NEA A/S WELCH'S MARCH 14 DISCUSSION OF HAMAS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000501 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR ALL NEAR EAST COLLECTIVE E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 TAGS: PREL PARM IR IZ IS PA SU AG SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH'S MARCH 14 DISCUSSION OF HAMAS, SUDAN, IRAQ, AND IRAN WITH PM OUYAHIA Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In their March 14 meeting, PM Ouyahia and NEA A/S Welch primarily focused on the Palestinian issue and dealings with Hamas. A/S Welch stressed that U.S. assistance to the Palestinians would continue but not through government channels so long as Hamas was in government and failed to recognize Israel, renounce violence and terror, and observe the Palestinian Authority's previous commitments. Ouyahia said Algeria's own experience with Islamists taught it the value of allowing conservative religious views to be expressed in the governing process and told Welch that Algeria would continue to funnel assistance through the Palestinian Government. At the same time, Algeria would continue to defend the peace process and encourage Hamas to accept the realities of the present situation. Welch also pointed out the growing threat posed by an Iran that was increasingly inserting itself in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Ouyahia said Algeria shared U.S. concerns about Iran's undue influence in Iraq and that he had urged three recent Iranian delegations to pursue responsible policies. On Iraq, Ouyahia said Algeria remained supportive of the U.S. and the need to look forward, not backward, so that the Iraqis could enjoy a normal life. With respect to Sudan, Ouyahia told Welch the GOA strongly supported the peace process on Darfur and that it was incumbent on the international community to help the African Union move forward there without embarrassing the government in Khartoum. Septel to report discussion of Western Sahara and bilateral issues. (End Summary.) ¶2. (C) In his March 14 meeting with Prime Minister Ouyahia, NEA A/S David Welch, accompanied by Ambassador, NEA Staff Assistant Donick and PolEc Chief, said it was good to be back in Algeria after 17 years. A lot had happened, commented Ouyahia, since then. As the State Department official responsible for the Middle East and North Africa, Welch said regional security, stability, and reform were his foremost concern. He then asked his Algerian interlocutor for his assessment of the upcoming Arab League summit in Khartoum. GOA ASSESSMENT OF KHARTOUM MEETING -------------- ¶3. (C) Ouyahia said there would be three main issues for discussion: the Middle East (Palestinian issue),Iraq, and Sudan. Starting with the Palestinians, Ouyahia said Algeria had enjoyed friendly relations with the PLO and Fatah for many years. Bouteflika, for example, was one of the first leaders to send a congratulatory message to Mahmoud Abbas upon his election to the Presidency of the Palestinian Authority. Ouyahia said although there were differences of opinion between Algiers and Washington on the Palestinian issue, both sides agreed the Palestinian people deserved a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The message of the Arab League summit in Beirut was an important one from the Arabs. Algeria would continue to work toward peace in the spirit of the Beirut declaration and would not turn its back on the new Hamas government. ¶4. (C) Turning to Iraq's place on the Khartoum agenda, Ouyahia noted that Algeria had supported the political process as evidenced by its involvement in the national dialogue meetings last year in Cairo. The GOA was concerned that the Iraqi leadership was not cohesive; Iraq's territorial integrity and the unity of its people was important for Iraq's future. Algeria's position on maintaining foreign troops in Iraq, noted Ouyahia, was not far from U.S. statements on the need for troops. It was important that we not look backward on Iraq; the future was ahead of us and we must look in that direction toward a return to normal life for the Iraqi people. ¶5. (C) On Sudan, Ouyahia said his government strongly supported the peace process in that country, both the peace agreement in the south and the current efforts in Darfur. The Africans were not financially able to maintain the necessary peacekeepers, but agreement with the Sudanese authorities was needed before handing the responsibilities over to the UN. Rule number one from his time in the UN, said Ouyahia, was that no peacekeeping forces could be deployed in a country that did not want their presence. The objective between now and November should not be to harm the Sudanese; there was a legitimate need to bring Sudan on board to the process. President Bashir has made efforts. It was important to