DARFUR: DECEMBER 7, AU DITF BRIEFING PROVIDES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003243 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: DECEMBER 7, AU DITF BRIEFING PROVIDES READOUT OF NOV. 30 PSC REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 3011 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2948 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2523 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. According to African Union officials, the head-of-state-level November 30 AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting affirmed Sudan's acceptance of UN assistance to the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but highlighted that Sudan continues to oppose full transition to a hybrid UN-AU operation falling under strict UN command and control. Chaired by Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki, the PSC sought to press Sudan's President Bashir, but the GOS position remains little changed from the November 16 high-level consultations chaired by UN SYG Annan and AU Commission Chairperson Konare. In the face of such uncertainty on UN transition, the AU PSC has again extended the mandate of AMIS (to the end of June 2007),but has made no provision for the continued funding of the AU operation. The League of Arab States still has not fulfilled its USD 50 million pledge (made in July) to support AMIS. Egypt, current chair of the PSC, was reportedly a strong advocate for the GOS position. Contrary to EU reports of recent security incidents in El Fasher, AU DITF officials largely blamed the UN for fomenting "panic" by evacuating staff from El Fasher, rather than focus on the alleged Arab militia threat which prompted their removal. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On December 7, the African Union Commission's Darfur Integrated Task Force (AU DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). -------------- -------------- SUDAN CONTINUES RESERVATIONS REGARDING HYBRID MISSION -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) AU DITF Head Ambassador Ki Doulaye Korentin provided a readout of the November 30 head-of-state-level AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting in Abuja on Darfur. Nigerian President Obasanjo, followed by South African President Mbeki, had chaired the meeting, which included representatives of the UN, League of Arab States, and Sudanese President Bashir. Amb. Ki Doulaye said UN U/SYG for Peacekeeping Guehenno had read a message from UN SYG Annan urging that the results of the November 16 high-level consultations in Addis (on Darfur) be considered as a package, so as to allow the UNSC to consider funding. To date, the League of Arab States had not provided any funding (despite its USD50 million pledge). ¶4. (SBU) Reviewing the elements of the Nov. 30 AU PSC communique, Amb. Ki Doulaye said nothing had changed in the Sudanese position on the phased approach to UN assistance to AMIS: the GOS accepted the "light" package of UN assistance (approximately 105 personnel),would "eventually" accept the "heavy" package (approximately 1,000 personnel),but continued to express concerns about a hybrid mission. -- SRSG: Pres. Mbeki had been "very effective" in affirming that Pres. Bashir agreed that a special representative for Sudan could be jointly designated by the UN and the AU. However, Bashir had said that AU Commission Chairperson Konare should also consult with the GOS (although this language was not included in the Nov. 30 PSC communique), when asked whether he minded Konare consulting with the UN SYG on the selection of a Force Commander. -- FC: The GOS insisted that the Force Commander should be African and designated by the AU, and that command and control structures should be "in and of the AU" and appointed by the AU Commission Chairperson, Ki Doulaye said. When pressed by Mbeki, Bashir reportedly said he did not mind the Force Commander receiving assistance from the UN. -- FORCE STRENGTH: The size of the hybrid force was left to UN and AU experts to determine as a technical issue, and therefore could be more or less than the 17,000 figure discussed on Nov. 16. -- EXTENSION OF AMIS MANDATE: While an initial draft had proposed convening the tripartite (AU-UN-GOS) committee by December 15 and then reconvening the PSC, the PSC had decided to extend the mandate of AMIS by six months, from Jan.-June ADDIS ABAB 00003243 002 OF 003 2007, based on the availability of funds. ¶5. (SBU) Despite the presence of Sudanese President Bashir, implementation of the phased approach risked becoming bogged down in the details, Amb. Ki Doulaye said, citing the tripartite committee and Sudan's acceptance "in principle" of the light and heavy support packages. The League of Arab States had requested and received many explanations at the Abuja PSC. The AU was trying to find an entry point for the UN. "The UN should enter the open door not like an elephant, but like a gazelle," Ki Doulaye cautioned. -------------- AU DITF PREPARING BUDGET FOR AMIS ENHANCEMENT -------------- ¶6. (SBU) AU DITF was working on a budget so AMIS could "immediately seek support," as current funds would be exhausted as of January 1, and it was unclear how the mission would be sustained. As the AU was appealing to the UN to provide financial and logistical support (through the "heavy package of assistance),the budget may not include logistics costs, Ki Doulaye said. To fulfill its mandate, AMIS still sought to enhance AMIS by two additional battalions: adopting the new concept of operations discussed at the July AU Summit in Banjul, which called for revising 8 sectors to 3, and which called for increasing troop strength to 10,300-a level the GOS had accepted. Potential troop contributing countries continued to include Nigeria and Rwanda; Rwanda was ready to provide 5 battalions if support were assured, Ki Doulaye said. Whether a pledging conference would be held depended on