NEW LAW DENOTES ALGERIAN PROGRESS AGAINST

UNCLAS ALGIERS 000629 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USTR/GREG HICKS COMMERCE FOR CLDP/MARC TEJTEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EINV PGOV AG SUBJECT: NEW LAW DENOTES ALGERIAN PROGRESS AGAINST CORRUPTION REF: A. 05 ALGIERS 02469 ¶B. 05 ALGIERS 01652 ¶C. ALGIERS 0335 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: A new anti-corruption law, which took effect March 8, aims to bring Algeria in line with the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. The law is an important step in establishing an institutional framework to combat corruption and comes at a time the GoA has been actively pursuing crooked officials, notably in the hitherto untouchable realms of financial services, energy, and local governance. ¶2. (SBU) Critics nonetheless decried the new legislation's exclusion of a proposed article that would have required members of Parliament (MP's) to declare their assets or risk loss of parliamentary immunity. The representative office of Transparency International told us the sluggishness that has marked each step of Algeria's adoption of the law -- not to mention Algeria's failed past endeavors combating corruption -- does not bode well for the discipline needed this time around. Algeria received a rating of 2.8 out of 10 in Transparency International's annual corruption index, underscoring the enduring pervasiveness of both small and large-scale corruption in the country despite the high profile investigations. (End Summary.) NEW LAW AN EXTENSION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (U) Algeria's new anti-corruption law 06-01 came into effect March 8. The law aimed to bring Algeria in line with its commitments as a signatory to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Among its 74 provisions, the law calls for the creation of an as-yet-unnamed centralized body to monitor and combat corruption. (Note: Algeria disbanded its previous anti-corruption body, the National Observatory Against Corruption (ONSPC),in 1999 because of its ineffectiveness. End note.) The law further broadens the definition of criminal activity, reinforces existing penal sanctions, and contains specific language aimed at curbing money laundering. (Note: Per ref A, separate money-laundering legislation was passed in February 2005. End Note.) ¶4. (SBU) Sluggishness marked each step of Algeria's path towards adoption of the new law and accession to international conventions. The Algerian Senate, which was expected to pass the anti-corruption law last September (ref B),approved the measure January 3; it then languished more than two months before taking effect March 8 with its publication in the Official Record. Algeria adopted the U.N. Convention Against Corruption in 2003 but did not ratify the law until the following year. Similarly, Algeria signed the African Convention Against Corruption in 2003 but waited until January 2006 to ratify it. Critics worry that the slow pace with which Algeria adopted the legal framework to combat corruption does not portend well for the discipline it needs to rigidly enforce its laws. WATCHDOG GROUP GUARDEDLY SUPPORTIVE OF NEW LAW, SKEPTICAL OF ENFORCEMENT -------------- ¶5. (U) Speaking at a press conference at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Institute in Algiers March 29, the Director of the Algerian Association for the Fight Against Corruption (AACC), Djillali Hadjadj, who represents Transparency International in Algeria, stressed that Algeria's adoption of the new law was undoubtedly a step forward but that political will on the part of the administration would be the key to "fighting corruption at its roots." He noted numerous examples of how lack of political will and transparency stifled past attempts to eliminate corruption in Algeria. He emphasized that Algeria already had a law requiring public servants to declare their assets to the government: the unenforced Ordinance 71 of January 11, 1997. In addition, Hadjadj mentioned the National Court of Accounts, which is charged with inspecting public expenses. Citizens have a right to access its findings, yet it has only published reports twice in the last 25 years. Hadjadj added that Algeria's previous anti-corruption body had never publicly released its reports and that its staff was inexperienced and unqualified. ¶6. (U) Underscoring the point that the key obstacle for Algeria remained enforcement, AACC Director Hadjadj highlighted a few examples of the GoA's missed opportunities to gain from international experience in the battle against corruption. He noted that Algeria had failed to follow up after a 2005 OECD initiative to create an informal Maghreb-wide group to combat corruption. The GoA similarly snubbed assistance from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Although FATF first approached Algeria in 2000, Hadjadj noted, the GoA had not followed up on its recommendations because FATF requires participating countries to first undergo an independent evaluation. (Comment: On the other hand, the GoA actively embraced U.S. advice in drafting the new money-laundering legislation and Algeria's Interministerial Financial Cell has repeatedly requested U.S. training for GoA officials involved in anti-money laundering enforcement -- requests which we are working on but for which Department has not yet identified funding. End comment.) ¶7. (U) Hadjadj also outlined what he viewed as the key gaps in the new law and the GoA's anti-corruption posture. Without naming the magistrate whom the GoA nominated to head the new anti-corruption body, Hadjadj claimed that he was someone who lacked a spotless record; the Superior Council of Magistrates had recently sanctioned him for an unspecified malfeasance. In addition, Hadjadj remarked that Algeria's new law mandated that the