DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ARGUES FOR UP TO NINE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002948 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER ARGUES FOR UP TO NINE ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2936 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2610 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2523 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a November 2 briefing to major AU partners, officers from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) highlighted two areas of continued fighting in Darfur: North Darfur, where GOS aerial reconnaissance and bombardment of suspected NRF strongholds continues; and the Darfur-Chad border, where NRF/JEM forces (with Chadian support) seek to defeat GOS fighters. AMIS fears an attack by rebels on its Tine and Kulbus Military Group Sites, near the border, one the few flashpoints in AMIS's area of operations. New AMIS Force Commander, Major General L.K.F. Aprezi, appealed for up to 9 additional battalions: one for each of AMIS's current sectors, and an additional battalion to serve as a rapid reaction force. Aprezi aims to realign AMIS into three sectors, and to establish checkpoints and observation posts throughout them in order to "dominate the ground." AU officials noted that AMIS's current troop strength of approximately 5,000 may be adequate for an observer mission, but is only half that needed for a more robust peace-keeping operation, and far less that the 20,000 troops sought by the UN for Darfur. Aprezi rejects calls to establish a Forward Joint Mission Headquarters under civilian control (ref A), and asserts that more military officers are needed in the field, than at any joint headquarters. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On November 2, the African Union Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and security developments of AMIS. In addition to updates from DITF military planners (ref A),visiting AMIS Force Commander Major General L.K.F. Aprezi and SO2 OPS Major Mohammed Mustapha briefed partners on the current security situation in Darfur, and on the Force Commander's need for up to 9 additional battalions "to restore a secure environment throughout Darfur." -------------- BRIEFING ON STATUS OF AMIS OPERATION -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Mustapha began with a diagram of parties to the conflict in Darfur, divided into those supporting or opposing the May 5, 2006 DPA. Pro-DPA groups included: -- Signatories: the Government of Sudan (GOS); and the SLM/A (M) (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, Minni Minawi faction), which previously controlled Sector 6 (North Darfur) but had now lost that area to the NRF. -- Parties that had signed declarations of commitment to the DPA: SLM/A (FWM) (Free Will Movement that had split from the SLM/A (W) ),and JEM. Anti-DPA groups included: -- SLM/A (W) (SLM faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed el-Nur), which now controlled Jebel Marra; -- G-19 (splinter group of SLM/A (W)); -- SLM/A (S) (splinter group of SLM/A (W)); -- SLM/A (AK) (sub-splinter group, of SLM/A (S)); -- SLM/A (U) (splinter group of pro-DPA SLM/A (M)) -- JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, led by Khalil Ibrahim); -- Arab militias. Elements comprising the anti-DPA National Redemption Front (NRF) included: SLM/A (U),G-19, and JEM. JEM forces controlled the border area with Chad; JEM Abu Resha forces controlled Sector 2 (South Darfur),he said. -------------- -------------- SECURITY TENSE IN NORTH DARFUR AND NEAR CHAD BORDER -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) According to Mustapha, AMIS assessed that the security situation was now tense, but that there was not any widespread fighting or loss of lives. Most of the region was free of fighting, except North Darfur, where AMIS faced restrictions of freedom of movement (5 no-fly zones). NGOs were also unable to access parts of North Darfur, leading to decreased humanitarian activities. GOS setbacks in Um Sidir ADDIS ABAB 00002948 002 OF 004 and Kariari had led to heavy retaliatory attacks on suspected NRF strongholds. Nearly 10,000 IDPs were moving to the safety of IDP camps at El Fasher and Tawilla. The security situation had been generally calm except in North Darfur (Sectors 5-6),where GOS aerial reconnaissance and bombardment of suspected NRF strongholds continued. -- Factional fighting continued in parts of Sectors 1,2,8 (South Darfur) and Sector 7 (West