ETHIOPIA: SEN. FEINGOLD TALKS SOMALIA, HUMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 003175 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2016 TAGS: PREL MOPS ASEC PHUM ET SO SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: SEN. FEINGOLD TALKS SOMALIA, HUMAN RIGHTS WITH PM MELES Classified By: P/E Counselor Kevin Sullivan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Meles told visiting U.S. Senator Feingold Nov. 30 that while the GOE was trying to avoid war with the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia, armed conflict was likely in the coming weeks. Meles expected that the CIC would move against Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Baidoa as well as against Puntland. Ethiopia's military objective would be to strike quick, painful blows to the CIC's military capacity and show CIC "fellow travelers" that Ethiopia would not permit the consolidation of an extremist regime in Mogadishu. The GOE hoped that this development would open the way for more moderate CIC leaders to open genuine dialogue with the TFG. The PM characterized the current CIC leadership as a "franchise of Al Qaeda" and a "Taliban in the making." Sen. Feingold said he understood the GOE's concerns and recognized the difficulty of its situation, but said he was not enthusiastic about military action. He expressed concerns about the possibility of a military defeat for Ethiopia, and asked about the GOE's plans for a post-conflict phase in Somalia. Meles answered that Ethiopian forces would not stay for long periods in Somalia, and said that Ethiopia planned to let Somalis work out their own political solutions after the CIC's momentum had been checked. Sen. Feingold also expressed concern about respect for human rights in Ethiopia and suggested that a pardon for CUD detainees and continued progress on democratic reforms would improve U.S. perceptions of the GOE. Meles said a pardon was possible after the conclusion of the CUD trial and reiterated his government's commitment to continued democratic reform. He denied that the GOE had overreacted to November 2005 protests, but acknowledged that he had failed to adequately prepare security forces to deal with the unrest. On China's growing relations with Africa, Meles told Feingold that such ties were no substitute for good relations with the West. The PM warned that if the USG withdraws from Iraq in defeat, the consequences for the whole region, including Ethiopia, could be dire. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Sen. Russ Feingold, accompanied by Senate staffers Grey Frandsen and Evan Gottesman, met with Prime Minister Meles Nov. 30. during a three-day visit to Ethiopia. Amb. Yamamoto and P/E Counselor (notetaker) also accompanied the Senator. Meles was joined by MFA acting Director for Europe and the Americas Almaz Amha and PM assistant Gebretensai. -------------- CIC IS AL QAEDA FRANCHISE -------------- ¶3. (C) After thanking PM Meles for the meeting and noting the positive U.S.-Ethiopian relationship, Sen. Feingold asked the PM about Ethiopian plans for dealing with Somalia. Meles replied that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated significantly in the last six months. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, the CIC had filled a political vacuum in Somalia, providing security and stability in areas that they controlled. Meles said the CIC was also riding a wave of resurgent Jihadism in the region which had been encouraged by developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted that the CIC had been implementing the same brand of radical Islam espoused by other extremists, as was evidenced by their censoring of television programming and cinemas, as well as their ban on khat. Meles acknowledged that Somalis had traditionally resisted such extreme interpretations of Islam, but also remarked that Somalis "liked to back a winning horse" and Jihadists had accumulated a string of victories that was winning converts to their cause. This gathering military momentum had allowed a relatively small group of extremists to dominate the large and diverse organizations who formed the CIC. Meles said CIC leaders Sheik Aweys, Aidan Ayro and Hassan al-Turki had direct connections to Al Qaeda that were known to intelligence services, including in the U.S. He agreed with Sen. Feingold's suggestion that the CIC could be considered a "franchise of Al Qaeda." -------------- -------------- GOE AIM: REDUCE CIC FIGHTING CAPACITY, STOP MOMENTUM -------------- -------------- ADDIS ABAB 00003175 002 OF 004 ¶4. (C) The PM told Feingold that the GOE's aim was to convince CIC "fellow travelers" that the GOE would be forced to act militarily to prevent the CIC from defeating the TFG and continuing its expansion. Meles said although the GOE continued outreach efforts to avert conflict, he was not optimistic. When Sen. Feingold asked how long the GOE could wait, Meles said the question was rather "how long the CIC will give us." He said the CIC was likely to attack both the TFG in Baidoa and the provisional government in Puntland, probably soon after the end of the rainy season in Somalia (note: rains are expected to end in the coming weeks). ¶5. (C) Meles told Feingold that the GOE's objective would be to remove the CIC's Jihadist leadership by "letting people know that such a government in Somalia is unacceptable to Ethiopia." The GOE intended to convince key Somali actors that Ethiopia had the capacity and