C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003316

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SE, AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC
LONDON, PARIS, AND ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU UK CH FR
SUBJECT: DARFUR: NOV. 16 SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS BILATERAL
CONSULTATIONS WITH P-5 ALLIES

Classified By: POLOFF ERIC WONG. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Separate November 16 bilateral consultations
with UK Secretary of State for International Development
Hilary Benn, French MFA Africa Director Jean de Gliniasty and
Special Envoy for the Peace Process in Sudan Henri Benoit de
Coignac, and Chinese PermRep to the UN Guangya Wang
highlighted different P-5 approaches to the situation in
Darfur and the UN SYG's proposed phased approach to UN
assistance to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),
despite the earlier adoption of UNSCR 1706. The UK largely
supported USG redlines and provided a list of specific
ceasefire, political process, and peacekeeping issues to UN
SYG Annan, that helped form the basis of the outcome document
adopted by an extraordinary meeting of senior representatives
of the UN, AU, GOS, League of Arab States, P-5, and selected
African countries. Sudanese President Bashir reportedly told
French FM Douste-Blazy that he would only accept "African"
forces; Bashir also appeared open to accepting a "supplement"
to the DPA to gain its acceptance by non-signatories. France
expressed concern that the UN's proposal did not call for
monitors for the Chadian border. China, which had abstained
on UNSCR 1706, proposed adopting a new UNSCR and stressed the
need to "work creatively" with Sudan. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan Natsios and AF/SE
Andrew Steinfeld, accompanied by deputy pol-econ counselor
(note-taker), conducted a series of bilateral consultations
on Darfur, prior to the convening on November 16 of a special
"high-level" meeting at African Union headquarters co-chaired
by UN SYG Annan and AU Commission Chairperson Konare
involving the P-5, Sudan, the League of Arab States, the
European Union, and selected African countries (septel).

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UK: FORCE G

ENERATION A CONCERN
--------------


3. (C) In a 45-minute meeting with visiting UK Secretary of
State for International Development Hilary Benn, UK
Special Representative on Darfur Christopher Prentice, UK FCO
Head of Sudan Unit Jessica Irvine, Private Secretary to
Secretary of State Hilary Benn Melanie Speight, and UK

SIPDIS
Ambassador to Ethiopia Bob Dewar, SE Natsios discussed the
necessity of establishing UN command and control for the
proposed hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur, given
the institutional weakness of the African Union which
rendered it susceptible to manipulation by the Government of
Sudan (GOS). Natsios underscored the urgent need for
effecting transition as soon as possible, expressing concern
that the GOS sought to wait until January 2007, when current
UN SYG Annan would end his tenure. The USG supported UNSCR
1706, and opposed calling for a new UNSCR. The USG was also
considering imposing travel restrictions on 5 JEM leaders
(although not on Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur), to sanction
recalcitrant non-signatories who continued to opposed the
Darfur Peace Agreement.


4. (C) Asked whether the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) should
simply be extended for another six months, Natsios said this
would provide time for the GOS to continue conducting its
racially motivated military campaign against civilians.
Natsios noted that there was indisputable evidence that the
GOS was arming Arab militia, in an attempt orchestrated by
central government officials to win militarily by attacking
the civilian population. Benn counseled that this be raised
privately with GOS officials, but not in the larger plenary
session to be chaired by UN SYG Annan and AU Commission
Chairperson Konare. Benn shared the text of a list of issues
he was providing to UN SYG Annan to serve as the basis of an
outcome document, expressing the desire to reach agreement
with the GOS on ceasefire, political process, and
peacekeeping issues.


5. (C) Benn noted the need to look beyond Africa for
potential troop contributing countries. African countries'
inability to generate only one-and-a-half battalions in six
months highlighted their lack of capacity. On the other
hand, Rwandan President Kagame had said in the previous month
that Rwanda could provide yet another battalion for Darfur,
if there were better command and control. Egypt had proposed

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naming three separate force commanders: one for southern
Sudan, another for Darfur, and an overall force commander.
The UK would support deploying monitors on the Chad/Sudan
border, as it would promote security, Benn said, adding that
a UN assessment mission was underway.

