MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001303

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A


TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS



1. Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their
coverage April 13 on the corruption scandals surrounding former
Presidential Office Deputy Secretary-General Chen Che-nan; the
opposition parties' veto of President Chen Shui-bian's nomination of
Hsieh Wen-ting as the state public prosecutor-general Tuesday; and
the upcoming economic forum between the KMT and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). The pro-unification "United Daily News" ran
a banner headline on its front page that read: "Taiwan Does Not
Exclude the Possibility of Unilaterally Opening [to Beijing]
Taiwan's Tourism [Market] and Cross-Strait Charter Flight
[Business]." The sub-headline added: "On the Eve of KMT-CCP
Economic Forum, the Mainland Affairs Council [Says It] Hopes to
Complete Negotiations [with China] in Six Months. Speaking of
Cross-Strait Policies, Premier Su Says Whatever Needs to Be Done
Should Be Done and [Taiwan] Needs Not Subject Itself to Others."
The pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, ran a
news story on its front page with the headline: "China Uses
Taiwan-made Numerical Control Machines to Produce [the Critical
Spare Parts] for Weapons [Used Against the Island]." The
pro-independence "Taiwan Daily," on the other hand, ran a front-page
headline news story that said "Three U.S. Aircraft Carriers to Hold
Exercises off Guam in June."


2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, an article in the
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" and a commentary in the
pro-unification "United Daily News" both discussed the notion of
"one China with each side having its own interpretation." The two
articles agreed that since Beijing already said it is willing to
return to the "1992 Consensus," it means that it is interested in
resuming talks with Taiwan on the basis of "one China with different
interpretations." A commentary in the limited-circulation,
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times," however,
criticized the KMT-CCP economic forum by calling it a "saboteur's
dreamland" that intends to isolate the Chen Shui-bian
administration. End summary.

A) "The KMT Does Not Know What It Is Fighting for"

KMT Central Committee Member Chang Si-kang opined in the
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" [circulation: 500,000] (4/13):

"... The [future] portrait of cross-Strait relations revealed in the
meeting between [President] Chen Shui-bian and [KMT Chairman] Ma
Ying-jeou [last week] will have a tugging influence on the United
States and China. As Taipei has started to 'define' cross-Strait
relations, the roadmap of the triangular relationships between
Washington, Beijing and Taipei will very likely develop in the way
Taipei depicted. President Chen said he hopes Beijing would
recognize the notion of 'one China with each side having its own
interpretation,' but did he not know that the essence of the '1992
Consensus' is exactly 'one China with each side having its own
interpretation'? Since Beijing already said it is willing to return
to the '1992 Consensus,' how can it be not aware of the contents of
the consensus? Chen's remarks only showed that in his heart, he
simply resisted the cross-Strait talks 'out of spite.' ..."

B) "'One China with Different Interpretations?' A-bian Throws out a
Ball; Is Hu Jintao Going to Catch It Or Not?"

Lee Yun-chieh, a professor at National Open University, opined in
the pro-unification: United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000]
(4/13):

"... To ask the Beijing authorities to reply 'whether the 1992
Consensus means one China with different interpretations' is
actually asking Beijing 'how it views the Republic of China.' ...

"PFP Chairman James Soong signed a six-point conference communiqu
with Chinese President Hu Jintao May 12 2005. The first of the
six-point communiqu, which was tagged with the theme of 'urging
[both sides of the Taiwan Strait] to resume talks on an equal
footing based on the 1992 Consensus,' listed the original texts
verbally used by Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and China's
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, respectively, in

1992. Judging against the backdrop that Soong started his 'bridging
journey' to China carrying with him the ten-point consensus he
reached with President Chen Shui-bian [in February 2005], [it seemed
evident that] these texts showed Beijing was willing to engage in
cross-Strait talks with the Bian administration on the basis of the
notion of 'one China with different interpretations.' [We] can thus
say that Beijing's attitude then had entered the stage of indirectly
recognizing the Republic of China. It is a pity that Chen regretted
and denied afterwards [his consensus with Soong], and as a result,
the cross-Strait impasse still continued until now. ...

"... China suspected that the Green camp would interpret the one
China as Taiwan independence. In particular, in the wake of Chen's
manipulation of issues such as the 'cessation of the National
Unification Council' and 'Constitutionally one Taiwan', it will be
even more difficult for Hu to give a positive response to Chen's
call. ..."

C) "KMT-CCP Forum Is a Saboteur's Dreamland"

Liu Kuan-teh, a political commentator based in Taipei, commented in
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation:
30,000] (4/12):

"... The timing of this year's KMT-CCP forum is politically
calculated and should be seen as part of Beijing's 'divide and
conquer' strategy to isolate the administration of President Chen
Shui-bian. It provides Hu [Jintao] with a means of blaming the
current cross-strait impasse on Chen when Hu meets Bush. ...
Utilizing Taiwan's domestic politics is the core of Beijing's
underhand strategy. However, it is the KMT's willingness to dance
to China's tune that reinforces Beijing's capacity to ignore the
Chen administration. It is also clear that Hu will use the example
of the KMT-CCP talks to convince his US counterpart that Chen and
the DPP are the major obstacles toward cross-strait dialogue.

"Beijing's philosophy of 'uniting with the lesser enemy to oppose
the main enemy' fits with the KMT's goal and Lien's personal desire
to open the door to China. Nevertheless, the KMT and Lien's scheme
runs the risk of sabotaging the national interest, national
security, sovereignty and dignity. ... It is of utmost importance
that members of the international community, especially our friends
in the US, are able to decipher Beijing's strategy and demand an
equal and peaceful negotiation between China and Taiwan."

YOUNG