commitment to intervene effectively and repeatedly if necessary to prevent the consolidation of an extremist regime in Mogadishu. Meles recalled the GOE's successful campaign against Sheik Aweys and his associates when they fought with Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI) in Ethiopia's Somali region. ¶6. (C) Sen. Feingold asked whether the GOE was concerned about the increasing military strength of the CIC and the difficult logistical challenges that Ethiopian forces would face operating in Somalia. If Ethiopia were unsuccessful in its offensive, wouldn't this embolden the Jihadists? Meles replied that Ethiopian military forces would not stay in Somalia for long periods. While it was difficult to predict the course of operations, he expected to deploy large forces no longer than a week or two. He underscored that Ethiopia did not have to defeat the CIC absolutely, but simply needed to deny the extremists complete victory. -------------- GOE'S POST-CONFLICT AMBITIONS LIMITED -------------- ¶7. (C) Sen. Feingold asked about the GOE's plans for stabilizing Somalia after military intervention, and wondered what kind of Somalia Meles hoped to see eventually. Would Ethiopia tolerate a unified Somalia? The application of Sharia Law? Did the GOE favor Somaliland's independence? Meles answered that the GOE did not have the means to pursue the kind of reconstruction and reform agenda that the U.S. had pursued in Iraq. "We must tailor our agenda to our means." That agenda would be limited to 1) proving that Jihadists could not rule Somalia; and 2) redressing the current military imbalance to encourage dialogue between moderate members of the CIC and the TFG. The PM stated that although Ethiopia did not like the idea of Sharia Law, Somalis had the right to implement it. What they did not have the right to do was promote Jihadist expansionism. Meles said that the GOE had no problem with a united Somalia. He noted that Puntland favored a loose confederation, while Somaliland made an argument for independence based on the principles of espoused by the African Union. Resolving these questions was not part of Ethiopia's agenda, however. -------------- -------------- FEINGOLD: HOPE CONFLICT AVERTED, BUT UNDERSTAND CONCERNS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Sen. Feingold thanked the Prime Minister for his direct answers. He expressed hope that the armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia could be averted, and remarked that he would be surprised the USG were enthusiastic about an Ethiopian military intervention. At the same time, Feingold acknowledged that the GOE was in a difficult situation which he now understood better. Meles replied that no one, including the GOE, was enthusiastic about conflict, but sometimes circumstances made military action the only option. -------------- -------------- FEINGOLD: RELATIONS GOOD, BUT HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMATIC -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Sen. Feingold said he knew that the USG had a good relationship with Ethiopia and had learned more from his earlier meetings about positive developments in the country. ADDIS ABAB 00003175 003 OF 004 The principal problem in the relationship, however, remained the issue of human rights. He had heard about problems during the post-electoral period, including the detention of opposition leaders. He asked if the GOE was considering a pardon for the detainees. Meles said that rule of law must apply to all Ethiopians and that the current judicial process involving opposition leaders must be completed. He acknowledged that the GOE had been discussing the possibility of a subsequent pardon for the detainees. ¶10. (C) Meles denied that the GOE had overreacted to the November 2005 protests and reviewed for Sen. Feingold his government's efforts to avert a confrontation with the opposition after the election. He noted that he had worked with Charge Huddleston and others on these efforts. The CUD leadership had eventually decided not to follow this path, however, and had instead chosen to pursue a change of government through street action. Meles claimed that when he saw street confrontations coming, he had met with senior and even mid-ranking commanders of the security forces to explain the situation. He had emphasized the need to avoid any killings in putting down the protests, since provoking such incidents was the essence of the CUD's strategy for overthrowing the GOE. Police had not received adequate training or equipment to deal with the magnitude of the disturbances, however. The PM accepted the responsibility for this failure, and noted that "the British could probably have handled the protests without killing anyone." Meles also expressed satisfaction with the work and report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the incidents. -------------- PROGRESS ON DEMOCRATIC REFORMS ESSENTIAL -------------- ¶11. (C) Sen. Feingold alluded to the growing political influence of the Ethiopian Diaspora in the U.S. and noted that most are critical of the GOE. He noted that the best ways to defuse this problem would be 1) resolving the situation of the CUD detainees; and 2) continue making progress on democratic reforms, including a new media law. He asked about the GOE's plans for reform. Meles said the GOE was working hard on the reform agenda. He remarked that post-electoral problems had prompted the GOE to "take a second look" at the country's democratic