bear in mind that the peace agreement in the south created winners and losers in Sudan. Now, another ALGIERS 00000501 002 OF 004 peace process was underway, and undermining the Sudanese Government in front of its population was not helpful to that process. It was incumbent upon the international community to help the African Union move forward in Darfur without creating additional complications. WELCH PRESENTS U.S. VIEWS ON SUDAN AND IRAQ -------------- ¶6. (C) Welch said the U.S. was skeptical about the commitment of the Sudanese Government to changing the situation. In our view, said Welch, the AU force was not fully capable. The U.S., therefore, supported a UN operation which would bring more financial and practical support to the endeavor. Welch underscored that the U.S. was not seeking to insert American forces, UN troops, or NATO forces; a UN force could attract other other troop contributions, however. NATO's role would be limited to providing command lift, logistical and other support. Darfur, continued Welch, was an issue of great concern to President Bush. ¶7. (C) With respect to Iraq, Welch offered that there was a "hard press" for formation of a new government. President Talabani had called parliament into session. There was a clear need for dialogue and a national consensus government to bridge, not create, differences among Iraqis. The parties needed to compromise at this dangerous time. Welch explained the U.S. role as continuing to transfer authority to the Iraqis, and only a strong Iraqi government could deal with the security issues. By necessity, said Welch, such a government would have to be non-sectarian. Welch thanked Algeria for its helpful role, which was still needed, and acknowledged that Algeria had paid a price for its policies, having seen two of its diplomats murdered in Baghdad. U.S. VIEWS ON DEALING WITH HAMAS -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to Palestinian issues, A/S Welch noted that like Algeria the U.S. had welcomed the Palestinians' holding of democratic elections for the legislative branch. As in any democratic election, there was always someone who wins and loses. Welch explained that the U.S. had pushed for the holding of the Palestinian elections after weighing various factors. The U.S. advice to the Palestinians, when asked, was to go forward with the elections as scheduled. Now that Hamas had won the elections, the U.S. expected the new Palestinian Government to 1) accept Israel's existence; 2) renounce violence and terror; and 3) observe previous agreements such as the Road Map, Oslo Accords and Arab League summit declarations. While Hamas had won the legislative elections, Abbas had a peace mandate of his own that must also be respected. ¶9. (C) Welch said the U.S. would announce shortly a new humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians, since we wanted the world to know that we support, and will not punish, the Palestinian people. The U.S. would not, however, provide assistance to a Hamas government and thus the new initiative would channel aid outside of government channels. Hamas, noted Welch, was considered by many a terrorist group, and it would be difficult at best to manage a relationship with it. Noting Algeria's history of supporting the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Welch encouraged the GOA to make a distinction between the political tracks of Hamas and the PA under Abbas, especially in terms of channeling assistance. ALGERIAN SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS WILL CONTINUE -------------- -- ¶10. (C) Ouyahia said Algeria supported the Beirut peace plan as outlined by the participants in that Arab League summit and acknowledged that dealing with Hamas as the leaders of the Palestinians was a problem because of the linkage to the peace process with Israel, a process which Algeria strongly supported. Where our views may differ, said Ouyahia, was on approach. Algeria had experience with Hamas in its own territory. The current MSP political party in Algeria used to be called Hamas. The Prime Minister said he had been working with MSP since 1996 and noted that MSP has participated in previous Algerian governments. While MSP took views different from the government on many issues, its participation in the political process was welcome because its (moderate) Islamist tendencies and conservative views needed a voice in the political process. Such participation was new in Palestine and certainly complicated the situation on the ground, commented Ouyahia, who said he understood that the U.S. and some European countries were not ready to talk with Hamas. ALGIERS 00000501 003 OF 004 ¶11. (C) Ouyahia continued by saying that just as the USG position on dealing with Hamas reflected the views of the American people, Algeria's position