ETHIOPIA: FM SEYOUM ASKS WITNESSES TO STOP EEBC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003012 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2016 TAGS: PREL KPKO MOPS UNSC ET ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: FM SEYOUM ASKS WITNESSES TO STOP EEBC DEMARCATION PLANS OR RISK WAR Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: GOE Foreign Minister Seyoum summoned representatives from the permanent five members (P-5) of the UN Security Council and Witnesses to the Algiers Accords to a meeting Nov. 14 to denounce the plans of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) to complete demarcation the border from a distance using coordinates, rather than through on-the-ground field work and consultations. Seyoum charged that the EEBC's proposed action would be "illegal" and inconsistent with the body's mandate under the Algiers accords, as well as inconsistent with the approach advanced by the Witnesses since their February 2006 statement. The Minister criticized the Commission's written request to the UNSC to assist in the transfer of territory according to the new demarcation, and warned that taking this step would risk the resumption of hostilities that that Algiers Accords were meant to prevent. Unless the EEBC desisted from its planned course, Seyoum said, the Algiers Accords would be finished. He urged that ambassadors engage their capitals to put pressure on the EEBC to back down from its decision to demarcate. Chiefs of Mission from the UK, France and the US (Charge) told Seyoum that the GOE should send a representative to the Nov. 20 meeting called by the EEBC to seek to dialogue concerning the demarcation plan. Seyoum flatly rejected the suggestion, but promised that the GOE would continue to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid armed conflict. He underscored that Eritrean troops were now manning the same trenches they had occupied during the war and in some places were a mere 100 meters from the Ethiopian border, nullifying the temporary security zone (TSZ). Following the meeting with the Foreign Minister, representatives from P-5 countries huddled briefly and agreed to recommend a postponement of the Nov. 20 EEBC meeting. Post believes that allowing the EEBC to proceed will pour gasoline on the already burning conflict in the Horn. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Foreign Minister Seyoum summoned representatives from the permanent five members (P-5) of the security council and Witnesses to the Algiers Accords to a meeting to denounce the plans of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) to complete demarcation the border from a distance using coordinates, rather than through on-the-ground field work and consultations. In attendance were Charge and ambassadors from the UK, France, Russia, China, Finland (EU Presidency) and Algeria. Also present were UNMEE SRSG Ennifar and AU Peace and Security Officer Geoffrey Mgumbya. Seyoum was joined by several legal experts and other aides. Pol/Econ Counselor served as notetaker. -------------- -------------- Like Colonial Powers Drawing Straight Lines Across Africa -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Seyoum began the meeting by distributing the GOE's Nov. 13 reply to the EEBC letter of Nov. 7. Seyoum read the portion from the Nov. 7 that notified parties to the Algiers Accords of the EEBC's intention to "complete the demarcation process by the use of coordinates to establish fixed points on the boundary to be connected to each other by appropriate straight lines and river lines." The Foreign Minister expressed the GOE's "dismay and serious concern" about the EEBC's plans. He argued that the new approach contradicted the EEBC's own rules and procedures, ignoring the importance of field work to address anomalies and impracticalities on the ground. He noted that the EEBC apparently felt frustrated by the lack of cooperation from the parties and had therefore decided to "go into its laboratory" to concoct a solution. Seyoum compared the exercise to African colonial powers sitting around a conference table drawing straight lines in defiance of human geography. -------------- -------------- Eritrean Troops Back in the Trenches, 100 Meters Away -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The EEBC's planned approach to demarcation was not just a legal issue, Seyoum told the group. It ran the risk of pushing the parties into a situation that the international community had worked hard to prevent. The most ADDIS ABAB 00003012 002 OF 003 disturbing aspect of this development was the timing, he added. Eritrea had recently breached the cessation of hostilities agreement of 2000 by deploying regular troops -- not militia -- in the same trenches they had occupied during the war, 100 meters from the Ethiopian border and clearly in violation of the TSZ. Eritrean forces were occupying such trenches in both the Central Sector of the border near Tserona and in several places in the Western Sector, near SIPDIS both Badme and Humera. Seyoum noted that several key bridges had been closed to UNMEE and other users, with opposing forces at either end of the bridge. He concluded that "the 25 kilometer TSZ no longer exists." -------------- Eritrea Defying the UNSC and Witnesses -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Seyoum recalled that a series of Eritrean measures were now preventing UNMEE from fulfilling its mandate under the