Darfur). For example, from October 2-23, SLM/A (M) clashed with SLM/A (FWM) forces at Muhajariyya in Sector 8, although both factions technically supported the DPA. -- The Janjaweed were continuing attacks in Sector 1 (e.g., Tawilla),Sector 2, and Sector 6. -- Meanwhile, banditry continued as well, with NGOs losing vehicles along the Kabkabiya-El Fasher-Nyala road. ¶5. (SBU) At the Chad-Darfur border, the situation had been "very tense" since an October 7 JEM/NRF attack on GOS positions at Kariari, in which 150 GOS soldiers were captured before GOS forces withdrew to Kornoi. Mustapha reported a heavy Chadian military presence along the border, along with NRF reinforcements. On October 21, some 82 vehicles had been seen moving toward the border from Darfur; on October 22, Chadian rebels and Janjaweed attacked 3 villages, including Gos Beina, 40 km within Chad. -- NRF/JEM were operating with Chadian support, and aimed to defeat the GOS at Kutum to gain access to El Fasher. The NRF was reinforcing forces at Kutum; opposing the NRF were GOS, Arab militia, and Janjaweed reinforcements. -- Chadian rebels and Janjaweed were supporting the GOS. The GOS intended to use Chadian rebels to open another front, to draw Chadian support from the north; the GOS also intended to use Janjaweed to attack refugee camps loyal to the rebel movements. -- The rebel movements, according to AMIS, sought to attack AMIS Military Group Sites (MGS) at Tine and Kulbus (along the border with Chad) in order to seize AMIS armored personnel carriers (APCs). -------------- -------------- REVISED CONOPS: UP TO 9 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS NEEDED -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Force Commander Aprezi said there were few flashpoints in AMIS's AOR, apart from the Chadian border. With adequate personnel, AMIS could address these security challenges, Mustapha said. Current force levels, and long distances between AMIS sites, made it impossible for AMIS to be effective. Three hours between consecutive AMIS sites did not allow for rapid reaction. Significant areas of Sector 6 (North Darfur) were without coverage. AMIS now had a protection force numbering 5,107 for an area of operations (AOR) of 503,000 sq kilometers. As that total included logistics and medical personnel, the actual number of armed troops was even lower. Mustapha noted that armed only with AK-47 rifles, AMIS troops could cover a 600 km radius; but with the small number of troops, each soldier was responsible for 2,000 sq kilometers. ¶7. (SBU) As discussed in background documents for the July 18 pledging conference in Brussels (emailed to AF/SPG),AMIS sought to shift from an observer mission with an authorized strength of 6,171 (AMIS 2e) to a more robust peacekeeping operation with an authorized strength of 10,500 (AMIS 3). In actuality, however, AMIS had a current strength of only 5,454: which was 95 per cent of its authorized strength as an observer mission, but only half the strength it needed to serve as a more robust peacekeeping operation. AMIS assessed its combat efficiency to be 46 per cent under AMIS 2e, but only 30 per cent under the AMIS 3 concept, Mustapha said. The AMIS Force Commander therefore needed additional battalions; if the UN needed 20,000 more troops, AMIS, with less than 6,000 troops, would need them as well. Additional troops would significantly increase areas of coverage within each sector, he added. ¶8. (SBU) The Force Commander sought 9 additional battalions: one extra battalion for each of the current 8 sectors, and an additional battalion to serve as a rapid reaction force. AMIS envisioned deploying these additional battalions incrementally, to establish checkpoints and observation posts in an AOR that would be revised into three sectors: North, ADDIS ABAB 00002948 003 OF 004 South, and East. As SLM/A (M) was seeking to withdraw from Graida if AMIS could assure security for IDPs there, the first battalion would be deployed at Graida. Thereafter, additional battalions would be deployed in this sequence: Tawilla, Kutum, Um Barro, Forobaranga, reserve battalion, Golo, and Kabbkabiya. -------------- INITIATIVES BY THE NEW FORCE COMMANDER -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Mustapha said initiatives by Force Commander Aprezi included calling for aggressive patrolling (i.e., each patrol being escorted by 2 armored personnel carriers, or APCs). Lack of spare parts and tires rendered many APCs inoperable; with those remaining, AMIS could conduct a maximum of 30 patrols daily. One APC had been lost in the August 19 ambush on an AMIS fuel convoy, when the AMIS driver discovered that the APC's weapons had jammed, and therefore decided to drive the APC into a rebel vehicle, killing 6 attackers. ¶10. (SBU) To complement aggressive patrols, the Force Commander was also calling for quick impact projects "to win hearts and minds", as well as information operations to publicize the DPA. ¶11. (SBU) As Chairman of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC),the Force Commander sought to strengthen the CFC through verification of parties' current area of control vs. areas controlled in May, as well as by "reinvigorating" the GOS plan for disarmament of the Janjaweed. Attempting to clear the backlog of 94 ceasefire violations, AMIS had determined that 48 could not be investigated, due to the changing identity of parties. Of the remainder, 8 had been investigated, and 38 had been sent to the CFC. Aprezi underscored the need for enhancement of AMIS "to dominate the ground": there was no point in simply verifying ceasefire violations, he said, if one could not apportion blame. ¶12. (SBU) Aprezi explained that information on Janjaweed positions had been distributed upon the signing of the DPA, and had now been given to all CFC parties. AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes observed that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) had decided in January 2005 to call for the disarmament of the Janjaweed, and that parties were to inform AMIS of their locations. The GOS plan was the first step, Gomes said. ¶13. (SBU) Asked whether the issue of DPA non-signatories participating in the CFC had been addressed, Aprezi said, "for me, I require everyone to be on hand, to be successful." The issue had not been resolved, however, as the GOS and SLM/A (M) continued to object to participation by non-signatories. Dr. Gomes noted that AU Commission Chairperson Konare had decided to engage non-signatories, but did not elaborate on how this was being implemented. Gomes had no information on AU involvement in recently reported Eritrean attempts to convene non-signatories. -------------- -------------- FJMHQ: COMPARISON WITH NATO AND UN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES -------------- -------------- ¶14. (SBU) Mustapha noted that under the UN light assistance package to AMIS, the UN would contribute 105 UN to AMIS: 29 to the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ),16 to the CFC, and 60 as staff officers. However, as such UN officers were to be "under the operational control of AMIS, but administrative control of the UN," the Force Commander proposed realigning the additional UN officers as follows: 20 to Force Headquarters (FHQ) , 10 to the CFC, 36 staff officers to FHQ and 38 to the sectors. ¶15. (SBU) Mustapha's presentation concluded with analyses of NATO and UNMIS organizational structures, and an explanation of why the AMIS Force Commander did not see the need for a FJMHQ under civilian control. In NATO, the JOC was under the command of CJ-3 (OPS). In UNMIS, the JMOC included CIMIC, UNMO, G2, LO, LOG, and COMMS, and was under the command of the COO (J3),who in turn reported to the Force Commander. As AMIS had a protection force of only 5,107, a force of less than 6,000 did not require a JOC of over 200 staff. (NOTE: Force Commander Aprezi's explicit rejection of the FJMHQ ADDIS ABAB 00002948 004 OF 004 concept, and its implications for strengthening command and control of AMIS in preparation for UN transition, has been reported septel. END NOTE.) ¶16. (SBU) COMMENT: The jury is still out on whether Major General Aprezi is a more effective Force Commander than his predecessor, fellow Nigerian general C.R.U. Ihekire. During his first month on the job, AMIS has been beset by crippling operational failures, such as having to postpone rotation of the Senegalese battalion due to lack of aviation fuel, and failing to introduce new security arrangements that would let it resume ground convoys suspended since the August 19 ambush that killed two Rwandan peacekeepers. His decision to reject the Forward Joint Mission Headquarters also causes concern among Western donors. However, it also highlights the vacuum in civilian leadership of AMIS, following the recent resignation of Baba Gana Kingibe as head of mission. The AU's presentation clearly outlines the significant security challenges facing international peacekeepers in Darfur, whether they hail from the AU or the UN. END COMMENT. HUDDLESTON