TO POSTPONE OR NOT TO POSTPONE: AMNESTY DEADLINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 001514 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER KDEM KISL AG SUBJECT: TO POSTPONE OR NOT TO POSTPONE: AMNESTY DEADLINE LOOMS REF: A. ALGIERS 751 ¶B. ALGIERS 390 Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Algerian terrorists seeking amnesty under the Peace and National Reconciliation process (reftels) have until August 28 to surrender to the authorities. In mid-August the military and police began ostentatious preparations to conduct what they assert will be a final mopping-up of remaining terrorists once the deadline passes. Lively speculation continues nonetheless that President Bouteflika will extend the deadline in a humanitarian gesture aimed at creating goodwill with conservative Muslim voters in advance of a fall constitutional referendum (septel) and May 2007 legislative and local elections. Even though the official government line remains that "the law is the law" and the deadline will be respected, our contacts say Bouteflika is under pressure to prevent bloodshed during Ramadan, which starts about September 24. They doubt that security actions begun against the terrorists at the end of August could end by Ramadan, and note that it would not be practical to halt actions midstream. The solution may be a de facto postponement of the amnesty deadline, with the heavy clean-up work delayed until after the end of the Muslim holy month. End Summary. ¶2. (C) President Bouteflika has not been seen in public since late July, and is officially on vacation. In responding to lively media speculation about a postponement of the amnesty deadline, Prime Minister Belkhadem softened the previous hard line on the issue in mid-August by stating that the decision was Bouteflika's alone to make. Interior Minister Zerhouni, given the chance before the press on August 19 to repeat the GOA mantra that the deadline was fixed, declined to do so, which some chose to read as a signal that Bouteflika planned to make one final humanitarian gesture to the terrorists. (Note: Zerhouni has also applied for a visa to travel to the U.S. shortly, probably for medical treatment. Some of our contacts doubt that the GOA would take up arms in earnest against the terrorists with the interior minister out of the country.) QUIET SUPPORT FOR SURRENDER AFTER RAMADAN -------------- ¶3. (C) In an August 22 meeting with PolEc Chief, the chief of staff to the leader of the moderate Islamist party Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP) said his party firmly opposed "officially" changing the August 28 deadline. Any change now, Nourredine Ait Nessaoudene maintained, would send the wrong message to remaining terrorists, who were "hard core" and unlikely to surrender in large numbers anyway. Nonetheless, he added, allowing remaining terrorists the option of quietly surrendering at the end of Ramadan had MSP's full support. Terrorist activity traditionally increased during Ramadan, and it was unrealistic in Ait Nessaoudene's view to expect anything but an upswing this year. For that reason, the military and police would rightly increase security during Ramadan. But increasing security during the Muslim holy month was not the same as a final mopping-up of terrorist elements, which Ait Nessaoudene believed this would not take place before the end of Ramadan. He also offered that the MSP, a member of the presidential coalition, had used channels abroad to send a clear message to the terrorists that this was their final chance to lay down their arms. In what Ait Nessaoudene saw as further confirmation that Bouteflika was unlikely to unleash the military and police in early September, he said it was his understanding that the security services had let the small number of terrorist factions open to surrendering know that they could do so at the end of Ramadan. OPPOSITION: WE DON'T EVEN LIKE THE PROCESS -------------- ¶4. (C) Sa'id Saadi, head of the predominantly Berber opposition "Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie" (RCD),told us August 21 that his party had opposed Bouteflika's national reconciliation initiative because it was too long on forgiveness of the security forces and too short on their public contrition. RCD favors a South African model of truth and reconciliation. "Truth" is lacking in the Algerian context, said Saadi, who admired Bouteflika's desire ALGIERS 00001514 002 OF 002 to turn the page but also believed it was important to "read the page before turning it." In that sense, the RCD believed the deadline for the terrorists' handing in their arms was irrelevant, since the government lost its moral authority months ago when it decided that persons convicted for bombings in public places could be amnestied whereas those who carried out bombings in private places could not. Such distinctions, Saadi said, made a mockery of justice. ¶5. (C) Opposition Islah (Reform) Party head Abdallah Djballah told us August 22 his party believed that reconciliation absent truth, justice, and real forgiveness was not possible. Djballah underscored that he began talking about reconciliation in 1992 -- well before Bouteflika -- and that he had long envisioned a reconciliation process of openness and transparency whereby past justices would be confessed, confronted and healed. Bouteflika's approach, in contrast, was one of impunity for the security services and served the interests of the military and political leadership, not the people. Since the entire approach to reconciliation under Bouteflika was flawed, in Djballah's view, the question of the final deadline for terrorists' surrendering their arms was irrelevant. That said, Djballah indicated that his party was indirectly communicating with the remaining terrorists, urging them for purely humanitarian reasons to put down their arms and avoid bloodshed over the GOA deadline. COMMENT: PACKAGING THE "FINAL BATTLE" -------------- ¶6. (C) This week, Algerian military forces have markedly increased the tempo of their operations against terrorists in some parts of the country. Our contacts tell us that these operations, while intense and designed to hold the terrorists' feet to the fire of the looming deadline, do not amount to a "final assault" against the terrorists. Rather, they represent the usual (albeit intensified) GOA response to terrorist activity. President Bouteflika is clearly balancing a desire to adhere firmly to the original deadline in his national reconciliation process with the need to appear humane during Ramadan. While it is still not clear whether Bouteflika will ultimately postpone the August 28 deadline, we suspect that our MSP source has it right when he talks of "quiet support" for extending the deadline past Ramadan. The challenge for the GOA will be to package military operations and reinforced security measures before and during Ramadan to appear to the public as a response to terrorist attacks rather than as a final GOA assault against the terrorists. FORD