C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000385

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER AND UNMEE SRSG DISCUSS NEXT STEPS ON
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER


ADDIS ABAB 00000385 001.4 OF 004


Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VICKI HUDDLESTON. REASON: 1.4 (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Following her visit to the
Ethiopian-Eritrean border, AF A/S Frazer told UNMEE SRSG
Legwaila that current residents of the disputed town of Badme
oppose the 2002 boundary commission decision awarding the
town to Eritrea. Badme was administered by Ethiopia, but the
EEBC places it 1.7 kilometers within Eritrea, according to UN
peacekeeping officials. Amb. Frazer reported that Meles had
made minor but significant concessions on the border:
agreeing to "consider the possibility" of sending a
representative to the next meeting of the Ethiopia-Eritrea
Boundary Commission (EEBC), and showing some flexibility on
whether Ethiopia accepted the EEBC decision only "in
principle." A/S Frazer underscored the need for flexibility
among all parties, including the EEBC, whose president
Ethiopia believes is biased. Eritrea reiterates that
Ethiopia must accept the EEBC decision "as is," and
criticized the USG delegation's visit to "occupied
territory." UNMEE SRSG Legwaila asserts that a slightly
downsized UN peacekeeping operation that was mandated to
serve only as an observer force could still be used to
support demarcation of the border. END SUMMARY.

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USG DELEGATION VISITS BORDER FROM ETHIOPIA
--------------


2. (SBU) On January 19-20, AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi
Frazer, AF Special Assistant Kendra Gaither, and AF Military
Advisor COL Kevin Kenny, accompanied by Charge, DATT, and
deputy pol/econ counselor, visited the following sites on the
Ethiopia-Eritrea border:
-- Adigrat, Sector Center headquarters for the United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), manned by UNMEE's
Indian battalion (INDBATT);
-- Zelambessa, in UNMEE's Sector Center; and
-- the disputed town of Badme, currently under Ethiopian
cont

rol but awarded to Eritrea in the April 2002 decision of
the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC).

The USG delegation met only with UNMEE officials at Adigrat
and Zelambessa. On January 20, the Ethiopian National
Defense Force (ENDF) airlifted the delegation to Badme. A
young NCO assisted with Amharic interpretation as the group
moved throughout Badme, speaking at random with male and
female residents of Badme, ranging from young schoolchildren
to the elderly, in what was clearly an unexpected visit. The
local administrator of Badme said that Badme had 5,000
residents. The delegation also met with UNMEE military
observers (MILOBs) at UNMEE's Badme team site.


3. (C/NF) In Zelambessa, UNMEE military observers brought the
USG delegation to UNMEE's team site for a brief visit, which
lies approximately 200 yards in the Temporary Security Zone.
No officials were present, other than UNMEE MILOBs and troops.

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BADME'S CURRENT RESIDENTS STRIDENTLY ETHIOPIAN
-------------- -


4. (C) On January 21, A/S Frazer briefed UNMEE Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) Amb.
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, Deputy SRSG Amb. Azouz Ennifar, and
UNMEE poloff Dr. Abdel-Kader Haireche on her visit to the
border and on her January 20 meeting with Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi (septel). Amb. Frazer said she had
informed PM Meles of the places she had visited, but had not
shared her impressions of what she saw. She said she had a
better understanding of the challenges Meles faced in
implementing the EEBC decision, citing the "strong impression
of Ethiopian identity in Badme." She said that residents of
Badme were well-informed and opinionated, spoke with "the
passion of a people invaded," and had criticized the EEBC
decision as unjust, unfair, and unbalanced. Badme villagers,
including a one-legged man who said he was prepared to
sacrifice his remaining leg, claimed that they would rather
go to war than live under Eritrean administration. Elders,
who spoke Amharic rather than Tigrinya, asserted that
Eritrean President Isaias had banned a traditional song whose
lyrics identified a nearby river as the boundary.


