IMMINENT CABINET RESHUFFLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000935 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AG SUBJECT: IMMINENT CABINET RESHUFFLE Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) LATE NOTE: After the drafting of this cable, Turkish Ambassador told Ambassador on the margins of the May 23 official lunch for PM Erdogan that their delegation was informed that a new prime minister would be named May 24. CABINET RESHUFFLE LIKELY SOON -------------- ¶1. (C) A Counselor to the Prime Minister phoned our senior political FSN May 21 and informed her that President Bouteflika had decided not to wait until August to reshuffle ministerial portfolios. (Note: August marks the end of the period under National Peace and Reconciliation during which terrorists can surrender themselves to authorities and reintegrate into society, provided certain conditions are met. End Note.) The shuffling, according to this well-placed source, is now likely to occur around May 26 or ¶27. ¶2. (C) The Counselor to the Prime Minister added that two possible scenarios were under discussion with respect to Prime Minister Ouyahia's staying on in his current capacity. Since President Bouteflika, according to this source, considers the infighting among the presidential coalition parties of Parliament to be "shameful," he could step in and stop the attacks on Ouyahia by the FLN and MSP. The other scenario under consideration would involve a major reshuffle of ministerial portfolios and the President's naming a technocrat to replace Ouyahia as head of government, as both FLN leader Belkhadem and MSP leader Soltani have publicly advocated. Several informed sources believe the most likely candidate to replace Ouyahia is Abdelmalek Sellal, the manager of Bouteflika's 2004 presidential campaign, a four-time minister, and currently the Minister of Water Resources. While Sellal is seen as a technocrat close to Ouyahia's RND party, he himself contends he is an independent who has devoted his entire adult life to public service. The May 23 press has also reported speculation that Sellal could be tapped to replace Ouyahia as early as May 26 or 27. OUYAHIA CONSPICUOUSLY OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE -------------- ¶3. (C) Reinforcing speculation that something serious is afoot, Ouyahia has been out of the public eye since his return from a medical checkup in Belgium several days ago. In this regard, he was notably absent from the May 21 arrival ceremony of his Turkish counterpart, PM Erdogan, who was greeted instead by Senate President Ben Salah. He also was not present at the May 23 state lunch for Erdogan, normally a "must-attend" for the Prime Minister. While the May 23 press reported Ouyahia was in his office yesterday, his Counselor confirmed press reports that Ouyahia has not been to the office for a week and in fact had not left his residence. Since the Counselor also insisted that Ouyahia (a heavy smoker) was not ill, his unexplained absences suggest he is deliberately laying low until the dust settles. BOUTEFLIKA LIKELY ORCHESTRATING THE CURRENT CABINET DRAMA -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In Algeria's still very opaque political system, it remains unclear whether the political pressures to replace Ouyahia (in particular, attacks on him by the leaders of the other two presidential coalition partners) were orchestrated by Bouteflika or are a reflection of the growing confidence of majority FLN party leader Belkhadem, who returned the FLN to the pro-Bouteflika fold in 2004 and who might have felt he could break up the presidential coalition and weaken a rival in the 2007 elections without fear of repercussions. However, given Bouteflika's distrust of virtually everyone except his mother, his penchant for tight control, and his habit of playing potential rivals against one another, our best guess is that Bouteflika, not an over-confident Belkhadem, is behind the unfolding cabinet drama, even if he is not specifically behind the political attacks per se. In this regard, informed sources tell us that Bouteflika was not happy when Belkhadem told the press he would sign the friendship treaty with the Turks instead of Ouyahia. For this reason, Bouteflika decided to put Belkhadem in his place by asking FM Bedjaoui to play that role. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the explicit personal attacks on Ouyahia by both Belkhadem and MSP leader Soltani have made it difficult to envision the current presidential coalition being put back together again with the current cast of characters. Something has to give, and it looks as if Ouyahia may be it. NO SHORTAGE OF REASONS FOR SACKING OUYAHIA -------------- ¶5. (C) There is no shortage of speculation as to the reasons advanced for Bouteflika's alleged disenchantment with Ouyahia. Among them are: 1) Ouyahia's lukewarm endorsement of Bouteflika's national reconciliation strategy, his public dismissal of constitutional revision as not a high priority; and Bouteflika's consequent desire for a technocrat who would implement his program without too much questions; 2) Bouteflika's desire to replace several ministers whom he sharply and publicly criticized during a recent inspection tour; 3) the need to find a scapegoat for public discontent over perennial issues of government unresponsiveness, unemployment, housing, health, and corruption; 4) Bouteflika's desire to avoid any repeat of the prime minister emerging as a political rival, as happened with former Prime Minister Benflis in 2003; and 5) irritation over speculation that the military wanted to groom Ouyahia as Vice President in the expectation that Bouteflika might not last out his term. There is also speculation that Bouteflika's primary motivation for sacking Ouyahia and undermining a major cabinet reshuffle may have been to install a "homogeneous government," in this case one dominated by a strong and growing FLN as the best means to stop unseemly coalition-infighting that is slowing down progress. ERDMAN