reflected Algerian attitudes. The question of Palestine was a "sacred question" for all Algerians, leaders and "the street" alike. The Algerian street was not "boiling" as it was in the 1990s, Ouyahia said, noting the relatively mild reaction to the Danish cartoons in Algeria. Since the Palestinian Government had not been formed, Ouyahia said Algeria did not yet know who would take part, but for Algeria and Algerians support would go first and foremost to the Palestinian people. Algerian support of the Palestinians would continue, and Algeria would make good on its obligations to the PA under the Arab League. Aid would continue to pass through the Arab League and the Palestinian Government. ALGERIA WILL DEFEND THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶12. (C) As far as receiving Hamas delegations, Ouyahia twice said, "We will continue to defend the peace process." Arab leaders, he added, would speak plainly to Hamas and infuse their discussion with reality. It was not practical to expect Hamas to wake up overnight and accept Israel, but contacts with the rest of the world, Russia included, would be helpful, in Algeria's view. In the same way, Ouyahia understood the U.S. could not accept overnight to recognize Hamas but assured Welch that Algeria supported President Abbas and the peace process and would help to bring Hamas and others on board. Remarking that Ouyahia, according to Ambassador, appreciated directness, Welch predicted it would be easier for the U.S. to accept to say "yes" to Hamas (i.e. deal with it once it accepted Quartet conditions) than for Arab states to tell Hamas "no." He underscored that Hamas' acceptance of Palestinian commitments on the peace process would be essential, and urged Algeria to take this message to Hamas. ¶13. (C) Ouyahia felt Hamas would change its position slowly. The Palestinian vote was a "sanction vote"; voters were unhappy with what was being delivered to them. Ouyahia said Algeria allowed the FIS to participate in the elections in the early 1990s but did not let it take office. Several years of fighting ensued, fueled in large part by the impression of Algerians who voted for the FIS in a sanction vote that a great injustice had prevailed. We share the U.S. goal, said Ouyahia, of avoiding radicalism out of our own experience. OUYAHIA SAYS ALGERIA IS URGING IRAN TO ACT RESPONSIBLY -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) Welch then pointed out the growing threat posed by Iran, saying the U.S. was alarmed by the direction of the government under the new Iranian president. The U.S. did not expect "grand steps" in the UNSC. We aimed instead for a presidential statement laying out the choices for the Iranian regime to make. The U.S. was further concerned about the destabilization underway by Iran in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. There was a need to deal with Iran's activities outside of its borders. The SARG was weak and allowed it; Lebanon was in no position to stop it. The U.S. would keep up the pressure on Iran. Welch stressed that the U.S. was worried about Iran's behavior. Although President Bush would not take the language on a use of force option off the table, the U.S. did not look to a military solution. ¶15. (C) In response, Ouyahia thanked Welch for his analysis and said Algeria served on the board of the IAEA and, like Iran, was an oil and gas producer. Algeria knew that its oil and gas supplies would not last forever and predicted that in 30-50 years Algeria would be a net importer of energy. Hence, Algeria supported the peaceful use of nuclear technology while remaining firmly opposed to its use for military purposes. Ouyahia added that three Iranian delegations had met with him in the past month. He told them that leadership required the exercise of responsibility and urged Tehran to take steps to ensure that Iranian interests would not be harmed. Algeria, he continued, was not surprised to see the Iran dossier move to the UNSC. Algeria, said Ouyahia, did not want to see the region enflamed and shared U.S. concerns about Iran's undue influence in Iraq. ¶16. (C) Welch expressed optimism that the UNSC outcome on Iran's nuclear weapons program would be good and noted that the U.S. agreed that countries had the right to exploit nuclear technology for peaceful aims. Unfortunately, Iran abused that right and has been caught in a lie not of 18 minutes but of 18 years. The issue, said Welch, was how to ALGIERS 00000501 004 OF 004 contain the problem. The recent meeting between Secretary Rice and her Russian counterpart was productive. The U.S. thought Iran had yet to produce a nuclear bomb and that there was still time for the international community to act to prevent the building of one. ¶17. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message. ERDMAN