C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002872

SIPDIS

SIPDIS


AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS ASEC PTER UNSC SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: MELES HOPES TO DELAY SOMALIA
INTERVENTION UNTIL MID-NOVEMBER

Classified By: CHARGE VICKI HUDDLESTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: PM Meles told visiting Gen. Fulford and SFRC
staffer Michael Phelan that delays and problems with IGASOM
deployment might leave Ethiopia to face the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) alone, but that he hoped to hold off on
military intervention until around mid-November. He said the
delay should allow the UNSC to consider a partial lifting of
the UN arms embargo as well as improve weather conditions for
military operations in Somalia. The PM indicated that
Ugandan troops might no longer be available for deployment in
IGASOM due to pressure to desist from "a prominent member of
the Commonwealth." Meles alleged that funding for the CIC
was coming from salafist Muslims in the Gulf as well as
Sufists from Egypt and Sudan. Eritrea was using these funds
to supply Russian-made, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft and
anti-tank weaponry. Meles said the GOE's goal in a military
operation would be to force the disintegration of CIC forces,
whom he predicted would collapse back into sub-clan level
militias pursuing their own interests. Low-level CIC
representatives had told GOE reps that they would leave
Ethiopia in peace if the GOE agreed not to impede the
creation of a unified, CIC-run state in Somalia, but PM said
the GOE had rejected the offer. The goal of Ethiopian
military action would be to push back the CIC, deliver
territory and time back to the TFG and train the TFG to
defend itself. End Summary


2. (C) A USG delegation including Ret. Gen Carl Fulford and
Amb. Peter Chaveas from the African Center for Strategic
Studies (ACSS), Gen. Remkis from EUCOM J5 and Michael Phelan,
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer, called on Prime
Minister Meles Oct. 26. Charge and Pol/Econ Counselor
accompanied the group. The ACSS delegation was v

isiting
Addis to inaugurate a new ACSS annex, the first in Africa, on
the compound of U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa. Phelan is
conducting a multi-nation visit in East Africa. The Prime
Minister welcomed the establishment of the ACSS in Addis.
Most discussion focused on Somalia; a separate message will
report on discussion of the report of Independent Commission
of Inquiry into domestic political violence in 2005.

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CIC A POWERFUL MONSTER WITH FEET OF CLAY
--------------


3. (C) Phelan asked for the PM's view on the situation in
Somalia. Meles called Somalia the most important challenge
to Ethiopia's security. He said the CIC had capitalized on
chaos in Somalia by providing social services, security and
stability that people wanted. They had used this achievement
as an entry point for imposing their radical Islamic agenda
on a country whose Muslims had always practiced tolerance.
The PM said that the Somali sub-clan militias fighting under
the CIC were not a real threat, but their foreign-financed
Jihadist leadership was. He called the CIC in general "a
powerful monster emerging, but with feet of clay." The CIC
had momentum and funding now which were keeping its
disparate, clan-based elements together. Their agenda was to
exploit this momentum to remove the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) as well as provisional governments in
Somaliland and Puntland. "Once they control all of Somalia,
they have lots of ideas about a broader Caliphate," he added.
He also referred to "international brigades" of extremist
volunteers from Indonesia, Pakistan and elsewhere to provide
training, including in suicide bomb attacks.

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Eritrean Arms Bought with Foreign Funds
--------------


4. (C) The PM said that the normally anti-Islamic Eritrean
Government was pursuing a short-sighted policy of aiding
jihadists, apparently in the hopes that the extremists "would
attack Ethiopia before they attack us." Meles claimed that
the Eritreans had provided the CIC with Russian-made,
shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry. The
funding, he said, had come from both salafist individuals and
charities in Gulf States as well as Sufist elements in Egypt
and Sudan. He noted that the GOE had observed some tension
between the two groups in training camps in Somali, but that
their unusual cooperation was continuing. When Gen. Fulford

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asked if the conflict in Somalia were not simply a proxy war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Meles replied that the two
issues were separate. There was a genuine threat from
Islamists in the region that would exist with or without
Eritrean help; Eritrea was simply trying to take advantage
of it.