5. (C) SRSG Legwaila observed that in the Temporary Security
Zone, the "opinions of the people are invariably those of the
government," as residents were "indoctrinated" by political
cadres. Amb. Frazer and Charge pointed out that a number
of elderly residents made their case by stating that Badme

ADDIS ABAB 00000385 002.4 OF 004


had never been subject to Italian colonization, which stopped
at the Mereb River. UNMEE observers also had the same view,
namely that the residents of Badme consider themselves
Ethiopian.

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MELES: ISAIAS MUST MAKE "STRATEGIC DECISION" ABOUT DIALOGUE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Although PM Meles reported that he had not talked with
President Isaias in seven years, he considers Isaias a "fully
rational" adversary who makes calculated decisions, Amb.
Frazer said. Meles had indicated that neither he nor Isaias
want to go to war. Meles believes that because Isaias cannot
topple Ethiopia militarily, Isaias is using Ethiopian
opposition groups to foment dissent and to seek "vengeance,"
Amb. Frazer said. According to Meles, the "key test" for
Isaias is whether he is willing to make a "strategic
decision" to engage in dialogue about an EEBC decision in
which Ethiopia is losing towns that are clearly Ethiopian,
and Eritrea is losing towns that are clearly Eritrean. Meles
had not extensively discussed normalization of relations
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Amb. Frazer said. SRSG
Legwaila responded that there could be no normalization
without demarcation; indeed, Eritrea had said that landlocked
Ethiopia may gain access to the port of Assab, as part of
normalization. Demarcation would lead to progress in other
areas, Legwaila said.


7. (C) SRSG Legwaila noted that residents of border areas
"disadvantaged" by demarcation had the choice of going to
either Ethiopia or Eritrea, but said that Isaias had
manipulated groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to
get international aid and to blame UNMEE falsely for giving
border villages to Ethiopia. Legwaila explained that the
Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) had told IDPs not to
return to villages along the southern edge of the TSZ, even
though conditions permitted them to do so; the GSE had even
mined some villages. Legwaila also said that Isaias knows
that land must be ceded or transferred (as a result of the
EEBC decision), but "does not care" to address the issue.
Isaias falsely claimed to have instructed Eritreans living
near the border with Ethiopia to move four kilometers north,
Legwaila said.

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MELES TO "CONSIDER" SENDING REPRESENTATIVE TO EEBC
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Amb. Frazer said that Meles repeatedly referred to his
five-point plan, saying it accepted the EEBC decision but
required dialogue. Meles said initially he was willing to
work with Isaias, not the EEBC, but ultimately agreed to
"consider the possibility" of sending a representative to a
future meeting of the EEBC, "if prepared carefully," Frazer
said. SRSG Legwaila highlighted the need to thoroughly
prepare the agenda of any EEBC meeting contemplated, as the
GOE did not want to be told by the EEBC that it was simply
reaffirming the 2002 boundary decision. He said that in
accordance with the EEBC's own decision (not the Algiers
accords), the EEBC could vary or "refine" the boundary line,
if both parties (i.e., Ethiopia and Eritrea) requested it.
Legwaila noted that the EEBC's "dispositif" in the 2002
decision stated that the decision was final, but also
recognized the principle of "manifest impracticability":
that it may be impractical to place a pillar (demarcating the
border) in a given location, such as on a mountain.
Observing the principle of "manifest impracticability," both
parties had already agreed to minor variations of the
boundary along the 375 kilometers of the border's eastern
sector, he said.

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"MANIFEST IMPRACTICABILITY" WILL NOT ALLOW EXCHANGE OF BADME
-------------- --------------


9. (C) However, this principle did not mean that entire towns
could be exchanged, Legwaila said, noting that by UNMEE's
calculation, Badme lay 1.7 kilometers within Eritrea.
Legwaila said that the GOE had not emphasized the issue of
Badme before the EEBC, as, according to Ethiopia's
calculation, Badme was 60 kilometers within Ethiopia. In
2001, UNMEE sent a cartographer and poloff to Badme to draw
the boundary of the TSZ, Legwaila said. The UNMEE team found
that Badme then had 2,700 residents (2,500 Ethiopian and 200
Eritrean), and that "even the Eritrean elders" acknowledged
that the land belonged to Ethiopia. According to archives,

ADDIS ABAB 00000385 003.4 OF 004


Ethiopian authorities had conducted municipal elections,
Legwaila said; an OAU mission had confirmed that Ethiopia had
long administered the village, but could not determine for
how long.


