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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ADDISABABA3212
2006-12-06 14:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SOMALI PRIME MINISTER GEDI HIGHLIGHTS FOREIGN EXTREMIST SUPPORT FOR ICU

Tags:   PREL  PINS  KPKO  SO  ET  KISL  MOPS 
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VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #3212/01 3401451
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD570D69 MSI3110 538)
O 061451Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3589
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
						C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 003212 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING THREE ADDRESSEES

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS NMOPS KPKO SO ET KISL
SUBJECT: SOMALI PRIME MINISTER GEDI HIGHLIGHTS FOREIGN
EXTREMIST SUPPORT FOR ICU

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3158

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR KEVIN SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 003212

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING THREE ADDRESSEES

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS NMOPS KPKO SO ET KISL
SUBJECT: SOMALI PRIME MINISTER GEDI HIGHLIGHTS FOREIGN
EXTREMIST SUPPORT FOR ICU

REF: ADDIS ABABA 3158

Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR KEVIN SULLIVAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. TFG PM Gedi reported that over 3,000
foreign Islamic militants are assisting the CIC, including
fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, and Libya.
Eritrea and Saudi sources have provided weapons and funding
respectively to the CIC, while Somali Hawiye are
increasingly backing the TFG. Collective defense of
Somalia's TFG is in accordance with its national security
stabilization plan, endorsed by the IGAD council of
ministers and the AU PSC, Gedi added. TFG officials said
potential TCCs to an IGASOM peacekeeping force include
Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and even Turkey. Citing an
executive order by the CIC to assassinate 16 TFG leaders,
PM Gedi affirmed that the TFG would not negotiate with
terrorists, and appealed for USG assistance to interdict
illegal weapons shipments to Mogadishu, as well as to
provide the TFG with additional bodyguards. END SUMMARY.

-------------- ---
COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC COURTS USING FOREIGN FIGHTERS
-------------- ---


2. (C) In a December 6 meeting with Ambassador and deputy
pol-econ counselor Eric Wong, Transitional Federal Government
(TFG)
of Somalia (TFG) Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Gedi said
Somalia now faced "a choice between life and death, peace
and war." Highlighting the extremist threat posed by the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), Gedi said more than
three-fourths of the CIC's strength derived from foreign
fighters, including over 3,000 Islamic militants from
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Chechnya, Comoros, and
Libya, as well as Ethiopian insurgents. CIC militia leader
Adan Hashi Ayro had trained in Afghanistan. The CIC had
sent delegations to Islamic countries (including the UAE

and Kuwait) to declare that dissident Parliamentary speaker
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan and 30 MPs were waging jihad
against the TFG. Speaker Adan had "defected" for the last
66 days, Gedi said. Military engagement of the CIC would
not require a protracted guerilla war, Gedi said, as such a
conflict would be primarily against foreign fighters,
rather than Somali against Somali.


3. (C) Somalia's PermRep to the African Union, Amb.
Abdikarin Farah, noted that as Somalis were predominantly
Sunni Muslims, it was foreigners who were escalating the
war. Saudi sources had provided USD 3-4 million in funds
to the CIC, Gedi said, delivered through flights from
Nairobi, accompanied by Eritreans. Direct flights between
Asmara and Mogadishu had also provided weapons and
fighters; Iran was also playing a destabilizing role.
Opponents were thus receiving illegal shipments of weapons,
threatening the legitimate government.


4. (C) PM Gedi asserted that the vast majority of Hawiye
supported the TFG. General Mohamed Warsame Farah, Director
General of Somali Intelligence and TFG National Security
Advisor, noted that 70 per cent of some 4,000 troops
trained in the previous week by the TFG were Hawiye.
Citing accounts from groups of dozens of escapees who had
fled from ICU imprisonment to Galcaio and Baidoa, Gen.
Farah said the CIC attempted to recruit fighters from
captives it first tortured and then humiliated.


