C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003175

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS ASEC PHUM ET SO
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SEN. FEINGOLD TALKS SOMALIA, HUMAN
RIGHTS WITH PM MELES

Classified By: P/E Counselor Kevin Sullivan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Meles told visiting U.S. Senator Feingold
Nov. 30 that while the GOE was trying to avoid war with the
Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia, armed conflict
was likely in the coming weeks. Meles expected that the CIC
would move against Somalia's Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) in Baidoa as well as against Puntland. Ethiopia's
military objective would be to strike quick, painful blows to
the CIC's military capacity and show CIC "fellow travelers"
that Ethiopia would not permit the consolidation of an
extremist regime in Mogadishu. The GOE hoped that this
development would open the way for more moderate CIC leaders
to open genuine dialogue with the TFG. The PM characterized
the current CIC leadership as a "franchise of Al Qaeda" and a
"Taliban in the making." Sen. Feingold said he understood
the GOE's concerns and recognized the difficulty of its
situation, but said he was not enthusiastic about military
action. He expressed concerns about the possibility of a
military defeat for Ethiopia, and asked about the GOE's plans
for a post-conflict phase in Somalia. Meles answered that
Ethiopian forces would not stay for long periods in Somalia,
and said that Ethiopia planned to let Somalis work out their
own political solutions after the CIC's momentum had been
checked. Sen. Feingold also expressed concern about respect
for human rights in Ethiopia and suggested that a pardon for
CUD detainees and continued progress on democratic reforms
would improve U.S. perceptions of the GOE. Meles said a
pardon was possible after the conclusion of the CUD trial and
reiterated his government's commitment to continued
democratic reform. He denied that the GOE had overreacted to
November 2005 protests, but acknowledged that he had failed
to adequately prepare security forces to deal with the
unrest. On China's growing relations with Africa, Meles told
Feingold that such ties were no substitut

e for good relations
with the West. The PM warned that if the USG withdraws from
Iraq in defeat, the consequences for the whole region,
including Ethiopia, could be dire. End Summary.


2. (U) Sen. Russ Feingold, accompanied by Senate staffers
Grey Frandsen and Evan Gottesman, met with Prime Minister
Meles Nov. 30. during a three-day visit to Ethiopia. Amb.
Yamamoto and P/E Counselor (notetaker) also accompanied the
Senator. Meles was joined by MFA acting Director for Europe
and the Americas Almaz Amha and PM assistant Gebretensai.

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CIC IS AL QAEDA FRANCHISE
--------------


3. (C) After thanking PM Meles for the meeting and noting the
positive U.S.-Ethiopian relationship, Sen. Feingold asked the
PM about Ethiopian plans for dealing with Somalia. Meles
replied that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated
significantly in the last six months. Like the Taliban in
Afghanistan, the CIC had filled a political vacuum in
Somalia, providing security and stability in areas that they
controlled. Meles said the CIC was also riding a wave of
resurgent Jihadism in the region which had been encouraged by
developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted that the CIC
had been implementing the same brand of radical Islam
espoused by other extremists, as was evidenced by their
censoring of television programming and cinemas, as well as
their ban on khat. Meles acknowledged that Somalis had
traditionally resisted such extreme interpretations of Islam,
but also remarked that Somalis "liked to back a winning
horse" and Jihadists had accumulated a string of victories
that was winning converts to their cause. This gathering
military momentum had allowed a relatively small group of
extremists to dominate the large and diverse organizations
who formed the CIC. Meles said CIC leaders Sheik Aweys,
Aidan Ayro and Hassan al-Turki had direct connections to Al
Qaeda that were known to intelligence services, including in
the U.S. He agreed with Sen. Feingold's suggestion that the
CIC could be considered a "franchise of Al Qaeda."

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GOE AIM: REDUCE CIC FIGHTING CAPACITY, STOP MOMENTUM
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4. (C) The PM told Feingold that the GOE's aim was to
convince CIC "fellow travelers" that the GOE would be forced
to act militarily to prevent the CIC from defeating the TFG
and continuing its expansion. Meles said although the GOE
continued outreach efforts to avert conflict, he was not
optimistic. When Sen. Feingold asked how long the GOE could
wait, Meles said the question was rather "how long the CIC
will give us." He said the CIC was likely to attack both the
TFG in Baidoa and the provisional government in Puntland,
probably soon after the end of the rainy season in Somalia
(note: rains are expected to end in the coming weeks).


