ALGERIA REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001278 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MARR ML AG LY SU SUBJECT: ALGERIA REQUESTS U.S. ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING MALI AGREEMENT REF: A. ALGIERS 1243 ¶B. BAMAKO 748 ALGIERS 00001278 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Chergui briefed Ambassador July 9 on the recent agreement Algeria brokered between Malian authorities and Tuareg rebels in northern Mali (reftels) and asked for a U.S. pledge of financial assistance for the "Forum on Development" created by the agreement. The GOA also requested that Embassy Bamako help explain the benefits of the agreement to the people of Mali and provide moral support for its implementation. Ambassador, while making no promises of assistance, noted the U.S. interest in keeping the Sahel region stable and free of terrorism and undertook to inform Washington of the GOA requests. Chergui also told Ambassador of GOA concerns that Libya could hamper the implementation of the agreement, leaving the clear impression that U.S. assistance in bringing the Libyans on board would also be appreciated. Separately, Chergui told Ambassador Algeria was continuing its efforts to convince Sudan to accept conversion of the AMIS to a UN force by the end of the year and expressed optimism that in the end Sudanese President Bachir would accept UN forces for Darfur. Post requests guidance from the Department on responding to the GOA requests for assistance in implementing the Mali agreement. (End Summary and Action Request.) ¶2. (C) MFA Director General for African Affairs Smail Chergui convoked Ambassador July 9 for a briefing on the recently signed peace agreement between the government of Mali and the Tuareg rebels (see reftels). Chergui told Ambassador, who was accompanied by PolEc Chief, that he had been part of the Algerian team negotiating the agreement. Chergui said the President of Mali had asked the GOA to intervene, and the Tuareg rebels agreed to the GOA's assistance by a referendum vote among the tribes. The GOA told both parties it insisted on working through "the full integrity of Mali institutions," a condition that both the rebels and government accepted prior to Algeria's involvement. AGREEMENT CALLS FOR NEW TUAREG SECURITY UNIT IN NORTH MALI -------------- -------------- �00A;¶3. (C) After Ambassador congratulated the GOA on its success in brokering the agreement, Chergui said he wanted to draw U.S. attention to the provisions for creating a special Tuareg security unit because of its relevance to counterterrorism efforts in the region. This new security unit in the north of Mali would be composed mainly of the Tuareg and would be similar to the arrangement Algeria had negotiated in Niger some years ago. The security unit would be subordinate to the Malian military, could be used to fight terrorism as needed, and would have responsibilities for patrolling, visitor protection, guarding public buildings, and assisting the police. Chergui noted it was better to employ the Tuareg in fighting terrorism than have them sit around with no source of income and getting into trouble. Ambassador observed that Niger seemed to have a more disciplined fighting force against terrorism than Mali. Chergui agreed, stressing that much work remained in order to strengthen Mali's forces. ¶4. (C) Asked what arms the Tuareg would carry, Chergui said "light arms, like police" and referred Ambassador to a copy of the French-language agreement, which he handed Ambassador, for more details. (Note: Embassy provided a copy of the agreement to NEA/MAG.) Chergui said the central government could use the new security forces as it wished. Chergui suggested to Ambassador that the U.S. and Algeria, through intelligence channels, should work cooperatively over time on defining and enhancing Mali's cooperation against terrorism. U.S. FINANCIAL AND MORAL ASSISTANCE VITAL -------------- ¶5. (C) In addition to the creation of the new security unit, Chergui drew Ambassador's attention to the economic and social areas of the agreement, which in part called for the establishment of a fund to make payments to fighters leaving the mountains, returning to their families, and turning in ALGIERS 00001278 002.2 OF 003 weapons. As part of the emphasis on social and economic development, Mali agreed to issue invitations within three months to a "Forum on Development". Observing that there was no running water, roads or sanitary structures to speak of in Kidal, the focus of the conference would be on developing this region, home to the Tuareg In the interest of "not provoking jealousies" in other regions of Mali, Chergui emphasized that the Forum would not be billed as assistance to Kidal. Chergui concluded by telling Ambassador the GOA "counted a lot" on the United States to help fund the necessary development. Ambassador responded that the U.S. already provided assistance to Mali and that any assistance would need to be addressed through the budgetary process. Chergui stressed that a U.S. pledge of assistance would help make the Forum a success. ¶6. (C) Noting that press coverage in Mali of the new agreement had not been good, Chergui also asked that the U.S. Embassy in Bamako help explain the agreement to the people of Mali. "Anything you could do would help." Chergui hoped the U.S. Ambassador to Mali would "diffuse the same message as the President (of Mali) and help calm the waters." Chergui explained that the social pact of 1992 in Mali contained many elements that the central government had failed to implement due to lack of financial means. It was because of this lack of attention that some Tuareg went to the mountains. Thankfully, the number of casualties was limited, and the movement to the mountains merely brought attention to the situation and facilitated intervention. Ambassador said he could make no promises but would convey the GOA request to Washington. It was in our mutual interest to maintain calm in the Sahel, deny sanctuary to terrorists, and work together to strengthen the abilities of Sahelian governments and militaries to exercise more effective control over their territories. GOA CONCERNED THAT LIBYA COULD BE UNHELPFUL -------------- ¶7. (C) Chergui, stressing the sensitivity of his next point, expressed concern that Libya could complicate the implementation of the agreement in Mali. Libya had closed its consulate, and the Tuareg tribes did not have a favorable opinion of Qadhafi's "Greater Sahara Initiative." The tribes themselves told Qadhafi in person of their opposition to it. Qadhafi's behavior in Timbuktu a couple of months ago -- keeping people waiting for him and then starting a planned ceremony before the President of Mali had arrived -- had also left bad feelings, which continued even today. Ambassador asked if the unrest among northern Mali Tuaregs had spilled over into Tuaregs in Algeria. Chergui claimed it had not but added that Algeria was closing its eyes and allowing the transportation of most goods to the tribal areas across its border with Mali. This gesture of goodwill was aimed at bringing peace to the area and reflected Algeria's good neighbor policy toward Mali and its inhabitants. Chergui stressed that Algeria's cooperation in these areas, at the request of the government in Bamako, was being kept quiet. AGREEMENT MUST SUCCEED -------------- ¶8. (C) Chergui said the agreement between the Tuareg rebels and Government of Mali was signed in Algiers in order to avoid the perception of a national pact that would lead to animosity between other regions of Mali and the central government. The Tuareg also did not want to travel to Bamako. Holding the signing ceremony in Algiers, where fanfare was kept to a minimum, was a compromise acceptable to both parties. It went without saying that Algeria needed to make the agreement succeed, and Chergui welcomed U.S. assistance to this end. ALGERIA WORKING TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SUDAN ON DARFUR -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Ambassador took advantage of his meeting with Chergui to request the GOA's assessment of the transition to UN peacekeepers in Darfur. Chergui noted that the Peace and Security Council of Africa would meet in the coming days and that a conference of donors was scheduled for later this month in Brussels. Chergui said the Sudanese President wanted to make the AMIS stronger, but this was not sustainable over the longer term because the resources "were just not there." If support for AMIS was secured into December, the rehatting of the AMIS to a UN force would be ALGIERS 00001278 003.2 OF 003 considerably easier. Asked if the upcoming meetings aimed to provide Khartoum a face-saving way to agree to the rehatting, Chergui responded in the affirmative. Chergui observed that the AMIS could not continue to operate without money. By the end of the year, it would be clear to everyone, including Bachir, that the African Union could no longer handle the operation on its own, and the pressure on Sudan to accept the UN force would be substantial. Algeria would continue to work toward this end. ERDMAN