MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000680

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC
BARBORIAK
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF
CESSATION OF THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION COUNCIL AND GUIDELINES



1. Summary: Coverage of Taiwan's major Chinese-language
dailies March 3 focused on a Taiwan towel-makers' rally
Thursday to protest China's alleged economic dumping of the
product, a possible corruption scandal related to the
freeway electronic toll collection system, and other local
issues. The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" ran a news
story on its page two that quoted U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Chris Hill in Manila as saying that he does not
foresee any military confrontation between China and Taiwan
due to President Chen Shui-bian's announcement regarding the
cessation of the National Unification Council (NUC) and
National Unification Guidelines (NUG). Almost all papers
carried reports on new AIT Taipei Director Stephen Young's
briefing with Taiwan journalists in Washington.


2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, Soochow
University Associate Professor Lo Chih-cheng opined in the
pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily,
that the United States has been acting too passively and
unenthusiastically with regard to facilitating the
resumption of dialogue across the Taiwan Strait. Lo added
that Taiwan has seized the opportunity presented by
President Chen's announcement of the cessation of the NUC
and NUG and has grasped the right to interpret the "status
quo." An editorial in the limited-circulated, pro-
independence, English-language "Taiwan News" also said
Chen's announcement regarding the NUC and NUG has ensured
that "the Taiwan people have the right to decide and define
their own status." An editorial in the pro-unification
"United Daily News" found several aspects of Chen's
announcement and Washington's response somewhat ironic. An
editorial in the limited-circulated, conservative, pro-
unification, English-language "China Post" questioned how
Chen could turn out to be a winner in his row with the
United States over the NUC and NUG. End summary.

A) "Cessation of the NUC and NUG Draws Taiwan's Bottom Line"

Lo Chih-cheng, associate professor of political science at
Soochow University, opined in the pro-independence "Liberty
Times" [circulation: 600,000] (3/3):

"The process that resulted in President Chen's announcement
of the `cessation of the NUC and NUG' highlights that the
United States has been acting too passively and
unenthusiastically with regard to facilitating [the
resumption of] dialogue across the Taiwan Strait. In the
wake of [China's] passage of the Anti-Secession Law and the
visits by Taiwan opposition leaders' to China, the principle
of Beijing's Taiwan policy has been to isolate and
marginalize the Chen Shui-bian administration. But
Washington's response to [Beijing's move] was nothing but
constant reiteration of its hope that Beijing would have a
dialogue with Taiwan's duly elected leader. Evidently, this
kind of verbal expression of [Washington's] wish was unable
to persuade Beijing to return to the negotiation table. .

"It is crystal clear that Washington remains the only one
who can make Beijing seriously consider resuming dialogue
with Taiwan. . From now on, the United States really should
seriously consider how to adopt more proactive ways to
persuade Beijing to start political dialogue with Taipei.
This event [i.e. Chen's announcement] also underscores the
fact that Washington needs to review its role as a balancer
of cross-Strait relations. Washington tends to define the
status quo across the Taiwan Strait as `no independence,
[then] no use of force', and it tends to use `no unilateral
attempt to change the stats quo' as a principle for its
policy responses. But for a period of time, the United
States has shown far more concern over `no independence'
than for `no use of force.' .

"Washington's hands-off attitude and tolerance will only
make Beijing push further and make Taiwan lean toward `being
unified' and `being annexed.' If Taiwan fails to take any
counteraction, it will only make the status quo advance
toward an unfavorable direction for Taiwan. . In short,
despite the fact that this event has in a way ended for the
time being that `different side may have different
interpretations over the cessation of the NUC and NUG,'
Taiwan has actually seized this opportunity and grasped the
right to interpret the `status quo' and `the definition of
altering the status quo.' This may be where the turning
point lies [for Taiwan] following the crisis."

B) "Taiwan Has Right to Define Own Status"

The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News"
[circulation: 20,000] editorialized (3/3):

". First, the cessation of the NUC and NUG marked the final
termination of the most important remaining illegitimate
relics of the era of authoritarian rule by the former ruling
Kuomintang. . The combination of external and internal
pressures made it necessary for the DPP government to act to
ensure that a possible new KMT government could not use the
NUG to abrogate the hard-won right of free choice of the
Taiwan people. With the cessation of the NUC and NUG, any
government pushing for an `ultimate goal' will be required
to proceed through legal and constitutional procedures
instead of decreeing an `ultimate goal' by fiat. .

"In addition, the termination of the NUC and NUG marked a
major step in the consolidation and deepening of Taiwan's
democracy and the principle of `people's sovereignty.' .
Certification of the right of democratic self-determination
for the 23 million people of Taiwan is a major historical
accomplishment and sufficient to be considered a `historical
legacy' for President Chen and the DPP administration. The
third level of meaning is that the summation of these
changes ensures that the Taiwan people have the right to
decide and define our own status through our democratic
system instead of having such definition imposed by
authoritarians or great powers, including the United States
and the PRC. We should cherish and defend this
achievement."