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CIC Not Interested In Talks, Sharing Power
--------------


5. (C) Meles told the group that the CIC had demonstrated
through its handling of Khartoum talks with the TFG that it
was not going to accept a negotiated solution, nor did it see
the necessity of sharing power with the TFG. The CIC had
continued its territorial expansion in spite of two
cease-fires signed in Khartoum. The PM also revealed that
low level reps from the GOE and CIC had held discussions
recently in Nairobi. In that exchange, the CIC had indicated
that the GOE was the only obstacle standing between it and
achieving its goal of a united Somalia. If the GOE were
willing to stand back and allow the CIC to consolidate
control in Somalia, the CIC promised to leave Ethiopia in
peace. According to the PM, GOE reps responded that although
Ethiopia had not yet acted militarily, it would never accept
the CIC's agenda and would intervene to stop it if others did
not. The GOE had urged the CIC to work out a power-sharing
arrangement with the TFG, but the reps had also declined.
"At least there was clarity on both sides," Meles concluded.
He added that if the CIC were stopped militarily, clan
militias would resume their traditional loyalties and
healthier elements of the CIC could be incorporated into the
TFG. Jihadists could not be eliminated altogether, Meles
predicted, but they could be marginalized.

-------------- ---
Uganda Sidelined, Ethiopia Prepared to Act Alone
-------------- ---


6. (C) The Prime Minister said that he had recently received
private communications from the Ugandan Government informing
him that due to "pressure from a prominent member of the
Commonwealth," (note: probably the UK) Uganda would not be
able to deploy in Somalia within an acceptable time frame.
The Ugandan government had said that it had received signals
that to deploy would be "inconsistent" with serving as host
of the upcoming Commonwealth Summit. Meles bemoaned the loss
of the "international cover" that Uganda would have provided
for efforts to stop the CIC, but said that Ethiopia was
prepared to handle the task directly alone if necessary. He
also noted that the costs of the operation would increase
over time.


7. (C) The PM said that the GOE planned to wait until the UN
Security Council's planned consideration of a resolution to
partially lift the arms embargo in early November before
launching any military operation against the CIC. Weather
conditions in Somalia would also improve in mid-November, he
added, making ground-based military action easier. He
caveated his remarks, however, but noting that the CIC might
act preemptively to catch the GOE before it was fully ready.
Such an action might force the GOE's hand, but Ethiopia might
still "take some punches" until the rainy season ended.


8. (C) The objective of Ethiopian operations would be to push
the CIC back to Mogadishu, "liberate" parts of Somalia for a
TFG takeover and train the TFG to defend itself, Meles
explained. He said that Ethiopia could not fight the
Islamists itself forever, but was confident that the TFG
could be trained to handle the job itself. The PM pointed to
Ethiopia's previous experience with TFG President Abdullai
Yusuf in Puntland, where Yusuf had taken help from Ethiopia
but had eventually built a self-sufficient militia able to
cope with extremists.

--------------
USG Understands GOE Position Best
--------------


9. (C) Gen. Fulford asked whether IGAD countries and the
African Union (AU) would support military action to defend
the TFG. Meles replied that he was confident of support from

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Kenya and Uganda. In fact, President Museveni wanted
Ethiopia to move more quickly. The AU, meanwhile, "should at
least not pose a problem." Meles said that the GOE had
discussed the issue with leaders in the AU Commission and
believed there was an understanding on this point. He told
Fulford that Eritrea was of course on the side of the CIC,
and that Djibouti was taking a position somewhat closer to
the CIC as well. Sudan might not support an Ethiopian
military operation, but was unlikely to do anything against
it. Beyond the region, Meles said that the USG understood
Ethiopia's position the best, while the UK had recently shown
signs of ambivalence about Somalia. The PM said the GOE
would try to "firm them up." He expected that the EU might
issue negative statements about an military operation, but
suggested that he would be prepared to live with that.
HUDDLESTON