DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 21 AU DITF BRIEFING CONFIRMS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002610 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU SUBJECT: DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 21 AU DITF BRIEFING CONFIRMS AMIS EXTENSION, HIGHLIGHTS FUEL PROBLEMS REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2524 ¶B. ADDIS ABABA 2523 AND PREVIOUS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: While the AU PSC extended the mandate of AMIS to December 31, and Sudan has allowed the rotation of AMIS troops to resume, AU officials expressed concern that transition to a UN peacekeeping operation remains an unresolved issue. The AMIS Force Commander remained in Addis Ababa, but reportedly received a visa for Sudan on September 24a. AU officials reported that security in Darfur continues to deteriorate, citing aerial bombing by the GOS and threats to IDPs. Inability to pay its aviation fuel contractor compelled AMIS to ground its air operations and underscores the need for funding and logistics support for AMIS to establish a strategic reserve, AU military planners said. AU officials also acknowledged that the Sudanese Air Force forcibly refueled its aircraft using an AMIS-marked tanker. The European Commission reported that it owes nearly 39 million Euros in unpaid pledges to the AU, but cannot provide nearly USD 7 million sought by contractor PAE by September 30, as prepayment for the extension of food services. AU officials requested partner assistance in conducting a "lessons learned" exercise, and welcomed the appointment of a USG Special Envoy for Sudan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On September 21, the African Union Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK, Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). -------------- AMIS EXTENDED; 2 BATTALIONS TO BE ADDED -------------- ¶3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes confirmed that on September 20, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), meeting at the head of state level in New York, had decided (1) to extend the mandate of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for three months to December 31; and (2) to enhance AMIS with the addition of two battalions, as suggested in a new concept of operations (CONOPS). (NOTE: Communique was subsequently forwarded to AF/SPG on September 22. END NOTE.) While Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore had told the press that Sudan was willing to talk to the UN, "the issue is still there, and that is transition." ¶4. (SBU) Gomes reiterated concern that the August 30 addendum to the July 28 UNSYG's report on Darfur called for UN military personnel to "infiltrate" AMIS: USD 50 million in proposed UN DPKO assistance to AMIS was specified for 105 MILOBs, CIVPOL, and civilian staff from the UN. As Sudanese military personnel were stationed in every sector, the deployment of such UN staff could complicate the situation in Darfur further, even leading to AMIS being asked to leave. The area of operations for UNMIS was not the same as that of AMIS, Gomes added. Operative paragraphs 7-8 of UNSRC 1706 discussed tangible support that the UN could provide to the AU, he noted. -------------- ROTATION SHOULD RESUME -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Referring to the GOS note verbale of the previous week that requested the suspension of AMIS rotation pending the outcome of the PSC, Gomes said there was now "no reason to block the rotation process." If the GOS wanted the AU to stay, then "it needs to cooperate with us," he said. NATO Senior Military Liaison Officer (SMLO) noted the need for a formal note verbale from the AU to both NATO and the EU, in order to resume rotation; Gomes said that the AMIS Deputy Head of Mission would raise the issue with the GOS and with AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit. The GOS had agreed to issue visas to incoming AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke Aprezi and to 6 MILOBs, but had not commented recently on rotation, Gomes said. (NOTE: AU subsequently acknowledged receiving a GOS note verbale dated September 18 granting overflight and landing clearance to specific aircraft conducting rotation. END NOTE.) ADDIS ABAB 00002610 002 OF 005 ¶6. (SBU) Poloffs underscored the urgency of clarification from the GOS to resume rotation, especially of Rwandan forces who would utilize airlift from Botswana, and who would have to wait to October if not airlifted within the next few days. -------------- AERIAL BOMBARDMENT CONTINUES -------------- ¶7. (SBU) AU DITF Military Component representative Colonel Masumba said information on actual activities on the ground was "hard to come by," as AMIS was not given open access; it was therefore difficult to provide a military assessment of the military offensive by the GOS in northern Darfur. The GOS continued to use aircraft to bomb areas held by non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),Masumba said. SITREPs received on September 21 reported Janjaweed moving north to support the GOS offensive there. "The assault by GOS is being done hand-in-hand with SLA Minni (Minawi). There is a clear case here of the two working together to try to deal with the non-signatories, SLA Wahid and the NRF (National Redemption Front)," Masumba said. As SLA Minni forces had captured one village from SLA Wahid, but had been repulsed from another, the offensive was not so successful, he added. -------------- SECURITY: CONTINUED DETERIORATION -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Displacement of the civilian population was ongoing, reflected in the number of new IDPs appearing at IDP camps, especially at Abushouk and Tawila, Masumba said. He reported a "deteriorating situation": villagers reported harassment and raids by Arab militias, who prevented villages from working on their own farms. In addition, demonstrations against transition to the UN occurred throughout Darfur, "not without some prompting". Two pro-UN demonstrations had also occurred: one student had been killed in suppression of a protest at the University of El Fasher; elsewhere, a local sheikh had been arrested after condemning the GOS policy of opposing the UN, but was later released following