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FRANCE: NEED TO MONITOR CHAD/SUDAN BORDER
--------------


6. (C) SE Natsios began an hour-long meeting with visiting
French MFA Africa Director Jean de Gliniasty, French Special
Envoy for the Peace Process in Sudan Henri Benoit de Coignac,
and French Ambassador to Ethiopia Stephane Gompertz, by
stating that the situation between Chad and Sudan was
deteriorating. Having suffered three conventional military
defeats since August, the GOS was now mobilizing Arab
militias, as it had in 2004; three massacres had occurred in
the last two weeks alone. GOS hard-liners believed the
intent of a UN force was to protect IDP camps. Arab militia
attacks on such camps had become more provocative, and over
700 villages had been destroyed; repatriation of IDPs
remained a challenge.


7. (C) While France generally agreed on the phased approach
being proposed by the UN SYG, de Gliniasty said, France was
concerned that Annan's paper focused on establishing a
peacekeeping force to implement a political agreement,
without enlarging the political agreement in question. The
paper also failed to address the need to monitor the
Chad/Central African Republic border, a French priority.
Such monitors could be based in the CAR, as Bashir objected
to UN peacekeepers on the Sudanese side of the border, de
Gliniasty noted. Finally, Annan's proposal did not address
the "central" role the AU needed to play as an intermediary
with the GOS, de Gliniasty said. Natsios agreed on the
importance of stabilizing the Chad/Sudan border, and noted
that the United States sought a more comprehensive approach
to Darfur, which included an effective mechanism to address
non-signatories who had been ejected earlier from the
ceasefire commission. Following a political settlement, the
USG was prepared to fund reconstruction and development,
Natsios added.

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READOUT OF FRENCH FM MEETING WITH BASHIR
--------------


8. (C) France assessed that Bashir was "sincere" in seeking a
political agreement, but questioned his sincerity in
accepting an African peacekeeping force, de Gliniasty said.
He said that French FM Philippe Douste-Blazy had met in
Khartoum with Bashir, GOS FM Lam Akol, and GOS intelligence
chief Salah Abdallah Gosh. The GOS was "in a bitter mood"
fearing a U.S. "hidden agenda," but had been happy with
Natsios's October visit to Sudan, although unhappy with the
visit of Hilary Benn. Bashir had complained that the
international community had not rewarded Sudan for its
efforts in acceding to the Darfur Peace Agreement, nor had it
sanctioned DPA non-signatories. Seeking a peacekeeping
solution to Darfur required strengthening the political
process, de Gliniasty added. The GOS felt that UNSCR 1706
had been imposed on them, and now sought to participate in
decisions on Darfur. De Coignac noted that Bashir appeared
open to a "supplement" to the DPA, in order to grant
concessions to non-signatories; flexibility was needed to
bring JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim to negotiations, he added.
De Coignac said Gosh acknowledged playing a role in
encouraging factions to split, a tactic the GOS had pursued
for two decades. Referring to U.S. plans to consider
sanctions against JEM leaders other than Khalil Ibrahim,
Natsios noted that the JEM sought regime change through the
overthrow of the GOS; one needed to distinguish between the
JEM and groups willing to negotiate in good faith. De
Gliniasty remarked that Khalil Ibrahim was struggling for the
autonomy of Darfur and, ultimately, secession.


9. (C) De Gliniasty reported that Egyptian President Mubarak
had urged French FM Douste-Blazy to be "cautious" with
Sudanese President Bashir: to listen to GOS concerns, rather
than seek to impose a solution. According to Mubarak, the

ADDIS ABAB 00003316 003 OF 004


GOS did not seek a military solution but only sought revenge.


-- TCCs: Mubarak had cautioned the French not to refer to an
"international force" for Darfur, and Bashir had said he
would only accept Africans. Natsios observed that the GOS
had previously agreed that the peacekeeping force in Darfur
required another 10,000 troops; expanding the mission to
include contingents from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh was
desirable. Six weeks earlier, AMIS Force Commander Aprezi
had stated he wanted troops on the ground, not UN officers
under the "light" assistance package. Amb. Gompertz
responded that the presence of non-Africans remained a
sensitive issue for the AU, with foreign experts seconded to
the AU Commission having to be based at foreign embassies
rather than AU headquarters. African officers, serving under
the UN, was an option, de Gliniasty said.

