DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS WARNS SUDANESE FM TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003318 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SE, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS WARNS SUDANESE FM TO END ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS Classified By: POLOFF ERIC WONG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a bilateral meeting with Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol and other GOS principals, just prior to November 16 high-level consultations on Darfur chaired by the UN SYG and AU Commission Chairperson Konare (septel), Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan Natsios outlined USG priorities on AMIS transition to a joint UN-AU peacekeeping operation. Citing information on specific attacks in Darfur and Chad, SE Natsios also cautioned the GOS to end deliberate attacks on civilians, or risk hampering a cooperative approach between the United States and Sudan. FM Akol and GOS military commander General Ismat al Zain denied that the GOS had undertaken such a policy to attack civilians, but agreed to inform President Bashir. FM Akol affirmed that the GOS had agreed to the first of three phases of proposed UN assistance to AMIS, but that the GOS disagreed about other aspects derived from UNSCR 1706. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Special Envoy Natsios and AF/SE Andrew Steinfeld, accompanied by deputy pol-econ counselor (AU watcher) met November 16 in Addis Ababa with visiting Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol, GOS Ambassador to Ethiopia Abu Zeid, GOS PermRep to the UN Amb. Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohammed, and General Ismat al Zain, commander of the Sudanese army in Darfur. ¶3. (C) SE Natsios reviewed USG policy on transition of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN peacekeeping operation, in accordance with UNSCR 1706. The USG was not supporting a new UNSCR but did support a joint UN-AU operation; a presidential statement by the UNSC (PRST) could address elements of UNSCR 1706 that required revision. UN funding of the operation (i.e., through assessed contributions),provided a more stable mechanism than current ad hoc arrangements. and was in the interest of the GOS. The joint operation would be a predominantly African force led by an African general, using command and control structures of the UN with the AU. The USG supported the voluntary return of IDPs, and was prepared to provide a reconstruction package if a peace agreement were reached. SE Natsios noted that to sanction parties who continued to oppose the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),the USG was considering imposing a travel ban and asset control on 5 JEM leaders. -------------- HALT DELIBERATE ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS -------------- ¶4. (C) SE Natsios cautioned FM Akol that while the USG had so far taken a cooperative, collaborative approach with the GOS, since Natsios's visit to Sudan, Arab militias had re-energized to displace and attack civilians: 89 (including 27 children) had been killed in a recent attack at Jebel Moon; another 200, mostly civilians, had been killed in attacks on IDP camps at Gaz Beat in Chad. SE Natsios underscored that if the GOS continued to support such attacks, then the USG could no longer continue its cooperative approach with Sudan. Citing information that the GOS had formally decided to attack civilians, SE Natsios warned that attacks on women and children risked altering the current relationship between the United States and Sudan. ¶5. (C) General Ismat responded that he had no details on the referenced attack on Jebel Moon. The GOS military had been briefed that even when attacked by "undisciplined" forces of non-signatories to the DPA, they should not attack either women and children or villages. Ismat noted that Jebel Moon ranged over 100 square kilometers; rebels were living among civilians, he said. DPA non-signatories had also undertaken unprecedented acts of violence, he added. Ismat and FM Akol denied that GOS policy called for attacked civilians or burning villages, but FM Akol said he would inform President Bashir. -------------- SUDAN ACCEPTS STRENGTHENING OF AU FORCE -------------- ¶6. (C) FM Akol said the GOS had not come to discuss UNSCR ¶1706. The GOS sought restoration of peace and security in Darfur, in order to implement the DPA, he said. The GOS and ADDIS ABAB 00003318 002 OF 002 USG agreed on the need to strengthen the AU force, he said, although such strengthening was only in the interim for the USG, but "longer-term" for the GOS. Security was a common goal, he said. FM Akol noted that the GOS had accepted the first of three phases of UN assistance. (NOTE: The August 28 addendum to the UN SYG's report on Darfur, S/2006/591/Add.1, outlines the three phases of UN assistance to AMIS, culminating in a hybrid operation. END NOTE.) In response to SE Natsio's observation that much of UNSCR 1706 was derived from the DPA, FM Akol noted that the GOS disagreed on some aspects. Akol concluded by noting that the United States should not send a delegation to Khartoum if there was nothing concrete to offer Bashir. ¶7. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message. WILGUS