5. (C) Meles told Feingold that the GOE's objective would be
to remove the CIC's Jihadist leadership by "letting people
know that such a government in Somalia is unacceptable to
Ethiopia." The GOE intended to convince key Somali actors
that Ethiopia had the capacity and commitment to intervene
effectively and repeatedly if necessary to prevent the
consolidation of an extremist regime in Mogadishu. Meles
recalled the GOE's successful campaign against Sheik Aweys
and his associates when they fought with Al-Itihad
Al-Islamiya (AIAI) in Ethiopia's Somali region.


6. (C) Sen. Feingold asked whether the GOE was concerned
about the increasing military strength of the CIC and the
difficult logistical challenges that Ethiopian forces would
face operating in Somalia. If Ethiopia were unsuccessful in
its offensive, wouldn't this embolden the Jihadists? Meles
replied that Ethiopian military forces would not stay in
Somalia for long periods. While it was difficult to predict
the course of operations, he expected to deploy large forces
no longer than a week or two. He underscored that Ethiopia
did not have to defeat the CIC absolutely, but simply needed
to deny the extremists complete victory.

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GOE'S POST-CONFLICT AMBITIONS LIMITED
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7. (C) Sen. Feingold asked about the GOE's plans for
stabilizing Somalia after military intervention, and wondered
what kind of Somalia Meles hoped to see eventually. Would
Ethiopia tolerate a unified Somalia? The application of
Sharia Law? Did the GOE favor Somaliland's independence?
Meles answered that the GOE did not have the means to pursue
the kind of reconstruction and reform agenda that the U.S.
had pursued in Iraq. "We must tailor our agenda to our
means." That agenda would be limited to 1) proving that
Jihadists could not rule Somalia; and 2) redressing the
current military imbalance to encourage dialogue between
moderate members of the CIC and the TFG. The PM stated that
although Ethiopia did not like the idea of Sharia Law,
Somalis had the right to implement it. What they did not
have the right to do was promote Jihadist expansionism.
Meles said that the GOE had no problem with a united Somalia.
He noted that Puntland favored a loose confederation, while
Somaliland made an argument for independence based on the
principles of espoused by the African Union. Resolving these
questions was not part of Ethiopia's agenda, however.

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FEINGOLD: HOPE CONFLICT AVERTED, BUT UNDERSTAND CONCERNS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Sen. Feingold thanked the Prime Minister for his
direct answers. He expressed hope that the armed conflict
between Ethiopia and Somalia could be averted, and remarked
that he would be surprised the USG were enthusiastic about an
Ethiopian military intervention. At the same time, Feingold
acknowledged that the GOE was in a difficult situation which
he now understood better. Meles replied that no one,
including the GOE, was enthusiastic about conflict, but
sometimes circumstances made military action the only option.

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FEINGOLD: RELATIONS GOOD, BUT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMATIC
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Sen. Feingold said he knew that the USG had a good
relationship with Ethiopia and had learned more from his
earlier meetings about positive developments in the country.

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The principal problem in the relationship, however, remained
the issue of human rights. He had heard about problems
during the post-electoral period, including the detention of
opposition leaders. He asked if the GOE was considering a
pardon for the detainees. Meles said that rule of law must
apply to all Ethiopians and that the current judicial process
involving opposition leaders must be completed. He
acknowledged that the GOE had been discussing the possibility
of a subsequent pardon for the detainees.


10. (C) Meles denied that the GOE had overreacted to the
November 2005 protests and reviewed for Sen. Feingold his
government's efforts to avert a confrontation with the
opposition after the election. He noted that he had worked
with Charge Huddleston and others on these efforts. The CUD
leadership had eventually decided not to follow this path,
however, and had instead chosen to pursue a change of
government through street action. Meles claimed that when he
saw street confrontations coming, he had met with senior and
even mid-ranking commanders of the security forces to explain
the situation. He had emphasized the need to avoid any
killings in putting down the protests, since provoking such
incidents was the essence of the CUD's strategy for
overthrowing the GOE. Police had not received adequate
training or equipment to deal with the magnitude of the
disturbances, however. The PM accepted the responsibility
for this failure, and noted that "the British could probably
have handled the protests without killing anyone." Meles
also expressed satisfaction with the work and report of the
Independent Commission of Inquiry on the incidents.

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PROGRESS ON DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ESSENTIAL
--------------


11. (C) Sen. Feingold alluded to the growing political
influence of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the U.S. and noted
that most are critical of the GOE. He noted that the best
ways to defuse this problem would be 1) resolving the
situation of the CUD detainees; and 2) continue making
progress on democratic reforms, including a new media law.
He asked about the GOE's plans for reform. Meles said the
GOE was working hard on the reform agenda. He remarked that
post-electoral problems had prompted the GOE to "take a
second look" at the country's democratic institutions and
examine best international practices through a series of
studies. He acknowledged that there was room for improvement
in the media framework and said he expected to make progress
on the new law through consultations with stakeholders and
Parliamentary discussion.