-- UN COMMAND AND CONTROL: In response to Natsios's
discussion of necessity of having a single force commander,
subject to UN command and control, de Gliniasty said FM
Douste-Blazy had not raised command and control issues during
meetings with the GOS. Acknowledging the weakness of AU
forces, de Gliniasty said such a hybrid could be mandated
under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. France was now
"wavering," he said, and could accept a "strategic cell
crowned by UN officers," as used in Lebanon. Weak logistics
lay at the heart of the ineffectiveness of AMIS, he added.
AF/SE Steinfeld observed that the GOS preferred a weak
peacekeeping force to an effective one, so as to allow the
GOS to pacify Darfur.

-- UN FINANCING: De Gliniasty agreed that UN financing was
"essential" for peacekeeping in Darfur, rather than ad hoc
voluntary contributions.


10. (C) De Gliniasty cautioned against over-emphasizing UNSCR
1706, saying it was preferable to build up an effective force
in Darfur pragmatically: "We need to reach compromise
amongst ourselves," he said. Natsios noted that the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement had been the result of Africa
and the West having a unified position; by seeking separate
negotiations with different actors, the GOS was seeking to
divide and conquer Western allies. Noting China's support
for Sudan, de Gliniasty explained that using the AU was
"essential," as it was a means of bypassing Chinese
resistance.

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CHINA: SEEK A "CREATIVE" SOLUTION, POSSIBLY NEW UNSCR
-------------- --------------


11. (C) SE Natsios began a 30-minute meeting with visiting
Chinese PermRep to the UN Amb. Guangya Wang by observing that
attendance by FM Lam Akol rather than GOS Presidential
Advisor Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail indicated that the GOS was
not taking the November 16 high-level consultations
seriously. Natsios underscored the urgency of achieving
progress on Darfur prior to the end of the year, when UN SYG
Annan would leave office. A ceasefire and border security
were needed. As the Secretary would raise with Chinese FM
Li, the United States and the UK were proposing a joint UN-AU
successor to UN SRSG for Sudan Jan Pronk. As UN SYG Annan
had stated that Africa would likely not be able to provide
10,000 additional troops, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh had
to be considered as possible troop contributors; Egypt was
also possible. Dual command and control posed a problem; a
more effective solution was an African general reporting to
UN DPKO.


12. (C) Amb. Wang responded that as UNSCR 1706 had become a
political issue since adoption, parties "need to work
creatively." He noted that China had abstained on UNSCR
1706, as some elements had been "difficult" for China. A new
UNSCR in "the next few weeks," emphasizing Chapter 8 of the
UN Charter (i.e., regional arrangements), could address using
AU forces with UN assistance; without such a UNSC resolution,
a resolution of the UN General Assembly would be required,
Wang said. Natsios expressed the USG's preference for a UNSC
Presidential Statement (PRST), rather than a new resolution,
to clarify UNSCR 1706. Wang, in turn, observed that if the

ADDIS ABAB 00003316 004 OF 004


GOS and rebels were committed to the DPA, then there would be
less concern about "modalities."


13. (C) Natsios noted that aerial photographs had shown that
Arab militias had destroyed 700 villages in 2004. The USG
believed that the GOS was supporting the resumption of such
attacks by Arab militia, prompting concerns that negotiations
were being used as a front for atrocities against civilians.
Wang said he had told FM Lam Akol that Sudan needed to
implement the DPA, that the GOS needed to meet its
commitments without waiting for others. AF/SE Steinfeld
observed that the GOS did not appear to be showing good will,
as it was stalling implementation of the "light" UN
assistance package, and opposed the "heavy" package. Wang
observed that the United States and China were not at
opposite ends, but shared a common objective of seeking peace
for Darfur.


14. (C) COMMENT: During the subsequent high-level
consultations chaired by UN SYG Annan and AU Commission
Chairperson Konare, both China and the UK played an important
role in rebutting objections to UN command and control posed
by Sudanese FM Lam Akol. Hilary Benn observed that it was
simply "unrealistic" to expect the international community to
provide more than USD 1 billion to fund a proposed hybrid
operation, if it did not have any say in how the operation
would be led. Chinese PermRep Wang, modestly noting that the
UNSC had some experience in reviewing peacekeeping matters,
underscored in the plenary session that the selection of a
force commander was never a political issue, but always
regarded as a technical matter left to the discretion of the
UN Secretary-General. French interventions during the
plenary predictably underscored the need to monitor the
Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.
Of the P-5 members, Russia played an almost negligible role,
with its ambassador to Ethiopia reading a brief prepared
statement. END COMMENT.


15. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message.
WILGUS