ETHIOPIA GIRDS FOR HIGH-RISK IN SOMALIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003211 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER PARIS AND ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016 TAGS: MOPS PREL PGOV PINS ET SO ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA GIRDS FOR HIGH-RISK IN SOMALIA REF: A. ADDIS 3115 ¶B. DJIBOUTI 1428 ¶C. ADDIS 3175 Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Kevin Sullivan. Reason: 1.4 (A),(B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Indications suggest that Ethiopia is preparing to increase its military involvement in Somalia in the coming weeks. The GOE feels ever more compelled to intervene in southern Somalia to counter what it sees as the growing threat of an extremist Islamic regime in Mogadishu that is cooperating with Eritrea and other foreign elements to undermine Ethiopian stability and territorial integrity. PM Meles told Amb. Yamamoto on Nov. 29 that the GOE would return to its guerrilla roots to prosecute a brief, multi-pronged military campaign against the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC),rather than a sustained conventional offensive. The GOE has been steadily building up its military forces around its southern border with Somalia and has intensified its military cooperation with the government of Puntland. While Ethiopia and its allies in Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Puntland should be able to muster a significantly larger (perhaps 15-20,000) and better-trained fighting force than the CIC, the CIC appears to be marshalling a credible force of at least 5,000 fighters operating hundreds of "technicals" on their home ground. Recent arms shipments from Eritrea, Libya and Gulf state extremist organizations like Hizbollah have equipped the CIC to offer at least some resistance to Ethiopia's tanks, planes and helicopters. The CIC may also enjoy an advantage in terms of the motivation of its fighting force, which will likely be led by radical figures from "al Shebaab." The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF),for its part, are still coping with recent purges and morale problems. PM Meles has gone to unusual lengths to unite Ethiopia's major political parties behind him as he prepares for battle, but tensions and distrust lingering from 2005 elections and crackdown on internal opposition ultimately undermined this effort. The bottom line is that the ENDF could enter into limited military engagements in Somalia in the coming weeks which may prove more difficult for Ethiopia than many now imagine. End Summary. -------------- - INDICATORS ALL POINT TO AN ETHIOPIAN OFFENSIVE -------------- - ¶2. (S) The signals became unmistakable in late November that the GOE is preparing for increased military involvement in Somalia. PM Meles' speech to Parliament November 23 (ref A) laid out the GOE's justification for action to counter the "clear and present danger" posed by the CIC. Meles' contentions that 1) the CIC had already declared war (jihad) on Ethiopia; and 2) the CIC had already violated Ethiopian sovereignty by arming and transporting OLF and ONLF fighters across the border formed the heart of this justification. In private, Meles has referred consistently to the end of the rains in Somalia as the trigger for Ethiopian limited military operations against the CIC. Weather forecasts suggest that the rain may taper off beginning the week of Dec. 4, allowing ground-based operations to begin once the terrain dries. DATT believes that the ENDF, which is just emerging from a 10-days commanders conference, is prepared to launch operations roughly one week after rains have ended, if the order is given. All source intelligence has shown a steady build-up of Ethiopian military assets, including tanks, artillery, troop transport and other heavy equipment on both sides of Ethiopia's border with southern Somalia. Air assets including attack helicopters have not yet moved within range of their likely targets, but appear poised for action just outside the immediate theater, ready to move when the signal is given. Post's best estimate is that the ENDF will be poised to launch their offensive approximately in the latter part of December. Scheduled CIC-TFG talks in Nairobi and Khartoum mid-month might prompt the GOE to delay if there is reason to believe that the CIC might change and engage more seriously in such talks. Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda's Dec. 1 talks with CIC representatives in Djibouti (ref B) represent a last-ditch effort to change CIC behavior without resorting to war. ADDIS ABAB 00003211 002 OF 003 -------------- SEVEN DAY WAR? -------------- ¶3. (S) ENDF assets currently positioned near southern Somalia suggest an attack prosecuted by roughly 10,000 ENDF troops, 36 artillery pieces and 40-50 T-54/55 tanks. The ENDF will likely support the TFG militia numbering 8,000-10,000 as well as Puntland defense forces numbering 3-4,000. The twin objectives of the operation will be to drive CIC forces away from the seat of Somalia's TFG in Baidoa, as well as destroy those CIC forces that threaten Puntland. The ENDF is likely to utilize limited aerial bombing and attack helicopters against CIC forces, training camps and other key facilities. There are also indications that the ENDF commandos will conduct quick strikes against CIC targets. The lack of forward positioning of large logistical fuel and lubricant bladders and other supplies suggests that the ENDF does not expect the potential engagement to last longer than seven days and does not plan to attack Mogadishu. ¶4. (C) PM Meles told Amb. Yamamoto Nov. 29 that Ethiopian measures against the CIC would not be limited to conventional warfare. He talked of the ruling EPRDF returning to "guerilla mode" against its Islamist opponents, (note: probably referring to planned commando raids. End note.) Meles told Sen. Feingold Nov. 30 (ref C) that the GOE intended to 1) reduce the CIC's military capacity; and 2) send a message to the Somali public and moderate CIC members that Ethiopia would not permit the consolidation of a fundamentalist regime in Somalia. In the GOE's view, a successful offensive will create incentives for more moderate leadership in the CIC and for more sincere and pragmatic negotiations between the CIC and the TFG. The PM stated that the ENDF did not plan on remaining in Somalia in large numbers longer than 5-7 days. -------------- WHO IS THE REAL UNDERDOG? -------------- ¶5. (C) Most analysts believe that Ethiopia possesses clear military superiority over the CIC in terms of overall manpower, equipment, training and experience in battle. While this may be true in general, the battle that is shaping up in southern Somalia may pit a relatively modest ENDF contingent against a more motivated, highly mobile and relatively well equipped CIC force. Current estimates suggest that Ethiopian troops will not enjoy an overwhelming superiority in numbers in the theatre of battle. Long supply lines stretching through hostile territory in Ethiopia's Somali region will place additional strain on the GOE's ability to wage war. Moreover, the ENDF has recently begun undergone a series of purges theoretically designed to weed out poor performing officers from its ranks, but which in fact appeared to have an anti-Oromo and anti-Amhara character meant to reduce the danger of OLF infiltration. -------------- HOME FRONT SHAKY, BUT HOLDING -------------- ¶6. (C) PM Meles' effort to obtain a consensus authorization from Parliament to employ "all means necessary" to counter the threat in Somalia was rebuffed Nov. 30 by the majority of opposition MPs. While the EPRDF passed the resolution by a comfortable margin, 99 MPs from the CUDP, UEDF and OFDM blocs (or roughly one-fourth of the House of People's Representatives' 426 members) voted against the resolution. While initially pleased about being consulted, Opposition leaders later criticized the GOE's insistence on mentioning both Eritrea and internal insurgency groups the OLF and ONLF in its draft resolution. The opposition argued that the claims of internal groups should be addressed through negotiations, rather than lumping them together with external threats. UEDF leader Beyene Petros indicated privately to Pol/Econ Counselor that pressure from Oromo constituents of his ally, the Oromo National Congress (ONC) prevented him from accepting this point. The OLF, for its part, issued a statement Dec. 4 criticizing Parliament's approval of the ADDIS ABAB 00003211 003 OF 003 authorization measure and praising opposition leaders for opposing it. Ruling party press outlets, on the other hand, severely criticized the opposition's "lukewarm" support for Ethiopian sovereignty. ¶7. (C) While a significant portion of the population in Ethiopia may oppose Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia, many Ethiopians are concerned about the threat of Islamic extremism and are likely to back -- or at least not actively oppose -- the strong measures the GOE is pursuing. There is also a risk, however, that some Ethiopian Muslims will sympathize with the CIC. Nonetheless, the GOE appears fully capable of containing opposition to its policy on Somalia and of maintaining order during the potential military operations. Internal stability remains the paramount concern of the ruling party, which worries that the CIC, in cooperation with Eritrea, will send terrorist agents to Ethiopia and support internal rebel groups like the OLF and ONLF. The EPRDF has not betrayed significant concerns about a CIC counter-offensive against Ethiopia's Somali Region. YAMAMOTO