UNMEE SRSG ADVOCATES REDUCING UNMEE TO "TOKEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000419

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
USUN NY FOR T.OHLSON
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: UNMEE SRSG ADVOCATES REDUCING UNMEE TO "TOKEN
PRESENCE"

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 00385 (NOTAL)


B. ADDIS ABABA 03930 (NOTAL)

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Eritrea continues to restrict freedom of
movement by UNMEE MILOBs within the Temporary Security Zone,
and to flaunt previously agreed upon protocols relating to
UNMEE's right to challenge and inspect police and militia
within the TSZ, according to UNMEE SRSG Legwaila. Such
restrictions on freedom of movement, coupled with the GSE's
continued ban on UNMEE aerial operations within the TSZ, have
severely restricted UNMEE's ability to monitor the border,
with 95 per cent of the eastern sector going unmonitored.
According to Legwaila, the status quo favors Ethiopia, which
occupies contested areas legally, so long as demarcation does
not occur. Neither party seeks war, but neither appears to
seek compromise either, as both parties have avoided
participating in Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission
meetings since November 2004. Citing the futility of the
status quo, Legwaila advocates downsizing UNMEE to either a
"token presence" or "liaison office," which would cost
one-half to one-fourth the current mission's cost. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) On February 7, Charge and visiting Rear Admiral
Douglas McAneny, Joint Staff,s Deputy Director for
Politico-Military Affairs (Europe/NATO/Russia/Africa, J-5),
met with United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE) Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
(SRSG) Amb. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila and Deputy SRSG Amb.
Azouz Ennifar. DATT, deputy polecon counselor, and
Lieutenant Colonel Dan Hampton of the Joint Staff also
accompanied Charge.

--------------
GSE CONTINUES TO RESTRICT UNMEE MILOBS IN TSZ
--------------


3. (C) UNMEE SRSG Legwaila observed that while the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border situation appeared calm, "things are
not normal," as the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE)
continued to hamper the work of UNMEE military observers
(MILOBs) monitoring the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ).
Eritrean police and militia, allowed within the TSZ in
accordance with the 2000 cessation of hostilities agreement,
failed to present required identification cards to UNMEE, and
failed to allow UNMEE to inspect their weapons stores, he
said, which constituted a violation of both the cessation of
hostilities agreement and the protocol on police. Legwaila
underscored the importance of maintaining the special nature
of the TSZ, calling it the "core" of the 2000 cessation of
hostilities agreement. Despite protesting these violations
to the GSE commissioner the previous week, and asking him to
direct local Eritrean officials to end them, "intolerably
high" restrictions continued, Legwaila said. In contrast to
when UNMEE faced no restrictions in the TSZ, it now faced
10-14 restrictions daily on its freedom of movement within
the TSZ. The TSZ was "being violated with impunity,"
Legwaila said, noting that he had already received reports
that day of a restriction in the TSZ's central sector and
nine in the western sector. The GSE, which had previously
given UNMEE officials multiple-entry visas, were now issuing
only single-entry visas, in order to enforce its expulsion of
Western nationalities, he said.


4. (C) Such restrictions of movement, coupled with the GSE's
continued ban on UNMEE aerial operations within the TSZ,
severely hampered UNMEE's ability to monitor the border,
Legwaila said. UNMEE could now only monitor 5 (five) per
cent of the TSZ's eastern sector, he said, as it had
previously relied on aerial reconnaissance to monitor that
sector. Ground patrols also faced restrictions: Eritrean
authorities did not allow UNMEE patrols traveling between
Assab and Bure to leave use the highway, so UNMEE could not
inspect encampments visible from the road.


5. (C) Even before the GSE's October 2005 flight ban, Eritrea
had imposed more restrictions on UNMEE than Ethiopia had,
Legwaila said. As the GSE had never recognized the concept
of "adjacent areas" to the TSZ, UNMEE had never had full
freedom of movement beyond the northern border of the TSZ,

ADDIS ABAB 00000419 002 OF 003


and could only visit sites outside the TSZ when permitted to
by the GSE. In contrast, Ethiopia recognized "adjacent
areas" and allowed UNMEE unhampered freedom of movement on
its side of the border. Ethiopian troop movements had been
"very transparent," Legwaila said, noting that Prime Minister
Meles had informed UNMEE in advance before deploying an
additional seven divisions to the border in December 2004,
and before deploying an additional two divisions in 2005.
The UNMEE Force Commander had since been able to verify their
redeployment away from the border, Legwaila added.

--------------
BORDER DEMARCATION REMAINS UNMEE'S GOAL
--------------


6. (C) Despite these restrictions, UNMEE's continued presence
was intended to support the demarcation of the border,
Legwaila said. "The reason why we are still here is because
the (last) pillar has not been planted," he added. The
creation of the TSZ in April 2001, and the subsequent
imposition of UN peace-keepers, had created "space" for the
parties; however, there was now no indication that the border
would be demarcated, he said, citing the closure of
Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) offices.
Legwaila reviewed the parties' positions on demarcation:
"dialogue" was anathema to Eritrea, who had avoided meetings
with the UN special envoy and asserted that the EEBC decision
could not be changed. Eritrea had also opposed partial
demarcation, even though the border's eastern sector had been
ready for demarcation since 2004, and demarcation would
confirm Eritrean sovereignty over the port of Assab.
On the other hand, Ethiopia was "determined" that the
boundary decision "never" be implemented without discussion,
and avoided appeared at the EEBC for fear of being presented
with a timetable for demarcation. Both parties had last
attended an EEBC meeting in November 2004 at the Hague, he
said, when the EEBC confronted the GSE for blocking
demarcation of the mutually agreed upon eastern sector as a
confidence-building measure.


