C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002674

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM SO ER ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA ON ERITREA, SOMALIA AND
INTERNAL REFORM


Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda told the
Charge that the ruling EPRDF had not adopted any significant
new policies toward Eritrea at its annual conference in late
September. He also said the GOE was not concerned about
further expansion of the Islamic Courts in Somalia -- as long
as Ethiopia remained engaged. He was somewhat worried,
however, about losing the war of perceptions in the
international community, where even seasoned regional experts
appeared to be pulling their punches on the real nature of
the Courts. Tekeda said it should be possible for the TFG to
reach some kind of modus vivendi with some elements of the
Courts, although not with extremists like Sheik Aweys and
Ayro. Charge Huddleston urged greater GOE candor on the
presence and mission of Ethiopian trainers in Somalia, as
well as a more detailed and strategic plan for IGASOM. The
Deputy Minister dismissed the notion that defections and low
morale had weakened the Ethiopian military. The Charge
argued that since the GOE felt it was in a secure situation,
it could afford to deepen the current process of political
reform. She pointed out that opposition parties who took a
risk by participating in Parliament have not been empowered
by GOE decisions. She also questioned Tekeda about reports
of GOE pressure on the Commission of Inquiry into 2005
political violence. Tekeda lamented that the 2005 elections
were a lost opportunity for the opposition to embrace
democratic politics, and admitted that some ruling party
members had "gone back to their cocoons." He nevertheless
predicted positive movement on governance issues coming out
of the recently-concluded ruling party conference. End
Summary.


2. (U) Charge Huddleston met with State Minister for Foreign
Affairs Tekeda Alemu Sept. 29. Pol/Econ Counselor
accompanied the Charge, while Deputy Director for Europe and
the Americas Ayalew Mamo joined Tekeda.

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ERITREA: GOE POLI

CY REMAINS MOSTLY THE SAME
--------------


3. (C) Despite some suggestions that the ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) annual
conference might adopt a dramatically new policy towards
Eritrea, Tekeda claimed that there was "no significant
change" in the policy in the end. The slightly revised
policy was reflected in the GOE's statement to the UNGA in
late September, he added. Tekeda summed up the GOE's current
approach to its northern neighbor as 1) remaining vigilant
for signs of aggression; 2) continued desire for normalized
relations; and 3) leaving open the path to peace. When the
Charge asked about any plans to counter Eritrea's stepped up
efforts at destabilizing Ethiopia, Tekeda replied that the
GOE would attempt to deal with this threat by countering the
insurgencies and movements Eritrea was funding. (NOTE: PM
Meles confirmed this stance in a subsequent meeting Sept. 30
with donor country ambassadors.)

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SOMALIA: INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS MORE
WORRISOME THAN CIC MILITARY THREAT
--------------


4. (C) Tekeda told the Charge that the recent "triumph" of
the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Kismayo had
revealed the limits of the CIC's power. While the Courts had
succeeded in taking over Kismayo, they had faced
unprecedented resistance from the local population because
the city residents came from a mixture of clans, not just the
Hawiye who dominated other areas conquered by the CIC. One
of the major warlords who formerly controlled the city,
Hirale, had withdrawn promising continued resistance to the
CIC. Furthermore, CIC leader Turki had openly acknowledged
the role of foreign fighters in taking Kismayo. Tekeda
predicted that the CIC would not penetrate other areas of
Somalia, and argued that "the CIC cannot not even keep the
Hawiyes together." He reiterated the importance of Ethiopia
and Kenya continuing to act together on Somalia. He claimed
that Ethiopia had a number of additional measures it could
take to counter CIC influence, including fortifying or even
recognizing Somaliland and Puntland. In general, the GOE
felt comfortable with the current situation and did not
anticipate further deterioration as long as Ethiopia remained
engaged. He added that it should be possible for the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to come up with a

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"modus vivendi" with some elements of the CIC, although not
with extremists like Aweys and Ayro.


5. (C) What did concern Tekeda was nature of international
coverage and commentary on Somalia. He noted that even
experts like former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn
were saying publicly that the real intentions of the CIC were
unclear, when anyone knowledgeable about the area could
appreciate the extremist aims of people like Aweys. Tekeda
worried that an ill-informed and confused international
community might undermine the diplomatic cover that IGAD
countries currently had to support the TFG and oppose the
CIC's expansion.


6. (C) The Charge told Tekeda that the GOE's credibility in
the international community was being undermined by denying
the presence of any Ethiopian troops in Somalia. Tekeda said
the PM Meles had already publicly acknowledged the presence
of some trainers in Puntland. The Charge argued that
additional candor would help the GOE make its case. She also
pressed Tekeda and other IGAD allies to explain better their
strategy regarding the deployment of IGASOM. It was
important to make clear what IGASOM's role would be, what its
goals were, and that it was not "an invasion" of Somalia by
its neighbors. Tekeda took the points on board.

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ETHIOPIA MILITARY STILL STRONG
--------------


7. (C) Tekeda dismissed the suggestion that recent defections
of high and mid-ranking officers from the Ethiopian National
Defense Forces (ENDF) signaled a weakened state of readiness.
When pressed on the impact of the continuing dominance of
Tigrayan officers among the ENDF general staff, Tekeda argued
that the institution was re-founded after the fall of the
Derg in 1991 under the leadership of Tigrayan People's
Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels. Since that time, he claimed,
Ethiopia has not enjoyed enough peace or stability to broaden
the leadership of the armed forces. Tekeda acknowledged the
need to diversify the ENDF's leadership as soon as possible
to reflect Ethiopia's multi-ethnic composition.

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SUFFICIENT STABILITY TO MOVE ON POLITICAL REFORM?
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Charge made the case that if Ethiopia faced no
serious threats from Eritrea, Somalia or from internal
divisions within the ENDF, then the GOE ought to be in a
position to move more expeditiously to open political space
in the country. She argued specifically for reinvigorating
the inter-party dialogue begun earlier in the year on key
reforms, including to the Media Law and National Electoral
Board (NEB). She noted that opposition political parties
that had taken the risk of joining Parliament in spite of
negative popular opinion on the issue had not been rewarded
with empowerment by the GOE. Instead, they were feeling
disenfranchised by continuing restrictions on their
activities.


9. (C) Tekeda characterized the 2005 elections as a lost
opportunity for opposition parties. The EPRDF had embarked
on a policy of "changing society gradually" to be more
democratic, he explained, but admitted that some ruling party
figures had "gone back to their cocoons" in the wake of
opposition boycotts and street violence. Nonetheless, the
Deputy Minister expressed optimism about prospects for
renewed democratization efforts by the ruling party in the
wake of their annual conference in late September. He noted
that democratic governance was the dominant theme of the
conference, and that party leaders had acknowledged that the
EPRDF's performance in this area had been weaker than its
performance on development and economic growth. Senior party
leaders had told participants that "trouble awaits" unless
progress on governance could be made.

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CHARGE PRESSES ON INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Charge told Tekeda that the USG had expected that the
report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into
political violence would help "clear the air" on events of
June and November 2005. The USG was now aware, however, that
three members of the Commission had been pressured by the GOE

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to change their vote on whether excessive force had been used
and had since left the country. Others were also aware of
these developments, she added. The Charge argued that the
GOE's unwillingness to respect the independence of the
Commission was a "lost opportunity" for the ruling party to
promote reconciliation, and that admitting that excessive
force could have a positive effect on the current situation.
Tekeda replied that he was "not on top of that issue" and
couldn't offer an informed answer.
HUDDLESTON