AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002775 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF DAS YAMAMOTO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KPKO MASS AU SO SU ET ER SUBJECT: AFRICAN UNION DEPUTY CHAIRPERSON SUPPORTS INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS FOR DARFUR AND SOMALIA ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. African Union Commission Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka underscored the need for a robust U.N. mandate for peacekeeping in Sudan, noting that the AU lacked the resources to sustain an operation in Darfur and therefore sought to transfer responsibility to the international community. The AU recognized that "heinous crimes" had occurred in Darfur, and that those responsible should be held accountable. In addition to Darfur, implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement remained a concern. On Somalia, Mazimhaka and other senior AU officials urged the immediate lifting of the UN Security Council arms embargo on Somalia, to allow assistance to be provided to the Transitional Federal Government. Deployment of an IGAD peace support mission to support the legitimacy of the TFG and its institutions should not require the consent of the ICU, and would be the only way to ensure that TFG-ICU tensions do not engulf neighboring countries in a regional war, Mazimhaka said. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On October 13, Charge, DCM, and CJTF-HOA Commander Rear Admiral Richard Hunt led Amcit delegation from the NGO, "Business Executives for National Security" (BENS),in a meeting at African Union Headquarters with AU Deputy Chairperson Patrick Mazimhaka, AU Conflict Management Director El-Ghassim Wane, and other AU Commission officials responsible for peace and security issues. Deputy pol-econ counselor and CJTF-HOA officers accompanied the U.S. delegation. -------------- "ROBUST U.N. MANDATE" NEEDED FOR SUDAN -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Sudan's refusal to allow transition to a UN mission in Darfur created a dilemma for the international community, and set a "very bad precedent" that "needs to be addressed firmly," Mazimhaka said. The only option had been to extend the current mandate of the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur (AMIS). However, the AU could no longer sustain the mission in Sudan, as the AU lacked the resources and capacity to conduct an operation envisaged at more than 20,000 troops. (NOTE: Current AMIS force strength is approximately 7,000; the AU Peace and Security Council has authorized enhancing AMIS by adding two additional battalions. END NOTE.) AU withdrawal would result in a "free-for-all" between rebels and armed groups, further suffering for the population of Darfur, and deterioration of relations between Sudan and its neighbors. The AU therefore needed to transfer responsibility for the peacekeeping mission to the international community. A "robust UN mandate" was needed in Sudan, Mazimhaka said, to ensure that all parties observed the Darfur Peace Agreement. The AU's intervention in Darfur was not intended to be peace enforcement, as the AU lacked the capacity to enforce peace in Sudan "or anywhere else." ¶4. (SBU) Darfur was a "tragedy for Africa and humanity," Mazimhaka said. The situation in Kordofan, not Darfur, initially drew international attention; conflicts over resources in western and southern Sudan, "exacerbated by ideology," had led to the current crisis. AU intervention came when rebels openly attacked the government. Rapes, destruction, and the systematic displacement of civilians led some to characterize the situation as "genocide." While the AU had cooperated with the UN commission of inquiry that could not conclusively define the situation as genocide, the AU nevertheless recognized that "heinous crimes" had occurred: those responsible should be investigated and held before international justice, Mazimhaka said. Numerous UNSC resolutions had been adopted holding individuals responsible for international crimes. As Sudan was an AU member state, the AU had the right to intervene when the population faced danger, "but it is extremely difficult when a member state refuses to cooperate with us." The AU had little leverage on Sudan, other than suspending Sudan's membership in the AU or endorsing UN sanctions on the Government of Sudan (GOS) or on Sudanese individuals. The international community needed deeper engagement with Sudan, Mazimhaka said. ¶5. (SBU) Asked whether China was obstructing international ADDIS ABAB 00002775 002 OF 004 pressure on Sudan, Mazimhaka noted that both Russia and China had abstained on UNSCR 1706. He said the Russian foreign minister had explained to AU principals that Russia's abstention had been intended to give Sudan an opportunity to accept UN deployment. China derived economic benefits from both Sudan and Chad, Mazimhaka said, noting that Chad now recognized China rather than Taiwan. -------------- DON'T FORGET ABOUT NORTH-SOUTH CPA -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Questioned about North-South relations in Sudan, Mazimhaka said enthusiasm for the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) had waned over recent years. The GoSS had strayed from the vision of John Garang, he said, by disagreeing on the implementation of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),establishing a parallel cabinet rather than accept the structure of the national government, and by disagreeing on Darfur. Salva Kiir spent most of his time in Juba as GoSS President, rather than as vice president of the government of national unity, Mazimhaka noted. Integration of armed forces had slowed, and resolution of border conflicts remained dormant. The GoSS was preparing to consolidate its gains and ultimately to secede, he said. ¶7. (SBU) AU Commission Conflict Management Director El-Ghassim Wane underscored that while the international community focused on Darfur, the CPA still needed to be implemented. Unresolved North-south issues included those related to oil, as well as the GOS rejection of the July 2005 Abyei Boundary Commission's ruling. Different positions on Darfur further strained relations between the GOS and the SPLM. Southern Sudan endorsing independence through a referendum would not be good for either Sudan or Africa, Wane said. -------------- -------------- SOMALIA: SUPPORT TFG IMMEDIATELY OR RISK REGIONAL WAR -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The situation in Somalia requires immediate, urgent attention, Mazimhaka said. He affirmed the legitimacy of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),which resulted from international negotiations, and noted that the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) had