C) "The United States' Interpretation: Chen Shui-bian Has
Reiterated His Firm Position to Stick to [His] Inaugural
Speech of 2000"

The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation:
400,000] editorialized (3/3):

"How ironic! After Chen put up a big show by announcing
`the abolition of the NUC and NUG,' the comment made by the
U.S. State Department immediately thereafter was: the United
States has noticed that President Chen has reiterated his
firm [position], made in his inaugural speech of 2000, to
stick to his pledge of not changing the status quo. It is a
well-know fact that the core concept of [Chen's] inaugural
speech in 2000 was the `Five No's' pledge. Is it possible
that Washington's interpretation of Chen's `announcement of
the cessation of the NUC and NUG' and his `seven-point
statement' turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, that [he was]
reiterating his adherence to the Five No's pledge! .

"Of course, Chen did not explicitly reiterate the `Five
No's' pledge. Based on the U.S. official interpretation,
Chen did not announce that he would `abolish' the NUC and
NUG (therefore he did not violate his `last No' pledge) and
he publicly guaranteed that the [planned] constitutional
engineering program would be carried out according to `the
existing constitutional procedures' (therefore he cannot
possibly violate the `Four No's' pledges). The inference
thus goes like this: Chen was `reiterating that he will
continue adhering to his inaugural speech of 2000,' and the
core concept of the 2000 speech was exactly the `Five No's'
pledges. Even though Chen and the DPP tend to want to
expand on their `achievement' over the cessation of the NUC
and NUG, . the ultimate right to interpret Chen's
announcement actually lies in the hands of the United
States. .

". Taiwan independence activists may claim that `the Taiwan
people have scored a big victory,' but the United States'
interpretation of Chen's announcement and his seven-point
statement is the issue of substance. Washington already
deemed `the pledge of not changing the cross-Strait status
quo' as an equivalent of the `Five No's pledges, and it also
regarded Chen's not using the word `abolish' as a move akin
to not violating the `last No.' As a result, Chen has, in
terms of international politics, failed to cross the zone
framed by the `Five No's' pledges despite the fact that he
did not reiterate these pledge. This is the conclusion
drawn by the United States for this tempest in a teapot.

"Chen has obediently put on his head the `incantation hoop'
handed to him by the United States. Washington has subtly
linked the `Five No's' pledges with the `commitment of not
changing the cross-Strait status quo.' All the more,
Washington has further interpreted Chen's announcement of
`cessation of the NUC and NUG' and his seven-point statement
as a `commitment [that Chen will] stick to his 2000

inaugural speech of not changing the cross-Strait status
quo.' Was this a commendation after all or an insult? Was
this a big victory or a major defeat? Chen must know what
it feels like now without being told, so do the Taiwan
people."

D) "Why Chen Could Emerge from His Row with U.S. as a
Winner"

The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China
Post" said in an editorial (3/3):

"Many observers are wondering why President Chen Shui-bian
could get away with abolishing the National Unification
Council and Guidelines without incurring U.S. punishment as
Washington had threatened in the past month as it sought to
stop him from doing so. On the contrary, his relations with
the U.S. appear to have even strengthened in the wake of the
diplomatic row. . So Chen, in terminating the unification
guidelines, has actually altered a significant component of
Taiwan's longstanding relations with China. This quiet
change, however, was lost on Washington. The U.S.
government accepted Chen's claim that he `has no intention
of altering the status quo' and that his new action `does
not involve the change of the status quo.' .

"In the assumption that the [i.e. Chen's] statement had
previously been cleared by Washington, this contention [i.e.
the 23 million people of Taiwan have the freedom to decide
their political future and the government has no right to
force them to opt for unification] must have gained the
U.S.'s prior consent. If so, Washington has changed an
important position regarding Taiwan. Since the Clinton
administration, U.S. government leaders have held that any
decision on Taiwan's future must have the respect of the
people on both sides of the strait. .

"In addition to the unification matter, Chen also subtly
changed his previously stated pledge in another sensitive
area with or without the knowledge of the U.S.: his
constitutional engineering program. To dispel domestic and
foreign concerns about his intentions of pushing for de jure
independence, Chen had promised in his second inaugural
address in 2004 that his constitutional reform would not
touch on any sovereignty issues and, besides, would be
carried out according to the rules stipulated in the
existing Constitution. But he implied, as revealed in the
statement this week, that future participation in his
constitutional program will not be limited to legislators.
It will be expanded and in such a way: `from bottom to top'
and `from civil groups to political parties.' This subtle
change will provide room for him to make maneuverings or to
revise the rules of the game by mobilizing popular support.

"What is difficult to understand is why Chen could emerge
from a month-long diplomatic row with Washington, sparked by
his controversial political moves, as the final winner and
without his U.S. relations being damaged. . Undoubtedly,
these latter two agreements [in Chen's statement] helped win
the hearts of U.S. officials. This is because a Taiwan
remaining loyal to the U.S. with its military power greatly
strengthened can play a more meaningful role in serving
Washington's strategic interests."

KEEGAN