ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA ON ERITREA, SOMALIA AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002674 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR A/S FRAZER AND DAS YAMAMOTO E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM SO ER ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: DEPUTY FM TEKEDA ON ERITREA, SOMALIA AND INTERNAL REFORM Classified By: Charge Vicki Huddleston for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Tekeda told the Charge that the ruling EPRDF had not adopted any significant new policies toward Eritrea at its annual conference in late September. He also said the GOE was not concerned about further expansion of the Islamic Courts in Somalia -- as long as Ethiopia remained engaged. He was somewhat worried, however, about losing the war of perceptions in the international community, where even seasoned regional experts appeared to be pulling their punches on the real nature of the Courts. Tekeda said it should be possible for the TFG to reach some kind of modus vivendi with some elements of the Courts, although not with extremists like Sheik Aweys and Ayro. Charge Huddleston urged greater GOE candor on the presence and mission of Ethiopian trainers in Somalia, as well as a more detailed and strategic plan for IGASOM. The Deputy Minister dismissed the notion that defections and low morale had weakened the Ethiopian military. The Charge argued that since the GOE felt it was in a secure situation, it could afford to deepen the current process of political reform. She pointed out that opposition parties who took a risk by participating in Parliament have not been empowered by GOE decisions. She also questioned Tekeda about reports of GOE pressure on the Commission of Inquiry into 2005 political violence. Tekeda lamented that the 2005 elections were a lost opportunity for the opposition to embrace democratic politics, and admitted that some ruling party members had "gone back to their cocoons." He nevertheless predicted positive movement on governance issues coming out of the recently-concluded ruling party conference. End Summary. ¶2. (U) Charge Huddleston met with State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu Sept. 29. Pol/Econ Counselor accompanied the Charge, while Deputy Director for Europe and the Americas Ayalew Mamo joined Tekeda. -------------- ERITREA: GOE POLICY REMAINS MOSTLY THE SAME -------------- ¶3. (C) Despite some suggestions that the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) annual conference might adopt a dramatically new policy towards Eritrea, Tekeda claimed that there was "no significant change" in the policy in the end. The slightly revised policy was reflected in the GOE's statement to the UNGA in late September, he added. Tekeda summed up the GOE's current approach to its northern neighbor as 1) remaining vigilant for signs of aggression; 2) continued desire for normalized relations; and 3) leaving open the path to peace. When the Charge asked about any plans to counter Eritrea's stepped up efforts at destabilizing Ethiopia, Tekeda replied that the GOE would attempt to deal with this threat by countering the insurgencies and movements Eritrea was funding. (NOTE: PM Meles confirmed this stance in a subsequent meeting Sept. 30 with donor country ambassadors.) -------------- SOMALIA: INTERNATIONAL PERCEPTIONS MORE WORRISOME THAN CIC MILITARY THREAT -------------- ¶4. (C) Tekeda told the Charge that the recent "triumph" of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in Kismayo had revealed the limits of the CIC's power. While the Courts had succeeded in taking over Kismayo, they had faced unprecedented resistance from the local population because the city residents came from a mixture of clans, not just the Hawiye who dominated other areas conquered by the CIC. One of the major warlords who formerly controlled the city, Hirale, had withdrawn promising continued resistance to the CIC. Furthermore, CIC leader Turki had openly acknowledged the role of foreign fighters in taking Kismayo. Tekeda predicted that the CIC would not penetrate other areas of Somalia, and argued that "the CIC cannot not even keep the Hawiyes together." He reiterated the importance of Ethiopia and Kenya continuing to act together on Somalia. He claimed that Ethiopia had a number of additional measures it could take to counter CIC influence, including fortifying or even recognizing Somaliland and Puntland. In general, the GOE felt comfortable with the current situation and did not anticipate further deterioration as long as Ethiopia remained engaged. He added that it should be possible for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to come up with a ADDIS ABAB 00002674 002 OF 003 "modus vivendi" with some elements of the CIC, although not with extremists like Aweys and Ayro. ¶5. (C) What did concern Tekeda was nature of international coverage and commentary on Somalia. He noted that even experts like former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn were saying publicly that the real intentions of the CIC were unclear, when anyone knowledgeable about the area could appreciate the extremist aims of people like Aweys. Tekeda worried that an ill-informed and confused international community might undermine the diplomatic cover that IGAD countries currently had to support the TFG and oppose the CIC's expansion. ¶6. (C) The Charge told Tekeda that the GOE's credibility in the international community was being undermined by denying the presence of any Ethiopian troops in Somalia. Tekeda said the PM Meles had already publicly acknowledged the presence of some trainers in Puntland. The Charge argued that additional candor would help the GOE make its case. She also pressed Tekeda and other IGAD allies to explain better their strategy regarding the deployment of IGASOM. It was important to make clear what IGASOM's role would be, what its goals were, and that it was not "an invasion" of Somalia by its neighbors. Tekeda took the points on board. -------------- ETHIOPIA MILITARY STILL STRONG -------------- ¶7. (C) Tekeda dismissed the suggestion that recent defections of high and mid-ranking officers from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) signaled a weakened state of readiness. When pressed on the impact of the continuing dominance of Tigrayan officers among the ENDF general staff, Tekeda argued that the institution was re-founded after the fall of the Derg in 1991 under the leadership of Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) rebels. Since that time, he claimed, Ethiopia has not enjoyed enough peace or stability to broaden the leadership of the armed forces. Tekeda acknowledged the need to diversify the ENDF's leadership as soon as possible to reflect Ethiopia's multi-ethnic composition. -------------- -------------- SUFFICIENT STABILITY TO MOVE ON POLITICAL REFORM? -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) The Charge made the case that if Ethiopia faced no serious threats from Eritrea, Somalia or from internal divisions within the ENDF, then the GOE ought to be in a position to move more expeditiously to open political space in the country. She argued specifically for reinvigorating the inter-party dialogue begun earlier in the year on key reforms, including to the Media Law and National Electoral Board (NEB). She noted that opposition political parties that had taken the risk of joining Parliament in spite of negative popular opinion on the issue had not been rewarded with empowerment by the GOE. Instead, they were feeling disenfranchised by continuing restrictions on their activities. ¶9. (C) Tekeda characterized the 2005 elections as a lost opportunity for opposition parties. The EPRDF had embarked on a policy of "changing society gradually" to be more democratic, he explained, but admitted that some ruling party figures had "gone back to their cocoons" in the wake of opposition boycotts and street violence. Nonetheless, the Deputy Minister expressed optimism about prospects for renewed democratization efforts by the ruling party in the wake of their annual conference in late September. He noted that democratic governance was the dominant theme of the conference, and that party leaders had acknowledged that the EPRDF's performance in this area had been weaker than its performance on development and economic growth. Senior party leaders had told participants that "trouble awaits" unless progress on governance could be made. -------------- -------------- CHARGE PRESSES ON INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON VIOLENCE -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Charge told Tekeda that the USG had expected that the report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into political violence would help "clear the air" on events of June and November 2005. The USG was now aware, however, that three members of the Commission had been pressured by the GOE ADDIS ABAB 00002674 003 OF 003 to change their vote on whether excessive force had been used and had since left the country. Others were also aware of these developments, she added. The Charge argued that the GOE's unwillingness to respect the independence of the Commission was a "lost opportunity" for the ruling party to promote reconciliation, and that admitting that excessive force could have a positive effect on the current situation. Tekeda replied that he was "not on top of that issue" and couldn't offer an informed answer. HUDDLESTON