5. (C) The TFG had sought to avoid war as much as possible,
Gedi said. Underscoring Somalis' right to self-defense,
Gedi noted that Somalia's national security stabilization
plan, endorsed by the IGAD council of ministers as well as
the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), provided for IGAD,
the AU, and others to assist the TFG's security forces, and
for frontline states to train and equip the TFG in
emergencies. Amb. Farah observed that Somalia had formally
adopted a bilateral cooperation treaty with Ethiopia in
November 2005, and had similar agreements with Kenya and
Djibouti. Yemen would likely assist the TFG, if the arms
embargo were lifted, Gedi said. Potential troop
contributing countries to IGASOM included Nigeria, South
Africa, Uganda, and possibly Kenya. According to Gedi,
Nigeria's President Obasanjo strongly supported lifting the


arms embargo on Somalia and had said "Tell Meles he is not
alone," offering to deploy 1,800 Nigerian troops for
IGASOM. If intervention were authorized by the UNSC,
Turkey, as a member of the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC), may also send troops, Amb. Farah said.

--------------
TFG WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH "TERRORISTS"
--------------


6. (C) Ethiopian deputy FM Tekeda, who met CIC
representatives in Djibouti on December 1 (reftel), had
concluded the CIC was not ready for dialogue, Gedi said.
Gedi observed that the December 2 CIC-IGAD Secretariat
communique reported on consultations chaired by IGAD
Executive Secretary Dr. Attalla Hamad Bashir, a Sudanese
who supported the CIC; in contrast, IGAD at the ministerial
level had previously endorsed the deployment of IGASOM.
The CIC would attack if a UNSCR on IGASOM deployment was
adopted, Gedi added, initially facing Ethiopian and Kenya
forces, and then those from other partners.


7. (C) PM Gedi said it was useless for the TFG to negotiate
or seek compromise with CIC leaders, who sought the TFG's
overthrow and the restoration of a "greater Somalia".
"Sitting with Aweys is like sitting with Bin Laden," Gedi
said; "we are not talking about 'Islamic courts,' we are
talking about terrorists." Despite the TFG's agreement to
participate in three rounds of talks with the CIC, the CIC
had continually seized additional territory, and was buying
time to attack. Ethiopia had taken the correct decision to
back the TFG, recognizing that the national security of
countries in the region was interlinked. While Ethiopia
had trained 9-10,000 Somali TFG military forces, they were
poorly equipped; lifting the UNSC arms embargo was a
mechanism to arm trained forces to defend Somalia.

-------------- --------------
CIC LIST TARGETS TFG AND SOMALILANDERS FOR ASSASSINATION
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Amb. Farah provided Ambassador with a copy of an
Arabic-language executive order reportedly issued by CIC
leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in Mogadishu, that calls
for the assassination of 16 TFG and Somaliland leaders
(including President Yusuf, PM Gedi, and Amb. Farah) and
for Al-Shabab "martyrs" to "execute the operations using
the most deadly suicide methods carried out by mujahidin
fighters in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and other
countries of the world" (septel). Kenya had trained 200
VIP protection officers (now serving as police securing
Baidoa), while Ethiopia had trained 50. With funding from
UNDP, Kenya and Uganda had trained 1,000 police.


9. (C) TFG relations with Puntland authorities, who were
part of the TFG, were good, PM Gedi said. Three Somaliland
ministers had called on PM Gedi in Addis. Gedi cautioned,
however, that international recognition of Somaliland could
impair the unity of Somalia. The TFG favored the
reconstruction of Somaliland, but only after the defeat of
their common terrorist enemy.


10. (C) REQUESTS FOR USG ASSISTANCE: Noting that he had
previously worked at the AU on a USAID-funded project, PM
Gedi expressed appreciation for USG support and for
humanitarian assistance provided through UNICEF and WFP.
In contrast, he said, Italy was collaborating with CIC
leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed's Ayr sub-clan to thwart peace,
just as it had leaked information to General Aideed's
Habr-Gedir sub-clan to thwart UNOSOM in 1992. TFG
principals made the following requests for material USG
assistance:

-- USG assistance was needed to blockade Mogadishu's port
and airport, Amb. Farah said. Gedi noted that the TFG had
previously provided former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Bellamy
with
written authorization to intercept illicit shipping in the
Indian Ocean, to distinguish between commercial goods and
smuggled weapons.

-- Observing that he had already survived two assassination


attempts, Gedi appealed for USG assistance to train and
equip 200-300 bodyguards for himself and President Yusuf.
Gen. Farah said additional funds were needed to provide
Ethiopian trainers in Baidoa with facilities.
YAMAMOTO