10. (C) Meles may be personally willing to surrender Badme,
Legwaila said, noting that Meles had publicly referred to
Badme as "a God-forsaken mud village" in a possible attempt
to minimize its importance. Legwaila said there had been
much recent investment in Badme, which had previously
consisted only of "shacks and mud huts." Legwaila
acknowledged that the EEBC decision split villages and
churches. "The only way out of this is for both countries to
sit down and to discuss exchanging villages," Legwaila said.
The boundary "circles" around Zelambessa, placing it in
Ethiopia, while circling around Tserona and placing it in
Eritrea, he noted.


11. (C) "The EEBC is prepared to change the line," if both
parties want it to, Legwaila said, but the GOE fears
"entrapment" by the EEBC. Charge noted that the GOE
considered EEBC President Sir Elihu Lauterpacht "biased," due
to his previous statement that the boundary was "practically
demarcated," which suggested little or no discretion would be
allowed. At the same time, SRSG Legwaila pointed out that in
March 2004, even the EEBC commissioners appointed by Ethiopia
had defended the 2002 EEBC decision. Legwaila noted,
however, the potential conflict of interest posed by
Professor James Crawford's affiliation (one of several legal
counsels for Eritrea, as noted in the 2002 EEBC decision)
with the "Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law"
at Cambridge University.

-------------- -
ERITREA: ETHIOPIA MUST ACCEPT DECISION "AS IS"
-------------- -


12. (C) Meles had told A/S Frazer that he accepted the EEBC
decision, and that the GOE's caveat that it accepted the
decision (only) "in principle" came as a suggestion offered
by the UK. For Meles, the problem was the implementation of
the EEBC's decision, for which he seeks dialogue with
Eritrea, she added. SRSG Legwaila said that Meles dropping
the caveat would be a positive development, which would then
allow the international community to push Eritrea. Legwaila
noted that "in principle" did not appear in the GOE's January
16 memorandum on the border situation submitted to the UN
Security Council. Legwaila agreed not to publicize Meles'
flexibility on "in principle," however.


13. (C) Amb. Frazer said that even if Meles were to drop the
caveat, the GSE may not necessarily welcome it. She
explained that she had informed EPFDJ head of political
affairs Yemane Ghebreab, who was visiting Washington and then
Paris, of her trip to the border, and had told him that the
next steps needed were: a meeting of the Witnesses
(including the U.S., AU, and EU) to the Algiers Accord, a
meeting of the EEBC, and then the beginning of demarcation.
Yemane responded that only the EEBC, not the Witnesses, had
the mandate and legal authority to demarcate the border; that
Ethiopia must accept the decision "as is"; and that the USG
delegation had visited "occupied territory." Amb. Frazer
said she had reminded Yemane that Badme was sovereign
Ethiopian territory until demarcation. Legwaila hailed USG
engagement with Yemane, noting that the GSE had spurned
former UN envoy Lloyd Axworthy, believing that Eritrea was
not the problem. Yemane Ghebreab was a better interlocutor
than GSE presidential advisor Yemane Gebremeskel, who was
"too angry for my liking," Legwaila said.


14. (C) Noting that Meles had said that Yemane Ghebreab spoke
for Isaias, Amb. Frazer said that she was not pushing for a
meeting with Isaias; the international community needed
actions, not talk, she added. Asked who exerted influence on
Isaias and the GSE, Legwaila suggested Israel as a
possibility, alleging that Isaias had an aversion to Arabs.
The relationship between Isaias and Qaddafi was a "marriage
of convenience," Legwaila said, noting that Qaddafi would not
be an effective intermediary since he questions why Ethiopia
simply does not accept the EEBC decision. One could also
engage the GSE's international lawyers, Legwaila said,
although some were "strident." (NOTE: Italy and Egypt have
had recent access to Isaias, if not influence. In subsequent
meetings with poloff, Italian DCM and Egyptian poloff
separately noted that Isaias hosted an Italian ministerial
delegation (led by deputy foreign minister Alfredo Manteca)
in January 2005; Isaias also visited Cairo in December. END

ADDIS ABAB 00000385 004 OF 004


NOTE.)