government anti-corruption body furnish its results to the President; rather, he argued, it should render these reports public. Finally, Hadjadj commented that the law should have included provisions to better engage civil society groups in the battle against corruption and shield whistle-blowers from persecution. As a point of comparison, he highlighted Jordan as an exemplar in the Middle East because of its work with FATF and its close collaboration with civil society groups. ARTICLE SEVEN A KEY GAP -------------- ¶8. (U) The final law noticeably excluded a provision that would have required MP's to declare their property to the government or risk loss of parliamentary immunity. Algerian MP's opposed to the provision, known as Article Seven, said they could not justify the provision because it was not included in the U.N. convention that they ratified in 2004. Some Algerian political parties, notably the FLN and MSP, claimed Article Seven would have provoked struggles among local politicians seeking to embarrass their political opponents. An AACC communiquQ declared that the omission of Article Seven had "emptied the text of substance." Critics argued that Article 36 of the new law -- which calls for imprisonment ranging from six months to five years or a fine ranging from approximately USD 700 to USD 7,000 for civil servants that do not respond truthfully to inquiries into their holdings -- was too weak. ¶9. (SBU) The exclusion of Article Seven from the final law unnerved many Algerians, according to Embassy contacts. The intransigence of many MP's -- whose monthly stipends and non-cash benefits such as free housing, household staff, and interest-free loans greatly exceed the means of typical Algerian families -- struck many as a direct affront to the spirit of the new law. AACC Director Hadjadj emphasized that the removal of Article Seven was a lost opportunity for Algeria to have a fully transparent legislature in place before the 2007 parliamentary elections. RECENT CRACKDOWNS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) On the positive side of the ledger, the last year has witnessed a noticeable increase in public investigations and outcry against corruption. Additionally, there are some indications that behind the scenes some senior military officials have urged the GoA to take stronger actions against corruption. The Algerian press reported that the Supreme Court would review the case of the former Wali of Blida, Mohamed Bouricha, who was accused of skimming public funds, forgery, and bribery. In January, the Director General of the Algerian Customs Authority, Sid Ali Lebib, announced on television that he had sacked 100 executives -- including seven central division directors -- and referred 530 customs agents to the authorities for corrupt or unprofessional practices. At the time, Lebib said 2006 would be the year of fighting against corruption. The Ministry of Justice dismissed 33 magistrates in 2005 because of "irregularities" in their rulings and started 755 investigations into misappropriation of public agricultural lands by the National Gendarmerie. ¶11. (SBU) Officials announced late last year that one of Algeria's largest public banks, the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (BADR),misappropriated USD 163 million (ref C); this came close on the heels of a reported USD 205 million loss at the National Bank of Algeria (BNA). State-owned oil and gas company Sonatrach suspended over 20 senior executives in June 2005 for taking bribes and over-invoicing. According to the energy editor of the Algerian daily El Watan, officials discovered the corrupt practices after a bidder for a gasket contract at the Arzew complex complained to Sonatrach that its offer had been unfairly refused. More recently, the state-owned insurance fund CASNOS confirmed March 4 that 150 embezzlement cases (representing a total loss of USD 14 million) were pending in the courts and that CASNOS had dismissed 68 executives and 669 insurance agents in 2005. President Bouteflika raised the issue in his remarks in March to the National Association of Lawyers, noting that the GoA should raise the salaries of magistrates in order to counter corruption. He also rather bluntly called on judges not to succumb to pressure from officials, be they political or military. ¶12. (SBU) Anecdotal examples aside, metrics on Algerian corruption remain hard to find. Algeria received a rating of 2.8 out of 10 in Transparency International's annual corruption index, denoting the pervasiveness of small and large-scale corruption in the country. AACC Director Hadjadj told us that his organization does not have reliable statistics on the annual number of cases in Algeria but he estimated that annual outflows to offshore tax havens including Luxembourg and the Isle of Jersey were USD 500 million per year. (Note: Prime Minister Ouyahia cited this same figure in an interview last year with the French magazine Le Point. End note.) COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Despite the slow adoption of the law and initial skepticism by the AACC, the GoA's increasingly public show of force against corruption, including President Bouteflika's comments on the issue, denotes an important recognition of the need for transparency throughout the Algerian Government. After the infamous Khalifa Bank scandal roiled the Algerian economy in 2003, recent GoA crackdowns against BADR and BNA send the signal that the gangrene in Algeria's banking sector is not limited to the private sector; public sector banks will not be immune from oversight either. Similarly, the prosecution of the Wali of Blida shows that local government officials are no longer untouchable. The new law, coupled with the GoA's recent inclination to publicly tackle corrupt officials, shows Algeria is moving in the right direction. ERDMAN