7. (C) Legwaila noted that Ethiopia currently occupied
contested areas "legally," as the exchange of territory was
preconditioned on demarcation. Eritrea, however, sought to
transfer territory prior to demarcation. He noted that
Botswana and Namibia had peacefully demarcated their border,
through compromise and the exchange of land. Legwaila
acknowledged that the line of delimitation had been
determined "blindly" at The Hague, and therefore split
villages and churches; some villages had moved from their
locations on colonial era maps, he said. Nevertheless, the
EEBC could vary the line only if both parties expressly
empowered the EEBC to do so; this was not likely, so long as
the GSE considered the boundary "immutably final and
binding." While UNMEE called for dialogue, it was the
parties' "prerogative" to determine the agenda; UNMEE had
never called for a renegotiation of the EEBC decision, he
said.


8. (C) Asked whether demarcation could proceed without the
cooperation of Eritrea, Legwaila explained that demarcation
would have to involve work on both sides of the border, on
the basis of demarcation directives involving both Ethiopia
and Eritrea. One could not demarcate unilaterally, he said;
doing so might endanger the security of those conducting the
pillar emplacement, he added. Legwaila lamented the absence
of any peaceful dialogue between the two parties (apart from
the UNMEE-chaired Joint Military Coordination meetings),
underscoring that such dialogue was essential to making
peace, and that the border would not be demarcated through
"brinksmanship." Ethiopia and Eritrea "are condemned by
geography" to co-exist with each other, but the anger between
their two governments was now worse than in 2000, Legwaila
said. He hailed the "determination" of AF A/S Frazer to
resolve the border tensions, and noted the irony of the
United States now "being condemned" in Eritrean state-run
media, even though both parties had previously appealed for
U.S. intervention.


9. (C) Asked whether the status quo gave rise to the threat
of renewed hostilities, Legwaila said the border could be a
source of future conflict if it remained undemarcated, but
that neither party sought war now. Both parties had

ADDIS ABAB 00000419 003 OF 003


condemned the 1998-2000 war as "senseless," he said.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia, having learned a historical lesson
from 1998, would not allow itself to be caught by surprise
again, he said. While Eritrea believed it had the right
under Article 51 of the UN Charter to take back what it
considered to be "occupied territory," doing so would lead to
international condemnation of the GSE, Legwaila said, citing
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Claims Commission's recent decision
that identified Eritrea as an aggressor. (NOTE: Article 51
in Chapter VII addresses a member state's "right to
self-defense". END NOTE.)

-------------- --------------
CUTTING UNMEE TO A "TOKEN PRESENCE" WOULD HALVE ITS COST
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Legwaila said that all six options for the future of
UNMEE presented by the UN SYG (in S-2006-1) were "offensive"
to the GSE, but he questioned whether one could sustain the
status quo, citing UNMEE's annual cost and the continued
"harassment" it faced from the GSE. "Why should UNMEE remain
in place, if it is not allowed to do its work?" he said. By
continuing its restrictions on UNMEE, Eritrea was withdrawing
its "consent" for the mission under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. He said the current stalemate was caused by the
parties, not by the mission, which had been successful. The
total withdrawal of UNMEE would not necessarily lead to war,
but would make the border "extremely volatile". However, a
downsized UNMEE "may end up as the best solution," he said.


11. (C) Legwaila advocated reducing UNMEE to "a token
presence," arguing that the approximately $180 million annual
cost of UNMEE could be used for other peace-keeping
operations where opportunity for political dialogue existed,
such as Sudan. It was "nonsense" to "keep UNMEE as it is
now," Legwaila said, explaining that a "token presence" would
cost $87 million (or half UNMEE's current cost),while a
smaller "liaison office" concept would only cost about $45
million. Legwaila rejected the proposal to move UNMEE's
entire operations from Eritrea to Ethiopia, saying that
removing Indian and Jordanian contingents from the TSZ would
anger Ethiopia and prompt Ethiopia to reoccupy the TSZ.


12. (C) Asked whether downsizing UNMEE would compel Eritrea
to return to the peace process, Legwaila said Eritrea needed
to realize the danger that the international community could
simply abandon the Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue, leaving
Eritrea "to its own devices." "Eritrea is holding a losing
hand; their intransigence will cost them in the end," he
said. Legwaila warned that of the possibility that the
border, like many others, would simply never be demarcated,
thus preserving Ethiopian occupation of all the disputed
areas (e.g., Badme and Irob). Legwaila added that
demarcation of the border would reinforce the status of
Eritrea as an independent state, as some Ethiopian
ultra-nationalists sought to reincorporate Eritrea into
Ethiopia. Legwaila observed that Norwegian deputy foreign
minister Vidar Helgesen, who had close relations with
Eritrea's President Isaias, had warned Isaias of the need to
engage the international community. Charge noted that PM
Meles had told A/S Frazer that Eritrea's President Isaias was
subject to about-faces and quick changes in policy.


13. (C) COMMENT: UNMEE SRSG Legwaila's recommendation that
UNMEE be reduced to "a token presence" is consistent with
earlier statements to visiting AF A/S Frazer that UNMEE could
still support demarcation if changed to a pure observer
mission (ref A). Legwaila's lament that UNMEE can now only
monitor 5 per cent of the eastern sector should be a concern:
the temporary occupation of "Point 885" in November 2005 by
an Ethiopian infantry platoon (ref B),in violation of the
June 2000 cessation of hostilities agreement, occurred in the
eastern sector. END COMMENT.


14. (U) RADM McAneny cleared the text of this cable.
HUDDLESTON