institutions and examine best international practices through a series of studies. He acknowledged that there was room for improvement in the media framework and said he expected to make progress on the new law through consultations with stakeholders and Parliamentary discussion. ¶12. (C) The PM reiterated that the GOE was pursuing democratization as a matter of national survival, given the country's diversity. Ethiopia had a history of changing governments through rebellion that the GOE was trying to overcome by creating space for peaceful dissent. In order to accomplish this, everyone had to play by the rules. Meles argued that the ruling EPRDF had re-defined the concept of Ethiopia (by instituting ethnic federalism) in 1991. This fundamental change had clearly angered those from the previous regime, many of whom were now leaders of the Diaspora. Meles said that resolving the situation of the CUD detainees was an issue that had to be addressed, but he had no illusion that any action the GOE could take would ever win over these Diaspora leaders, who would likely remain perennial critics of the EPRDF. Sen. Feingold replied that he did not take Diaspora criticism of the GOE at face value and could now better assess their claims. He added he would ask them to acknowledge the progress that Ethiopia was making. -------------- -- ISLAMIC EXTREMISM A GROWING PROBLEM IN ETHIOPIA -------------- -- ¶13. (C) Sen. Feingold asked whether Meles considered growing Islamic extremism in Ethiopia a serious problem. Meles said that he did. He noted that Ethiopia had welcomed Islam even before Arab nations, and had in fact from the earliest times welcomed all three major religions that had grown out of the Middle East. This culture of tolerance was now under siege, however, from Islamic extremism funded mainly by money from ADDIS ABAB 00003175 004 OF 004 Saudi Arabia. Wahhabists had trained activists to spread extreme interpretations of Islam within Ethiopia, and other forces, like AIAI, were also contributing to the problem. Meles said he was still optimistic that moderate Ethiopian Muslims could contain the spread of extremism and noted that one of the most modern interpretations of Islam had emerged in Lebanon through Ethiopian immigrants. The GOE had asked some to return to Ethiopia to promote moderation and tolerance. Sen. Feingold commented that the USG faced the same challenge of reaching out to moderate Muslims around the world. -------------- CHINA TIES NO SUBSTITUTE FOR WEST -------------- ¶14. (C) When the Senator asked about China's growing ties and influence in Africa, the Prime Minister said, "Ninety percent of China's relations in the region are business-related." He remarked that China offered cheap and adequate alternatives for poor countries needing technology and infrastructure. China also offered generous credit terms -- including $2 billion for Ethiopian public enterprises alone in the last six months. China was also the fastest growing market for Ethiopian exports. Meles said China was seen by many African leaders as "less meddlesome" than Western partners, and more predictable in its support. He argued that China's help was not completely unconditional, however, as had recently been evident in Sudan/Darfur. The PM also noted that the visit to China recently made by many African heads of state had been an expression of appreciation for China's role, but added that most serious African leaders recognized that increasing ties with China should not be done at the expense of relations with Europe, the U.S. and emerging powers like Brazil and India. The Chinese had their own agenda and interests and might not be so flexible and generous if they became the only option for African governments. -------------- - MELES ON IRAQ: U.S. SHOULD NOT LEAVE DEFEATED -------------- - ¶15. (C) Sen. Feingold asked the PM for his candid views on the situation in Iraq as well as the USG's current policy options. Meles said that the GOE had supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq primarily because of the country seemed to be a good candidate for transformation into a secular, democratic regime given its level of development and other factors. This was a particularly important goal, given that Iraq bordered Saudi Arabia, whose potential capture by a fundamentalist regime posed an enormous danger to the region and the world. Meles added that Ethiopia had also been happy to see the U.S. join the global war on terror aggressively. The GOE had not believed charges that Saddam Hussein's regime had connections to Al Qaeda, but did believe that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was disappointed when the failure to find such weapons undermined the credibility of the coalition. ¶16. (C) Concerning strategies in Iraq going forward, Meles urged the USG not to "leave like you did in Vietnam, not with your tail between your legs." It would be better to scale back your ambitions and try to withdraw on a positive note. If the USG left Iraq defeated, there would be negative consequences for the whole gulf region; countries would find it less attractive to support the U.S. The PM noted that while the U.S. still had the option to retreat back to its own shores, other countries (like Ethiopia) did not have the Atlantic Ocean to protect them. He noted that the last time radical Islam had surged in the 16th Century, it drove Ethiopia from empire back into the Dark Ages. ¶17. (U) Sen. Feingold cleared this message. YAMAMOTO