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EEBC MEETING IN FEBRUARY OR MARCH
--------------


15. (C) To ensure progress, all sides needed to be flexible,
Amb. Frazer said, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the EEBC,
which could hold its next meeting either at the beginning of
February or in March. Legwaila highlighted the need to
consult with Lauterpacht to explain what was needed from the
EEBC; Amb. Frazer responded that General Carlton Fulford had
already done so and would continue to do so in the future.
Amb. Frazer added that one could not rule out sanctions.
Both Amb. Frazer and SRSG Legwaila agreed that if both
parties sought war, then there was little the international
community could do.

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UNMEE OBSERVER MISSION COULD STILL SUPPORT DEMARCATION
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Amb. Frazer said that Meles supported the removal of
UNMEE, or its downsizing to an observer force, if UNMEE
continued to be "held hostage" by Isaias; Meles believed
UNMEE would not be able to stop Isaias if Isaias wanted to go
to war with Ethiopia. SRSG Legwaila agreed that so long as
UNMEE was being "brutalized" by Eritrean restrictions on its
freedom of movement, there was nothing to push the GSE to be
serious about solving the current crisis. Legwaila noted
that the GSE had long considered UNMEE's presence
unnecessary: twelve days after the EEBC's decision in April
2002, Isaias had expressed surprise that UNMEE was still in
Eritrea, since both sides (at that time) had accepted the
EEBC's decision. Legwaila said he had told Isaias that UNMEE
would withdraw "when the last pillar is driven" (i.e., only
after the completion of demarcation). Legwaila underscored
that the GSE's recent expulsion of UNMEE staff who were
Western nationals was "absolutely unacceptable," and
continued to hamper recruitment for the mission, as any
Europeans hired had to remain in Ethiopia and could not enter
Eritrea.


17. (C) SRSG Legwaila affirmed that if changed to a pure
observer mission, UNMEE could still support demarcation. A
tailored mission with field offices, helicopters, and fewer
than 3,700 troops could be used for demarcation, he said.
(NOTE: UNMEE's current troop strength is approximately
3,200; its authorized strength is 4,000. END NOTE.) UNMEE's
role would include demining pillar sites and adjacent access
roads. Originally, the EEBC had directed UNMEE to provide
security for pillar sites, so that pillars demarcating the
border would not be removed overnight; the demarcation
directives had later been amended so that the parties
themselves were to provide security, he said.


18. (C) COMMENT: Meles's decision to "consider the
possibility" of sending a representative to attend the next
meeting of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission,
coupled with the lack of any reference to accepting the EEBC
decision only "in principle" in the GOE's January 16
memorandum to the UNSC, represent small but significant
concessions. UNMEE officials, including SRSG Legwaila and
UNMEE military observers in the field (septel), highlight
Ethiopia's compliance with the provisions of UNSCR 1640
calling for the withdrawal of troops to December 2004
positions, saying that Ethiopia has withdrawn eight divisions
from the border. Progress on demarcation, however, is
another matter. It is clear from our visit to Badme that
local Ethiopian authorities are making no preparations to
transfer Badme to Eritrea, and that local sentiment strongly
opposes the EEBC decision. While it is important for the
United States to build on the momentum generated by A/S
Frazer's visit, the parties may have their own strategic
interests for maintaining the status quo. As SRSG Legwaila
observed in a January 19 briefing to the USG delegation
(septel), prior to its visit to the border, if the border is
not demarcated, then "advantage Ethiopia," as Ethiopia
currently occupies all the contested areas. END COMMENT.


19. (U) A/S Frazer cleared on this message.
HUDDLESTON