AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000408 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IS AG SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BEDJAOUI REF: STATE 34709 Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ambassador drew on reftel points on the Israeli-Palestinian situation in a March 5 meeting with Foreign Minister Bedjaoui (discussion of Sudan, Western Sahara, NDI visas reported septel). Ambassador stressed the importance of the international community maintaining a common position toward Hamas, adding that the Arab League should send Hamas the same message. The Ambassador said a two-state solution was the only way to achieve Palestinian goals, but it was difficult to see how a two-state solution could be achieved when one party did not recognize the existence of the other. The U.S. would not abandon the Palestinian people and would try to find a way to continue humanitarian assistance, but we had to review our assistance due to legal requirements not to provide aid to a terrorist organization. ¶2. (C) Bedjaoui responded that the Palestinians were deeply disappointed in the peace process, their situation had deteriorated in the thirteen years since Oslo. Hamas was a product of Israeli intransigence; Israel had lost the opportunity to negotiate with Palestinian moderates. Bedjaoui said he was nonetheless optimistic that Hamas would change once it was in power. The Foreign Minister added that the U.S. should not emphasize its view of Hamas as a terrorist organization, since this implied that the majority of Palestinians supported terrorism. Agreeing that both sides had legitimate concerns, Bedjaoui noted Israel feared destruction, but Palestinians were afraid they would lose all of their land to settlements. Ambassador concluded that violence strengthened hawks on both sides, making security the key question rather than how to make peace. This worked against Palestinian interests. Bedjaoui commented that the Israelis and Palestinians should not be left to themselves, they needed help to make peace. The U.S. should not cease assistance to the PA, since Hamas would be obliged to change its policies. End Summary. ARAB LEAGUE SHOULD SEND MESSAGE TO HAMAS -------------- ¶3. (C) In a wide-ranging March 5 meeting with Foreign Minister Mohammed Bedjaoui, Ambassador drew on reftel points intended for the Arab League ministerial to underscore the importance of the Arab League sending a message to Hamas that it must accept the Quartet's three conditions of recognizing Israel, ending violence, and accepting the PA's past agreements. Ambassador stressed that the U.S. had left the door open to Hamas if it changed its policies. The two-state solution envisioned by President Bush was the only way for the Palestinians to achieve their goals. But it was difficult to see how there could be progress toward two states if one party refused to accept the existence of the other. It would not help the Palestinians if Hamas thought it could maintain international support for the PA without changing its position. Ambassador noted that some Palestinian leaders were saying that the PA would go bankrupt within a few months unless Hamas changed quickly. ¶4. (C) Bedjaoui observed that Hamas had come to power democratically because the Palestinians were deeply disappointed in the peace process. In the thirteen years since the Oslo agreements, conditions in Palestine had deteriorated. Hamas, he asserted, was the product of Israeli intransigence. Israel had squandered its opportunity to negotiate with Palestinian moderates. Nevertheless, Bedjaoui said he was optimistic that the responsibilities of being in power would force Hamas to change. Hamas would come around, but it could take some time for them to do so. The five weeks that Hamas had to form a government meant that the new Palestinian government would be formed in synch with Israel's elections. Ambassador responded that the Arab League and Algeria could help expedite the process of change in Hamas' position, since the PA's financial situation would become desperate very quickly. Bedjaoui commented that as the new rulers, Hamas was obliged to meet the expectations of the international community. OLMERT "MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION" -------------- ¶5. (C) Bedjaoui said he had seen Ehud Olmert at a Barcelona Mediterranean Dialogue meeting in December, and Olmert had made a good impression. Bedjaoui did not meet Olmert one on one, but he watched the Israeli engage others. EU Commission Foreign Affairs Chief Solana had also told the Arabs present that Olmert was a reasonable person. People on both sides needed to be able to change, Bedjaoui said. Ambassador and Bedjaoui agreed that the role of women could be critical in promoting peace. ASSISTANCE DILEMMA -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador noted that the U.S. was well aware of the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people and, as Secretary Rice has said, would not abandon them. We were SIPDIS required, however, to review our assistance to the PA because U.S. law barred providing assistance to a terrorist organization. Bedjaoui said this was a great dilemma. The U.S. was a great country with a wonderful constitution. It must not allow itself to treat an entire people as terrorists. Bedjaoui commented that he had been pleased with the U.S. reaction the first couple days after the Palestinian election, but then noticed a change. It was a mistake to stress publicly the U.S. view of Hamas as a terrorist organization, since this was equivalent to saying that the majority of Palestinians supported terrorism. Bedjaoui added that he was glad the U.S. had not yet stopped its assistance. Ambassador reminded that the U.S. had welcomed the fact that the Palestinians had held a peaceful and free election and saw the outcome essentially as a reaction to Fatah corruption and incompentence. The same Palestinian people had also given Mahmoud Abbas, running on a platform of peace and negotiations with Israel, a solid majority. Thus, to meet Palestinian aspirations, Hamas would have to change its positions. If it did not, the Palestinian people would vote them out of office. MUTUAL FEARS OF DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶7. (C) Turning to Hamas' record of terrorism, Bedjaoui suggested that Hamas had not killed women and children because they were bloodthirsty, but because the negotiations were blocked and settlements were expanding. Ambassador responded that suicide bombings had undermined the peace process by changing Israeli public opinion toward the Palestinians whom they came to see as bent on Israel's destruction. Violence had the effect of making security the key issue instead of how to make peace. Bedjaoui said Israel feared its destruction, but Palestinians feared the expansion of settlements to the point that Palestine ceased to exist, while many Arabs still believed Israel's goal was a Jewish state stretching "from the Nile to the Euphrates." There was an urgent need to build confidence between the parties. The international community could not leave Israelis and Palestinians to themselves, but must help them make peace. Ambassador and Bedjaoui agreed that both sides had legitimate concerns that needed to be addressed. ERDMAN