12. (C) The PM reiterated that the GOE was pursuing
democratization as a matter of national survival, given the
country's diversity. Ethiopia had a history of changing
governments through rebellion that the GOE was trying to
overcome by creating space for peaceful dissent. In order to
accomplish this, everyone had to play by the rules. Meles
argued that the ruling EPRDF had re-defined the concept of
Ethiopia (by instituting ethnic federalism) in 1991. This
fundamental change had clearly angered those from the
previous regime, many of whom were now leaders of the
Diaspora. Meles said that resolving the situation of the CUD
detainees was an issue that had to be addressed, but he had
no illusion that any action the GOE could take would ever win
over these Diaspora leaders, who would likely remain
perennial critics of the EPRDF. Sen. Feingold replied that
he did not take Diaspora criticism of the GOE at face value
and could now better assess their claims. He added he would
ask them to acknowledge the progress that Ethiopia was making.

-------------- --
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM A GROWING PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA
-------------- --


13. (C) Sen. Feingold asked whether Meles considered growing
Islamic extremism in Ethiopia a serious problem. Meles said
that he did. He noted that Ethiopia had welcomed Islam even
before Arab nations, and had in fact from the earliest times
welcomed all three major religions that had grown out of the
Middle East. This culture of tolerance was now under siege,
however, from Islamic extremism funded mainly by money from

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Saudi Arabia. Wahhabists had trained activists to spread
extreme interpretations of Islam within Ethiopia, and other
forces, like AIAI, were also contributing to the problem.
Meles said he was still optimistic that moderate Ethiopian
Muslims could contain the spread of extremism and noted that
one of the most modern interpretations of Islam had emerged
in Lebanon through Ethiopian immigrants. The GOE had asked
some to return to Ethiopia to promote moderation and
tolerance. Sen. Feingold commented that the USG faced the
same challenge of reaching out to moderate Muslims around the
world.

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CHINA TIES NO SUBSTITUTE FOR WEST
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14. (C) When the Senator asked about China's growing ties and
influence in Africa, the Prime Minister said, "Ninety percent
of China's relations in the region are business-related." He
remarked that China offered cheap and adequate alternatives
for poor countries needing technology and infrastructure.
China also offered generous credit terms -- including $2
billion for Ethiopian public enterprises alone in the last
six months. China was also the fastest growing market for
Ethiopian exports. Meles said China was seen by many African
leaders as "less meddlesome" than Western partners, and more
predictable in its support. He argued that China's help was
not completely unconditional, however, as had recently been
evident in Sudan/Darfur. The PM also noted that the visit to
China recently made by many African heads of state had been
an expression of appreciation for China's role, but added
that most serious African leaders recognized that increasing
ties with China should not be done at the expense of
relations with Europe, the U.S. and emerging powers like
Brazil and India. The Chinese had their own agenda and
interests and might not be so flexible and generous if they
became the only option for African governments.

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MELES ON IRAQ: U.S. SHOULD NOT LEAVE DEFEATED
-------------- -


15. (C) Sen. Feingold asked the PM for his candid views on
the situation in Iraq as well as the USG's current policy
options. Meles said that the GOE had supported the U.S.
intervention in Iraq primarily because of the country seemed
to be a good candidate for transformation into a secular,
democratic regime given its level of development and other
factors. This was a particularly important goal, given that
Iraq bordered Saudi Arabia, whose potential capture by a
fundamentalist regime posed an enormous danger to the region
and the world. Meles added that Ethiopia had also been happy
to see the U.S. join the global war on terror aggressively.
The GOE had not believed charges that Saddam Hussein's regime
had connections to Al Qaeda, but did believe that Iraq
possessed weapons of mass destruction and was disappointed
when the failure to find such weapons undermined the
credibility of the coalition.


16. (C) Concerning strategies in Iraq going forward, Meles
urged the USG not to "leave like you did in Vietnam, not with
your tail between your legs." It would be better to scale
back your ambitions and try to withdraw on a positive note.
If the USG left Iraq defeated, there would be negative
consequences for the whole gulf region; countries would find
it less attractive to support the U.S. The PM noted that
while the U.S. still had the option to retreat back to its
own shores, other countries (like Ethiopia) did not have the
Atlantic Ocean to protect them. He noted that the last time
radical Islam had surged in the 16th Century, it drove
Ethiopia from empire back into the Dark Ages.


17. (U) Sen. Feingold cleared this message.
YAMAMOTO