Algiers Accords. He said that the GOE had asked the UNSC and Witnesses to the Accords to act to address this situation, including under UN Chapter Seven if necessary. They had not, and the situation was deteriorating, the Foreign Minister said. He also argued that the EEBC's new approach was in fact rewarding Eritrea for its actions and flew in the face of the Witnesses' statement of February 2006, which had underscored the need for dialogue and consultation on the implementation of demarcation. He expressed skepticism that the EEBC did not know what was happening on the ground, or that it did not understand the implications of its actions. Seyoum also pointed to the EEBC's request to the UNSC to assist in the transfer of territory following the final demarcation decision. He urged P-5 and Witness reps to convey to their capitals that "the EEBC is leading us to a nightmare," and seek help in reversing the EEBC plan. ¶6. (SBU) UNMEE head Ennifar told Seyoum that UNMEE had expressed to the EEBC its concern about the risks posed by the new approach to demarcation, but noted that it seemed the Nov. 20 meeting would go ahead regardless of whether the Parties attended it or not. He noted that the UNSC would meet at the end of November to consider a report from the Secretary General on the reaction of the parties to res. 1710 SIPDIS as well as the future of UNMEE's mandate. Ennifar noted that currently UNMEE was unable to fulfill its mandate, so there might be no reason to keep it. -------------- -------------- GOE Won't Attend EEBC Meeting, But Will Exercise Restraint -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Seyoum said the GOE's cabinet saw no value in attending the Nov. 20 EEBC meeting. He declared that if the EEBC insisted on the proceeding with its plans for Nov. 20, that would be the day it lost its mandate. Ethiopia would no longer be bound by the Algiers Accords if the UN and other Witnesses failed to act on their responsibilities under the Agreements. Ethiopia had so far refrained from declaring the Accords null and void in order to act responsibly. The Foreign Minister acknowledged that the situation was very challenging (for diplomats),but noted that the situation on the ground was even more challenging. "There may not be much time for debate around conference tables," since the Eritrean Government had been saying that it had the right to invade to claim the territory it had been awarded. ¶8. (SBU) The Charge made the case that the GOE should attend the Nov. 20 meeting in order to press for negotiations on the implementation of the EEBC decision. She cited the example of Cameroon, where demarcation had been accomplished through the use of coordinates but had been implemented through dialogue. UK Ambassador Bob Dewar supported the Charge's position and also urged that the GOE not act hastily in renouncing the Algiers Accords, which had kept the peace. French Ambassador Stephane Gompertz also argued for GOE attendance at the Nov. 20 meeting. He cited the needed for the parties and Witnesses to consult on legal and political issues related to the EEBC's proposed approach, and raised in particular the issue of whether the EEBC's use of modern, detailed maps for plotting coordinates would be consistent ADDIS ABAB 00003012 003 OF 003 with the Algiers Accords. ¶9. (SBU) Seyoum acknowledged the sincerity of the ambassadors' efforts to promote dialogue, but said that the purpose of the EEBC meeting would be to "bury" the earlier approach of the Witnesses to demarcation, which had been based on cooperation and dialogue facilitated by the EEBC. He reiterated that the GOE's legal experts believe that the "pillars" of the Algiers Accords had been destroyed some time ago, but the GOE had refrained from denouncing the Agreements. But if the EEBC insisted on its current plans, Seyoum said, that would be the end of Algiers. He noted that even the EEBC has said it will have concluded its work. At the same time, the Foreign Minister promised that the GOE would continue to exercise military restraint. It could ignore minor provocation, and would in fact be "more careful and responsible than ever before," but would have to go to war in self defense if attacked. The Minister also emphasized the GOE's continuing support for maintaining UNMEE's mandate as a peacekeeping mission intact, rather than reconfiguring it as an observer mission. He called UNMEE's presence "useful and essential." -------------- Comment: Postpone EEBC Action -------------- ¶10. (C) Following the meeting with the Foreign Minister, representatives from P-5 countries huddled briefly and agreed to recommend a postponement of the Nov. 20 EEBC meeting to their capitals. French Ambassador Gompertz suggested the need for legal analysis and consultations could provide the necessary justification for doing so. Post believes that an even more important justification for doing so is that the EEBC decision will pour gasoline on the fire of conflict already burning in the Horn. With Ethiopia preparing for military engagement with Eritrean-backed forces of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia, the EEBC action could increase the likelihood of another conflict on the primary battle front between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The GOE will not be willing to transfer territory awarded to Eritrea under these circumstances and will respond militarily if Eritrea seeks to seize the land by force. HUDDLESTON