not been party to those talks. The African Union recognized the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) as a step toward representational government, he said. Mazimhaka warned that failure to resolve conflict between the TFG and the ICU would inevitably result in a regional war, with a projected 75,000 refugees fleeing to Kenya, Somaliland, and Ethiopia. Mazimhaka said the AU believed that the ICU not only sought the military overthrow of the TFG, but also espoused Somali dictator Siad Barre's concept of a "Greater Somalia." "Somalia's neighbors--Kenya, Ethiopia, Somaliland, and Djibouti--would get not only refugees, but war as well," Mazimhaka said. A further concern, he said, was that while Siad Barre had espoused a secular revolutionary government, the ICU sought a religious revolutionary government. ¶9. (SBU) Observing that failure to act now could lead to possible war in the Horn of Africa, Charge asked what immediate steps could be taken to stop conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. AU Commission Peace and Security Director Geoffrey Mugumya responded that while some nations had a strategic interest in Somalia's stability, others sought Somalia's instability. Charge observed that instability served no country's interests: stability in Somalia would better enable Ethiopia to address its internal situation, but now OLF and ONLF insurgents used Somalia for operations against Ethiopia. -------------- -------------- ERITREA SHIPPING ARMS; EMBARGO SHOULD BE LIFTED TO HELP TFG -------------- -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Continuing contacts between the TFG and ICU was ADDIS ABAB 00002775 003 OF 004 important, Mazimhaka said, but one needed the will and resources to resist the advance of the Islamic Courts. If the ICU believed it enjoyed greater popular support, it should compete against the TFG in popular elections, he said. Rear Admiral Hunt noted that a third round of Khartoum talks between the TFG and ICU may not yield satisfactory results, if appropriate leaders did not attend. Mazimhaka noted that the ICU had immediately dismissed its representative after the first round of talks. Hawiye supporters of the ICU strongly resented TFG President Yusuf; so long as the ICU believed it could achieve its aims through war, it would not negotiate in good faith, he added. ¶11. (SBU) Questioned about reported arms shipments to the ICU from jihadists in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Iran, Mazimhaka said that while the source of such arms was unknown, the AU had evidence of arms "coming through one of our member states." "We know that most of the arms here come through Eritrea," he declared. Director Wane observed that the UN monitoring group's report highlighted violations of the arms embargo by several countries, including Eritrea. Wane appealed for the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on Somalia since January 1992, or at least provide an exemption for those assisting the TFG. By failing to distinguish between those supporting legitimate authority and those supporting the ICU, the arms embargo was "counter-productive to our efforts to establish a transitional government," he said. Mazimhaka observed that the arms embargo was intended for Somali warlords, not international peacekeepers. As the ICU already controlled all the ports of Somalia, one could not limit arms shipments, especially through Eritrea, Yemen, or the Indian Ocean. -------------- - ICU'S CONSENT NOT NEEDED FOR IGASOM DEPLOYMENT -------------- - ¶12. (SBU) IGAD's proposal to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia (IGASOM) was "the only way to prevent the spread of war to neighbors," Mazimhaka said. If the UN Security Council endorsed such a mission, then the arms embargo would not apply, he added, as it would be an UNSC-mandated peacekeeping operation. In addition to IGAD member states, the AU needed to consider other potential troop contributing countries, in order to generate "more capable forces," Mazimhaka said. A peacekeeping operation did not require the consent of all parties, Mazimhaka observed, and it was "not an acceptable position" for "a belligerent" like the ICU to require consent. International law required only the consensus of the TFG, he said, whose legitimacy was recognized by both the AU and the international community. ¶13. (SBU) Somalia's transitional federal institutions resulted from the Somali national reconciliation conference in Kenya, but faced both regional and internal obstacles, according to AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Secretary Dr. A.M. Kambudzi. At the international level, failure to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute exacerbated tensions within Somalia, he said, as did indeterminate borders between Ethiopia and Somalia, and between Somalia and Kenya. Within the region, there was also "no spirit of good neighborliness" in the Horn of Africa. Internally, domestic Somali political culture was one of clans, rather than political groups and parties. ¶14. (SBU) Conflict Management Director Wane underscored the need to promote regional integration, as well as a regional approach to conflict resolution, involving the AU, EU, and IGAD. International efforts to address localized conflicts (Ethiopia-Eritrea, Somalia, North-South Sudan, Darfur) often considered such conflicts in isolation from others. For example, while the United States focused on addressing the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute, he said, Eritrea was supporting rebels in Darfur. Ensuring that landlocked Ethiopia had access to the sea would resolve many security issues, Wane said. Asked whether greater U.S. engagement in Somalia could have the unwanted effect of attracting additional negative elements, Mazimhaka noted the importance of U.S. supporting regional efforts by the AU and EU, and ADDIS ABAB 00002775 004 OF 004 building consensus with actors ranging from Horn of Africa countries to China. Mazimhaka decried the "high level of intimidation" by countries in the Horn of Africa, intended to block such consensus. The U.S. could also use its influence among League of Arab States members. ¶15. (SBU) COMMENT: Mazimhaka, the second-highest ranking official in the AU Commission, has previously expressed strong support for UN and even NATO involvement in Darfur, but his observations do not necessarily reflect the consensus of AU member states or members of the AU Peace and Security Council. As for Somalia, his comments reflect a consensus among several senior AU officials responsible for international security issues that immediate action is needed to prevent the Somalia conflict from engulfing its neighbors in a regional war. END COMMENT. HUDDLESTON