Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ALGIERS2025
2006-11-22 11:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Algiers
Cable title:
POLISARIO PERCEIVES CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
how-toVZCZCXYZ0015 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAS #2025 3261124 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 221124Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2399 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1440 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8498 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5866 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2002 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 1513 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0394 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6371 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 2788 RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0406 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0377
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 002025
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PBTS PREF AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO PERCEIVES CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
REF: ALGIERS 1813
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 002025
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PBTS PREF AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO PERCEIVES CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
REF: ALGIERS 1813
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) During a November 16-17 orientation visit to Sahrawi
refugee camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria, NEA/MAG desk
officer and poloff met with Polisario Secretary-General
Mohamed Abdelaziz and Polisario Representative to the U.S.
Mouloud Said. Abdelaziz provided his version of the history
of the Polisario conflict, in which Morocco and France had
worked hand-in-glove against Sahrawi interests while the U.S.
had maintained a stance of neutrality and evenhandedness.
Recently, however, Abdelaziz had perceived a shift in U.S.
policy in favor of Morocco. Four recent U.S. government
actions had brought Abdelaziz to this conclusion:
-- Meetings between U.S. government officials and CORCAS "at
the State Department," which effectively recognized CORCAS as
the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people because
the U.S. government had refused to receive officially
representatives of the Polisario.
-- U.S. abstention on UN Fourth Committee draft resolution
A/C.4/61/L.5 (ref),which put the U.S. government in the camp
of "only France and Morocco."
-- The U.S. failure to press for human rights language before
giving its support for UNSC Resolution 1720 extending MINURSO
for six months.
-- The U.S. explanation of vote for UNSCR 1720, which
referred to Morocco's formulation of an autonomy proposal and
was therefore essentially a U.S. declaration of support for a
Moroccan autonomy-based resolution of the conflict.
2. (C) In response, poloff and deskoff noted our abiding
interest in a resolution to the conflict and stressed that
the U.S. was not taking Morocco's side in the dispute. We
also urged the Polisario to pursue constructive dialogue with
Morocco and promised to relay Abdelaziz's comments to
Washington.
3. (C) Comment: Abdelaziz's arguments, sometimes inaccurate,
were from the same script used by other Polisario officials
during the visit. The script also included longstanding
talking points on Morocco's refusal to accept the Baker Plan,
the need for a referendum on Sahrawi independence, and the
possibility of a return to armed struggle absent MINURSO.
Abdelaziz's addition of the CORCAS delegation and other
concerns to the usual litany suggests that the Polisario
leadership is worried by what it perceives to be the current
direction of U.S. policy.
FORD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PBTS PREF AG
SUBJECT: POLISARIO PERCEIVES CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
REF: ALGIERS 1813
Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).
1. (C) During a November 16-17 orientation visit to Sahrawi
refugee camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria, NEA/MAG desk
officer and poloff met with Polisario Secretary-General
Mohamed Abdelaziz and Polisario Representative to the U.S.
Mouloud Said. Abdelaziz provided his version of the history
of the Polisario conflict, in which Morocco and France had
worked hand-in-glove against Sahrawi interests while the U.S.
had maintained a stance of neutrality and evenhandedness.
Recently, however, Abdelaziz had perceived a shift in U.S.
policy in favor of Morocco. Four recent U.S. government
actions had brought Abdelaziz to this conclusion:
-- Meetings between U.S. government officials and CORCAS "at
the State Department," which effectively recognized CORCAS as
the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people because
the U.S. government had refused to receive officially
representatives of the Polisario.
-- U.S. abstention on UN Fourth Committee draft resolution
A/C.4/61/L.5 (ref),which put the U.S. government in the camp
of "only France and Morocco."
-- The U.S. failure to press for human rights language before
giving its support for UNSC Resolution 1720 extending MINURSO
for six months.
-- The U.S. explanation of vote for UNSCR 1720, which
referred to Morocco's formulation of an autonomy proposal and
was therefore essentially a U.S. declaration of support for a
Moroccan autonomy-based resolution of the conflict.
2. (C) In response, poloff and deskoff noted our abiding
interest in a resolution to the conflict and stressed that
the U.S. was not taking Morocco's side in the dispute. We
also urged the Polisario to pursue constructive dialogue with
Morocco and promised to relay Abdelaziz's comments to
Washington.
3. (C) Comment: Abdelaziz's arguments, sometimes inaccurate,
were from the same script used by other Polisario officials
during the visit. The script also included longstanding
talking points on Morocco's refusal to accept the Baker Plan,
the need for a referendum on Sahrawi independence, and the
possibility of a return to armed struggle absent MINURSO.
Abdelaziz's addition of the CORCAS delegation and other
concerns to the usual litany suggests that the Polisario
leadership is worried by what it perceives to be the current
direction of U.S. policy.
FORD