MFA ADVISES GIVING HAMAS TIME TO CHANGE, AVOIDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000336 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG AG SUBJECT: MFA ADVISES GIVING HAMAS TIME TO CHANGE, AVOIDING "SANCTIONS" REF: STATE 27174 Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) MFA Director General for Arab Affairs Bouzaher told Ambassador, visiting NEA/MAG Director Jordan, and DCM January 26 that while Algeria agreed with the U.S. that Hamas must change its position on peace with Israel, they disagreed about "imposing sanctions." Bouzaher advised the U.S. and Europe to "stick with the logic of respecting democratic elections." Hamas would need to focus on maintaining a truce and forming a government, and then it would have to address the Palestinian people's desire for peace. Bouzaher confirmed that Algeria would convey this message to Hamas at the Khartoum Arab summit in March. Ambassador, drawing on reftel talking points, stressed that while the U.S. welcomed the Palestinian elections as having been peaceful and fair, Hamas had to make choices. The U.S. could not provide assistance to a terrorist organization, but we would continue to support the humanitarian needs of the Palestinians. MAG Director Jordan noted the Quartet's requirements that Hamas abandon violence, recognize Israel, and accept past agreements. Bouzaher said that once Hamas was in power, it would have to adapt its rhetoric to reality. Arabs would not understand, however, if the U.S. insisted on isolating and sanctioning Hamas without giving it a chance to change. End Summary. PEACE PROCESS NOT MOVING BEFORE ELECTIONS -------------- ¶2. (C) Visiting NEA/MAG Director William Jordan, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, called on MFA Director for Arab Affairs Abdelhamid Bouzaher January 26 (septel will report discussion of relations with Morocco). Bouzaher began by saying the election of Hamas was a new factor, but the peace process had been stalled even before the elections. Algeria had seen the death of Arafat, the election of Abu Mazen, and the establishment of a truce which was respected by Hamas as creating a real opportunity for progress, but Israel's unilateral actions had complicated the situation. The withdrawal from Gaza had been carried out outside the negotiating framework with the PA and had thereby weakened it. The U.S. had influence with Israel, but did not use it, he claimed. As of the January 25 elections, the situation was blocked. The Palestinian vote had reflected a combination of protest against Fatah corruption and support for the Hamas program. Hamas had enjoyed both strong organization and funding "from who knows where." DON'T IMPOSE "SANCTIONS" -------------- ¶3. (C) Now that Hamas was assuming power, it would not be able to function if it insisted on its old positions, Bouzaher continued. All the Arabs agreed Hamas had to change, but they disagreed with the U.S. on "imposing sanctions." He advised the U.S. and Europe to "stick with the logic of respecting democratic elections." Mahmoud Abbas remained a symbol of legitimacy. Hamas would need to focus on keeping the truce and forming a government. They would also need to address the desire of the Palestinian people for peace. With time, the Hamas position would have to change. Ambassador stressed the need for the international community to send a united message to Hamas. Was Algeria conveying this message? Bouzaher answered affirmatively and added that the Khartoum Arab summit in March would provide an important opportunity to weigh in with Hamas. The Palestinians, including Hamas, understood Israel better than other Arabs, he said, noting that Hamas' position would evolve in tandem with Israel's. HAMAS FACES CHOICE -------------- ¶4. (C) Commenting on Secretary Rice's visit to the Middle East, Bouzaher said he thought this had not been the best time to call Hamas a terrorist organization. Why did the U.S. not respect the outcome of the elections? Ambassador pushed back, pointing out that the U.S. had publicly recognized the elections as fair, but stressing that Hamas faced a choice. The U.S., as well as the EU, had designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and we could not finance it as such. At the same time, Secretary Rice has said the U.S. would not abandon the Palestinians and, as part of our review of assistance, would continue to look for ways to address the Palestinians' humanitarian needs. What was needed was for Hamas to join the international consensus, otherwise it would be isolated. Bouzaher said Algeria was sure Hamas would make the right choice. The PLO charter had also called for the destruction of Israel, but Fatah had amended it after Oslo. The Israeli-Palestinian dialogue must resume. CONTROLLING TERRORISM -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador asked whether Bouzaher thought Hamas could keep the truce. Bouzaher said there were armed groups, including Fatah factions, that were determined to fight, but Hamas had proven discipline and would need to get control over "individual actions." In addition, Islamic Jihad still rejected the truce, but it was a small group without much support. Israeli attacks complicated the situation and engendered more violence. In addition, the economic situation in Gaza was worse than before Israel's withdrawal. The U.S. should use its influence in "positive ways" to support confidence building measures. Arabs thought the U.S. only supported Israel, there was a need to change that image. Ambassador responded that Palestinian aspirations could only be achieved through a two-state solution, based on recognizing Israel's right to exist. Bouzaher commented that Fatah had failed. Hamas was now in power and would need to adapt its rhetoric to reality. Arabs would not understand, however, if the U.S. sought to isolate and sanction Hamas without giving it time to change. ¶6. (C) MAG Director Jordan said the U.S. position was pragmatic but also based on principles we shared with the Quartet: Hamas must renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept past agreements. If it did so, we could work together, but if not, we would not be able to cooperate. Ambassador added that violence strengthened the hawks on both sides. It forced Israelis to think in terms of security rather than how to make peace. Bouzaher agreed, saying it was clear that violence would not produce results. Hamas had already proposed a long-term truce, and President Abbas was also insisting they accept past agreements. Bouzaher concluded that once the peace process began to move forward again, he was optimistic about the outcome. ERDMAN