TAIWAN PUBLIC OPINION AFTER KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU'S

UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 001122 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC BARBORIAK DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL TA KPAO TW SUBJECT: TAIWAN PUBLIC OPINION AFTER KMT CHAIRMAN MA YING-JEOU'S U.S. TRIP ¶1. Summary: KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou just concluded a ten-day, five-city whirlwind tour to the United States, which has garnered extensive media coverage in Taiwan. A horde of Taiwan media accompanied Ma on the trip and glamorized Washington's views of him as a promising candidate for Taiwan's presidential election in 2008. Media coverage also suggested that Ma successfully allayed the United States' fears that he may be anti-American and pro-China. Local observers are now watching closely Ma's next steps, Beijing's reactions, DPP's comments, and how Washington will work with Ma to "rein in" Chen during the latter's remaining term. End summary. ¶2. Pan-Blue commentators generally gave high marks to Ma's U.S. tour saying he was granted a "diplomatic favor" of unprecedented- and publicly acknowledged - meetings with high-ranking American officials during his two day stay in Washington, D.C. A "China Times" news analysis said "Washington was very pleased with the KMT's pledges and was willing to cast a vote of confidence in Ma during its formal 'first contact' with him." Analysts also concluded that Ma's pledge to maintain the status quo and ensure peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, not pursuing permanent separation or immediate reunification with China, has dispelled U.S. concerns that Ma might be tilting toward China. Chen Feng-hsing, a senior journalist and TV commentator, also said "Given Ma's fluent command of English, congenial manner, and oratorical skills, he has effectively introduced himself to elite American officials and scholars, convincing them that neither he nor his party will be as 'unpredictable' as President Chen." ¶3. Pan-Green commentators, however, defined Ma's trip as an official prelude to his presidential campaign, adding that Ma has patronized his U.S. audience with a mix of carefully structured evasions and mistruths. "Liberty Times" Journalist Wang Yu-chong said Ma's presidential aspirations obviously outweighed the need to speak up for Taiwan's democracy and national interests. "Ma has obviously gotten carried away by his success and the high-profile reception granted by the United States," Wang said, "and his call on China to face the choice between two devils - namely, the Republic of Taiwan and the Republic of China - has again revealed his pro-China stance and let people see more clearly his ultimate goal." ¶4. Commentators made special note that in his speech entitled "A Vision for Peace and Prosperity," which was delivered at Harvard University March 21, Ma mentioned that over the next ten years, Taiwan should play the role of a "responsible peacemaker" rather than a "regional troublemaker." This statement, they suggested, has been taken as an implicit message to the U.S. and China that, if elected president, he will use his two terms to transform Taiwan into a "peacemaker." Ma's policy statement is particularly significant since Chinese President Hu Jintao, whose term of office will last until 2012, will visit the United States in April. ¶5. Judging from his remarks in the United States, Taiwan commentators say that Ma considers cross-Strait relations Taiwan's most urgent problem and that Ma believes the best place to start solving the problem is with the United States. Ma, however, is also aware that winning Washington's trust will not by itself guarantee a resolution to the island's tense standoff with China. Thus, when Ma pledged to maintain the cross-Strait status quo and regional stability, some observers said he was reassuring Washington. But other analysts say that Ma was actually speaking to Beijing, especially when proposing to forge a "modus vivendi" to create more space for Taiwan in the international community. ¶6. Blue analysts argue that Ma was smart to take old (and accepted) ideas from the Lien-Hu communiqu and repackage them together as a new initiative. Detractors seized the opportunity to point out that Ma's U.S. statements contained no new ideas. They also noted that Ma waited until he got to Stanford to speak of Taiwan's tragic history and Beijing's squeezing of Taiwan's space in the international community. Observers said Ma did not publicly protest China's suppression of Taiwan until he left Washington, in order to minimize the "American factor" that Beijing cares about most. ¶7. Most critics viewed Beijing's silence about Ma's trip as a goodwill gesture to the KMT. Critics generally agreed that Beijing has shown more tolerance of Ma than Chen, particularly when one compares Beijing's reactions to Chen's cessation of the NUC and the NUG and to the KMT's ad in the "Liberty Times" in February, in which Taiwan independence is included as a possible option for Taiwan people. Some Taiwan pundits say the KMT ad could have a bigger and more lasting impact on Taiwan than Chen's decision to "cease to function/apply" the NUC and NUG. ¶8. Commentators posit that the reason Beijing sees Chen as a foe while regarding Ma as a friend is not simply because of the difference of their policies but because of 'trust.' Beijing has no faith in Chen, so every move the Chen administration makes, even when following in the KMT's footsteps (pushing to join the WHO and the UN),is seen by Beijing as pushing for "Taiwan independence." Beijing's tolerance of Ma partially stems from the mutual trust built during the Lien-Hu meetings last spring; it was also partially due to the fact that Beijing has no other choice but to define the KMT as its friend instead of foe. On the other hand, some observers in Beijing have started to show concerns about the so-called "Ma Ying-jeou phenomenon." They are worried that Ma may be a tougher rival to deal with than Chen because Ma, who supports the Falun Gung and students' movements in China, might threaten the stability of the Chinese Communist Party's regime. ¶9. The DPP, too, has started a heated discussion about the "Ma Ying-jeou phenomenon." KMT Legislator Sun Ta-chien has said publicly that some DPP members, especially those interested in running for president, are trying to raise their visibility by attacking Ma. Others, said Sun, are stunned to discover how easily Ma erased the 'anti-U.S. and anti-Japan' image of the KMT that the DPP has tried for six years to implant in the consciousness of the U.S. administration. ¶10. As the media coverage of Ma continues unabated after ten days, Taiwan's public is anticipating next steps from all parties. How will Ma consolidate his gains and follow up on the ideas he raised during his visit? How will Chen and the possible DPP presidential candidates respond to Ma's effort to build bridges between the KMT, the United States, and China? The answers to these questions may shed some light on the course of Taiwan's political development over the next two years. YOUNG