocrat to replace Ouyahia as head of government, as both
FLN leader Belkhadem and MSP leader Soltani have publicly
advocated. Several informed sources believe the most likely
candidate to replace Ouyahia is Abdelmalek Sellal, the
manager of Bouteflika's 2004 presidential campaign, a
four-time minister, and currently the Minister of Water
Resources. While Sellal is seen as a technocrat close to
Ouyahia's RND party, he himself contends he is an independent
who has devoted his entire adult life to public service. The
May 23 press has also reported speculation that Sellal could
be tapped to replace Ouyahia as early as May 26 or 27.

OUYAHIA CONSPICUOUSLY OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE
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3. (C) Reinforcing speculation that something serious is
afoot, Ouyahia has been out of the public eye since his
return from a medical checkup in Belgium several days ago.
In this regard, he was notably absent from the May 21 arrival
ceremony of his Turkish counterpart, PM Erdogan, who was
greeted instead by Senate President Ben Salah. He also was
not present at the May 23 state lunch for Erdogan, normally a
"must-attend" for the Prime Minister. While the May 23 press
reported Ouyahia was in his office yesterday, his Counselor
confirmed press reports that Ouyahia has not been to the
office for a week and in fact had not left his residence.
Since the Counselor also insisted that Ouyahia (a heavy
smoker) was not ill, his unexplained absences suggest he is
deliberately laying low until the dust settles.

BOUTEFLIKA LIKELY ORCHESTRATING THE CURRENT CABINET DRAMA
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In Algeria's still very opaque political system, it
remains unclear whether the political pressures to replace
Ouyahia (in particular, attacks on him by the leaders of the
other two presidential coalition partners) were orchestrated
by Bouteflika or are a reflection of the growing confidence
of majority FLN party leader Belkhadem, who returned the FLN
to the pro-Bouteflika fold in 2004 and who might have felt he
could break up the presidential coalition and weaken a rival
in the 2007 elections without fear of repercussions.
However, given Bouteflika's distrust of virtually everyone
except his mother, his penchant for tight control, and his
habit of playing potential rivals against one another, our
best guess is that Bouteflika, not an over-confident
Belkhadem, is behind the unfolding cabinet drama, even if he
is not specifically behind the political attacks per se. In
this regard, informed sources tell us that Bouteflika was not
happy when Belkhadem told the press he would sign the
friendship treaty with the Turks instead of Ouyahia. For
this reason, Bouteflika decided to put Belkhadem in his place
by asking FM Bedjaoui to play that role. Whatever the case
may be, it is clear that the explicit personal attacks on
Ouyahia by both Belkhadem and MSP leader Soltani have made it
difficult to envision the current presidential coalition
being put back together again with the current cast of
characters. Something has to give, and it looks as if
Ouyahia may be it.

NO SHORTAGE OF REASONS FOR SACKING OUYAHIA
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5. (C) There is no shortage of speculation as to the reasons
advanced for Bouteflika's alleged disenchantment with
Ouyahia. Among them are: 1) Ouyahia's lukewarm endorsement
of Bouteflika's national reconciliation strategy, his public
dismissal of constitutional revision as not a high priority;
and Bouteflika's consequent desire for a technocrat who would
implement his program without too much questions; 2)
Bouteflika's desire to replace several ministers whom he
sharply and publicly criticized during a recent inspection
tour; 3) the need to find a scapegoat for public discontent
over perennial issues of government unresponsiveness,
unemployment, housing, health, and corruption; 4)
Bouteflika's desire to avoid any repeat of the prime minister
emerging as a political rival, as happened with former Prime
Minister Benflis in 2003; and 5) irritation over speculation
that the military wanted to groom Ouyahia as Vice President
in the expectation that Bouteflika might not last out his
term. There is also speculation that Bouteflika's primary
motivation for sacking Ouyahia and undermining a major
cabinet reshuffle may have been to install a "homogeneous
government," in this case one dominated by a strong and
growing FLN as the best means to stop unseemly
coalition-infighting that is slowing down progress.
ERDMAN