the return of AU Commissioner Djinnit; such a conference could be held in Addis Ababa, as the first had been. Ki Doulaye appealed for partners to continue assistance to AMIS. ¶7. (SBU) AU outreach to DPA non-signatories continued, with Dr. Salim meeting "with all stakeholders" in Khartoum, to determine how soon the AU and UN could convene a non-signatories' meeting. One faction had signed a declaration of commitment to the DPA in Libya. The AU was also aware of initiatives by Eritrea and Chad (which may have some leverage on the NRF). Ki Doulaye said a roadmap was being considered for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC),but could not provide any additional information. ¶8. (SBU) Poloff noted the upcoming December 12 UN Human Rights Council's special session on Sudan, the need to underscore the deteriorating situation in Darfur, and draft resolutions calling for a UN human rights mission to Sudan. Ki Doulaye responded that the UN already had a mandate to investigate human rights in Sudan, and that the AU had previously prepared an assessment of Sudan's humanitarian situation. -------------- -------------- SECURITY: UN EVACUATION FROM EL FASHER CREATED "PANIC" -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) AU DITF J3/J5 Operations & Plans Team Leader Colonel G.Y. Mahunu said that the UN's evacuation of personnel from El Fasher, due to information that El Fasher was threatened by NRF and G-19 forces, has "spread a lot of panic" in AMIS area of operations, placing the entire force on alert. Ki Doulaye agreed that the UN had "complicated" the situation and created panic by withdrawing personnel. He said AMIS had moved personnel from El Fasher to the more easily defended Zam Zam, leaving only protection force elements at El Fasher. -- The Force Commander, who had left Addis Ababa two days earlier, had since met with stakeholders in Khartoum, in order to defuse the situation. Minni Minawi had not attended the meeting, as he had threatened two days earlier to withdraw from the DPA, despite AU concerns that he not. In a letter to AMIS, Minni had requested that the Ceasefire Commission investigate the incidents in El Fasher. -- On Dec. 4-5, armed elements in GOS uniform, suspected to be Janjaweed, had looted El Fasher market, and clashed with unarmed SLM/Minni elements who called for support; the ADDIS ABAB 00003243 003 OF 003 incident resulted in two deaths and increased tensions, Mahunu said. -- On Dec. 5, GOS and AMIS had defused a mass demonstration at the AMIS camp at Zam Zam. Ki Doulaye noted that the GOS had sent forces to Zam Zam and established roadblocks. -- The situation along the Chadian border remained unchanged. -------------- DPA JOINT COMMISSION: POSSIBLY DECEMBER 15 -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Ki Doulaye noted that the AMIS Deputy Head of Mission had proposed December 12 for the next meeting of the DPA Joint Commission; he had proposed December 15 but could not confirm any date. Partner representatives underscored the importance of distributing JC documentation, such as the agenda and CFC reports, at least 7 days in advance of any meeting, in accordance with the DPA, so as not to provide the GOS or other parties with an opportunity to object. In response to EU POLAD's observation that previous JC meetings had been "tragi-comical," Ki Doulaye quipped, "better tragi-comical than tragic." Partner representatives also underscored the importance establishing a mechanism to include non-signatories. -------------- LOGISTICS -------------- ¶11. (SBU) In the absence of any DITF logistics officials, Ki Doulaye provided the following updates: -- FHQ: A DITF mission to Khartoum this weekend would discuss the proposed "Joint Headquarters" (vice the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters or "FJMHQ"). -- FUEL: AMIS continued to face problems with the availability of aviation fuel: the main reserve was in El Fasher, which would not sustain AMIS for very long. -- FINANCES: The AU recently signed the 6th contribution agreement with the EU, which provides funds retroactively for Aug-Oct. 2006. -- LESSONS LEARNED: Ki Doulaye would participate in a mission to Khartoum, to strengthen coordination mechanisms among AU offices in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and El Fasher. NATO representatives conducting the lessons learned exercise requested by the AU would not be traveling to El Fasher at the current time, due to force protection concerns. ¶12. (SBU) COMMENT: AU DITF's readout of the Nov. 30 PSC on Darfur was more optimistic than that provided to AU partners on December 4 by EU POLAD Marcel Leroy, who had observed the talks with EU Special Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto. According to EU officials, Egypt (current monthly chair of the AU PSC) consistently advocated the GOS position, insisting on the insertion of language requiring consultations with the GOS, although the final AU PSC communique did not incorporate all of Egypt's recommended changes. EU officials also report that PSC members have a restrictive interpretation of the role UN backstopping and command and control structures would play, limiting such UN forces to "enabling units" of a "technical nature" only. The open-ended nature of the PSC's call to appoint a Special Representative for Sudan "after appropriate consultations as per the practice" could allow the GOS to exercise a veto, according to some AU partners. While the PSC calls for such an appointment to occur with the implementation of a hybrid operation (i.e., the final phase of the UN SYG's phased approach of UN assistance),the current vacancy of both the UN and AU positions following the departure of UN SRSG Jan Pronk and AMIS Head of Mission Amb. Baba Gana Kingibe renders the issue pertinent now, and highlights the lack of senior AU officials to engage with the GOS on UN transition issues. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO