DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER REJECTS FJMHQ CONCEPT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002936 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/SPG, AF/RSA, AND IO/PSC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: AMIS FORCE COMMANDER REJECTS FJMHQ CONCEPT AT NOVEMBER 2 AU DITF BRIEFING REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1736 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 1581 ¶C. ADDIS ABABA 2610 ¶D. ADDIS ABABA 2523 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. African Union civilian and military officials, including the new AMIS Force Commander, had few conclusions to share from a recently concluded internal "brainstorming" session on operational challenges facing the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Sudan's recent acceptance of 105 UN personnel to augment AMIS may signal its willingness to tolerate additional UN resources and staff, AU officials said, if they are "co-deployed" rather than placed strictly under UN command and control. AU officials highlight that, in any case, no additional forces may be deployed to enhance AMIS unless the United States fulfills its USD 116 million pledge made in July and agrees to the construction of additional camps. The construction of additional civilian police (CIVPOL) stations is also on hold, due to lack of promised funds from primarily European donors. To date, the AU has only received one-fifth of the cash pledges promised in May and is still struggling with logistical constraints, such as having only a 10-day supply of aviation fuel. Compounding these challenges is the AMIS Force Commander's recent announcement that he is rejecting the AU Commission's call to establish a Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ) under the civilian control of the AMIS Deputy Head of Mission. Such a structure had been approved in May (refs A-B),and was intended to strengthen command and control of AMIS, as well as to lay the groundwork for transition to a UN operation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On November 2, the African Union Commission's Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). New AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke K.F. Aprezi, in Addis Ababa for consultations with AU DITF, after nearly one month in Darfur, also attended. -------------- "CO-DEPLOYMENT" vs. UN TRANSITION -------------- ¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes began by noting that AU Commission officials, the AMIS Force Commander, and AMIS personnel from the field, had met at AU Headquarters in Addis on October 30 for an internal "brainstorming" session. The session provided a comprehensive view of problems faced by AMIS, he said, including management, financial accountability, and the failure of computer systems. ¶4. (SBU) Gomes asserted that Sudan's recent acceptance of "light" UN assistance to AMIS, through the provision of equipment and 105 UN personnel, provided a mechanism for further strengthening of AMIS with UN resources. He noted that a June 1995 UN paper on peace-keeping discussed two concepts: joint operations, and "co-deployment." UN support did not end at 105 personnel; one needed to "keep the door open," he said, although adding 20,000 in this manner may be unrealistic. Instead of insisting only on transition to a UN operation, the international community needed to think of ways to circumvent Bashir's opposition, Gomes said. Noting the appointment of U.K. and U.S. envoys to Sudan, Gomes said he had proposed the appointment of additional envoys from both the AU and partners to push Sudan's President Bashir to reconsider his position. Gomes noted that transition had begun with a decision by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC); the problem lay in Khartoum. The focus had to be on enhancing the capabilities of AMIS. He noted that either UNSCR 1706 or the relevant UN Secretary-General's report provided for AMIS to be assisted with 4 attack helicopters; the UN could provide such items, not just personnel. -------------- -------------- AMIS ENHANCEMENT AWAITING USG RESPONSE ON CAMP CONSTRUCTION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Enhancement of AMIS continued to be frustrated by political considerations, Gomes said. He noted that contractor PAE had informed the AU that it had not been given instructions to construct accommodations for additional ADDIS ABAB 00002936 002 OF 004 battalions; this was an important matter for the enhancement of AMIS and of significant concern to the AU Commission. Deputy pol-econ counselor acknowledged receipt of the AU's October 10 note verbale requesting the USG to instruct PAE to construct such camps (emailed to AF/SPG and NSC),noted it was still under review in Washington, and cited budgetary constraints that could influence the U.S. decision. ¶6. (SBU) AU DITF Administration Control and Management Center (ACMC) Chief, Commodore Binega Mesfin, clarified that a contract for the upgrade and maintenance of CIVPOL stations was ready for signature; however, the contract would not cover the construction of an additional 35 stations, due to lack of available funds. -------------- -------------- FINANCES: ONLY ONE-FIFTH OF CASH PLEDGES RECEIVED TO DATE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) AU Budget Analyst Biscut Tessema reviewed AMIS finances. If all donors honored pledges made, then the mission could be sustained through December. If the League of Arab States did not deliver its pledge, then AMIS would experience a shortfall of USD 27-30 million. AMIS required USD 329 million from April to December 2006 (USD 198 million of which was cash requirements). Expenditures from April to August 2006 totalled USD 69 million. A total of USD 322 million had been pledged at the July 18 Brussels pledging conference, including USD 33 million pledged by the League of Arab States (LAS). Other pledges from the LAS combined to total USD 50 million. Of the total pledges made at Brussels, cash pledges (including USD 50 million from the LAS) totalled USD 217 million. To date, however, the AU had received only USD 44 million in cash, primarily from the EU, Ireland, and China. ¶8. (SBU) A contribution from the UK would cover personnel costs (salaries and allowances) after October 18. Discussions were also underway with the Netherlands on additional contributions. However, as funds from a contribution agreement with the EU to cover those costs through October 17 had not yet been received, the AU had reprogrammed USD 15 million that was to have gone to troop contributing countries. Biscut explained that the AU was recruiting additional financial staff to complete outstanding financial reports. The AU had only reported to the EU on its second contribution agreement (the sixth is now being finalized),or up to November 2005; some USD 70 million was thus being held by the EU pending the submission of financial reports from the AU. ¶9. (SBU) Mesfin reported that USD 7.5 million had been paid to contractor PAE on November 1 (presumably for food services). The AU had signed a new contract with PAE calling for payments to be made within 15 days of invoices, and thus needed funds from the UK, he said. -------------- -------------- GROUND CONVOYS TO DELIVER AVIATION FUEL WILL RESUME -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Mesfin reported that AMIS now had 10 days stock of aviation fuel, but required a 15-day minimum; AMIS was still seeking to obtain fuel bladders to establish a reserve under its control. Asked when ground convoys to deliver aviation fuel would resume, AMIS Force Commander Aprezi said small convoys had resumed but not large ones, for which he would recommend accompanying helicopters and APCs. Some 22 vehicles awaited escort to El Fasher; their movement awaited his return to Darfur on November 4. "Don't worry about it; I will do it," he said. ¶11. (SBU) DITF J4 Movements Officer Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kuitche reviewed rotations: 2 Nigerian battalions had rotated, as had Nigerian and Ugandan CIVPOL; the Rwandan battalion had not. The rotation of the Senegalese battalion had been put on hold (due to the lack of aviation fuel several weeks earlier). The repatriation of Ghanaian CIVPOL was underway today. Germany was seeking to rotate the Senegalese and Gambian battalions together, after November 27, due to the unavailability of German aircraft from November 12-16, and of French aircraft after November 16. ADDIS ABAB 00002936 003 OF 004 Malian CIVPOL would have to rotate later. Dr. Gomes said Rwanda had formally asked the AU for aircraft to support additional supplies for its troops (who had not rotated). -------------- AMIS FC REJECTS FJMHQ, TIGHTENS OPSEC -------------- ¶12. (SBU) AMIS Force Commander MG Luke K.F. Aprezi, in Addis to attend internal AU Commission "brainstorming" sessions on challenges facing AMIS and due to return to Khartoum on November 3 before proceeding to El Fasher, outlined his strong opposition to the formation of a Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ) to be headed by the civilian Deputy Head of Mission (DHOM) of AMIS, calling the concept of a joint headquarters "over-bloated" and redundant. As "decisions have to come back to me for implementation," having decisions made first at the political level would simply waste time and impede AMIS operations, he said. The (civilian) head of mission had a headquarters at Khartoum; "my headquarters," Aprezi explained, was at El Fasher. Immediately upon his arrival in Darfur one month ago, Aprezi received a briefing on the AMIS Joint Operations Center (JOC),which he said had not met his expectations. Aprezi criticized the need for having up to 200 officers man a joint headquarters for a mission of only 5,000 troops. Coordination could be done under the direction of the Chief of Staff in Khartoum; the JOC needed to be under "my control" at El Fasher, Aprezi said. Asked if he was therefore proposing the cancellation of the FJMHQ, Aprezi replied in the affirmative, and questioned the need for a large body under the DHOM. All operational control should be under the Force Commander, he said. ¶13. (SBU) Coordination among the elements that were to be part of the FJMHQ (including CIVPOL, CIMIC or civilian-military cooperation, and the protection force) could now be done at the daily briefings held at headquarters, Aprezi asserted, particularly since such briefings were now restricted to AMIS personnel only. He explained that previously AU partners, signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and Government of Sudan (GOS) representatives had all attended the AMIS briefings, which was not conducive to coordination and gave parties access to operational details affecting AMIS effectiveness. For example, GOS and DPA signatories were present when AMIS discussed reinforcing its presence at Tine; on another occasion, an AMIS helicopter conducting reconnaissance of the border with Chad was immediately followed by a GOS helicopter, as the reconnaissance had been discussed at an open AMIS briefing. ¶14. (SBU) The retired Zambian general originally named in August to serve as the Joint Chief of Staff (JCOS) and to lead partner advisor/experts assigned to the FJMHQ, was introduced. Asked what the JCOS's role would be in AMIS (given Aprezi's opposition to establishing a FJMHQ),Aprezi said it would be up to the political leadership of AMIS. Gomes noted that the UN Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) had two Deputy Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (DSRSGs),but that its JOC was under SIPDIS UNMEE's Force Commander in Asmara. ¶15. (SBU) Saying he had "no problem" with the UN assistance package (whereby 105 UN officers, military and civilian, augment AMIS),Aprezi said additional officers from the UN or other partners would be "used properly": they were not needed at joint headquarters, but rather on the ground to verify disarmament of the Janjaweed. MILOBs now served as staff officers, he noted. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Burke, deputy military advisor to the EU Special Representative for Sudan, noted that the EU was providing 3 experts to the FJMHQ in response to a formal request by the AU; the FJMHQ had been proposed by the AU, not imposed by partners. Burke requested clarification on the future of the Force Headquarters and the FJMHQ. Canadian poloff noted that all partners shared with AMIS the common goal of peace in Darfur. (NOTE: The AU formally announced the formation of the FJMHQ and requested advisor/experts from the U.S., NATO, and European partners on May 18. END NOTE.) ¶16. (SBU) Following the Force Commander's remarks, AMIS ADDIS ABAB 00002936 004 OF 004 officers briefed partners on the current security situation in Darfur, outlined the need for 9 additional battalions for AMIS to cover its large area of operations, and discussed progress in clearing the backlog of ceasefire violations being addressed by the Ceasefire Commission (septel). AMIS officers also discussed how joint operating structures in NATO and UNMIS (JOC and JMOC respectively) were under military command, raising the question of why AMIS required a different structure under civilian control. ¶17. (SBU) COMMENT: In recent weeks, AU military planners have managed to address several significant logistical challenges that threatened to scuttle the AU's peacekeeping mission in Darfur: from running out of aviation fuel and having to postpone the rotation of troops, to not being able to pay for the extension of food services (refs C-D). Through a combination of ad hoc measures and last-minute intervention by donors (e.g., Canada and the UK, respectively, on aviation fuel and food),AMIS has continued to limp on. The future of AMIS beyond December, however, remains uncertain. The AU PSC will meet at the head of state level on November 24 to consider Darfur, but it is unclear whether the PSC will continue to push for AMIS transition to a UN peacekeeping operation, or will simply acknowledge Sudan's lack of consent and extend AMIS again, as it did at its previous summit-level meeting on September 20. Allied partners note that while cumbersome in the Force Commander's eyes, the establishment of a Forward Joint Mission Headquarters would be a key element in any transition to UN command and control. The United States is currently providing two military officers to assist the AMIS FJMHQ with intelligence and civil-military cooperation (J2 and J9). END COMMENT. HUDDLESTON