protest by local residents and the intervention of the Wali (governor). AMIS was also concerned about the threat of cholera, particularly due to the situation of camps. ¶9. (SBU) SITREPs received September 21 showed threats to IDPs from the GOS, and that the deteriorating security situation was not improving, Masumba said. AMIS was trying to "hang on" to do whatever it could, with limited resources; AMIS could not abandon the people of Darfur, he said. Incidents reported by AMIS MILOB group sites included the following: -- Zam Zam: a 28-vehicle GOS "battle pick-up" convoy with mounted weapons was reported threatening IDPs at Abushouk IDP camp for supporting UNSCR 1706; local sheikh threatened that if the UN came, the first shots fired would be against those at the camp. -- Various MILOB group sites reported cattle thefts (e.g., 250 in Sector 8; also in Sector 6). ¶10. (SBU) Masumba cited apparently coordinated attempts seize AMIS vehicles from unarmed CIVPOL: -- A gunman fired at a PAE vehicle at a PAE camp, then fled, after demanding its keys. -- Tawila (September 20, 11:45 a.m.): CIVPOL monitor on the way to pick up teachers at a primary school was stopped at gunpoint in front of the school; driver continued to drive toward the school, despite being threatened and struck; gunman seized Thuraya satellite phone and charger. ¶11. (SBU) Masumba could not confirmed reports of GOS troops being executed for cowardice, but said he would not be surprised. That Janjaweed were being brought in to assist the GOS suggested weakness among GOS troops, he said; GOS troops had a long history of such weakness. Dr. Gomes noted that if true, AMIS would likely have little to say about the executions. ¶12. (SBU) Gomes noted that the ceasefire agreement had called ADDIS ABAB 00002610 003 OF 005 for the GOS police to address crime, such as rape and banditry. He expressed concern that AMIS SITREPs used "Janjaweed" and "Arab militia" interchangeably. In fact, he said, when the GOS conducted attacks, it summoned members of the security forces (police, militia, etc.). SITREPs were therefore inconsistent: speculative as to which rebel forces the GOS was engaging, which underscored the AMIS Force Commander's need for enhanced intelligence. Reporting from AMIS was "less than satisfactory," and investigations were often promised but their reports were never received. -------------- AVIATION FUEL PROBLEMS GROUND AMIS AIRCRAFT -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Asked the impact of the grounding of AMIS helicopters, Masumba acknowledged that "lack of jet fuel means no flying," but said payment had been the issue. As a check had been processed the previous day to authorize a USD 1.5 million payment to fuel provider Matthews Petroleum Company (MPC),he said he hoped the situation was temporary and that MPC would resume delivery. While there were no problems with ground fuel, the aviation fuel situation was a "serious problem and challenge." Payment was only a short-term solution; "there is no reserve" of aviation fuel in theatre, which threatens operations, Masumba said. Lack of aviation fuel threatened rotation: how could aircraft enter Darfur, if they could not depart? It was critical to build a minimum reserve stock of 45 days. As MPC was paid for the fuel that went into aircraft, partners needed to assist in determining how to pay for and build a reserve stock. AMIS stock was not paid for until it was consumed; fuel being stored had therefore not yet been paid for. A single supply flight brings only 50,000 liters: less than what AMIS consumes in one day, so regular weekly convoys of 28-30 vehicles were needed. As the stock carried by such a convoy would cost USD 2.8 million, AMIS could not create a reserve stock without financial and logistical support (i.e., current storage bladders have insufficient capacity) from partners. ¶14. (SBU) Dr. Gomes observed that this issue had been raised earlier in 2004. AMIS had storage facilities for aviation fuel in three locations among its 8 sectors; it was unclear, however, whether they were functioning. Gomes recommended that AMIS adopt the practice used by the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). UN Assistance Cell to AMIS representative (formerly chief of fuel for UNMEE),said AMIS needed its own stock, under its own management, not under a contractor; he also noted that fuel could not be stockpiled beyond 3-4 months. Gomes said AMIS did "not have a choice" of whether to get fuel from another supplier. The issue needed to be discussed with AU DITF Administration Control and Management Center Chief Commodore Binega Mesfin and AMIS HQ in El Fasher; payment was an internal problem, he added. -------------- SUDANESE AIR FORCE REFUELS WITH AMIS TANKER -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Masumba acknowledged that MPC used a vehicle with white "AMIS" markings to fuel GOS aircraft, but noted that contractually the fuel in the tanker, until consumed, was not owned by AMIS but by MPC. (NOTE: On September 22, Ambassador John Kayode Shinkaiye, Chief of Staff to AU Commission President Konare, formally informed Canadian Embassy that the Sudanese Air Force forcibly seized an AMIS tanker on September 11-12 and used it to refuel GOS aircraft, which AMIS protested as a violation of bothe the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and the Darfur Peace Agreement. AMIS reports that MPC has now repaired its wholly-owned tanker, and will use it, rather than AMIS vehicles, to refuel other customers. END NOTE.) ¶16. (SBU) EC representative expressed concern about the GOS escorting fuel truck convoys from the Darfur border to El Fasher. Gomes responded that following an earlier attack in which fuel tankers were lost, the GOS had instructed MPC not to provide fuel to AMIS. Noting the difficulty of dealing with a sovereign government that was not sympathetic, such ADDIS ABAB 00002610 004 OF 005 arrangements depended on "exigencies on the ground." DPA non-signatories already had the false perception of collusion between AMIS and the GOS, but in reality this was not the case, and should not be an issue. Masumba said whether the conduct of a contractor could imperil the mission was a valid concern; it was possible "to starve AMIS of fuel," if there were no reserve in the mission area. Even now, fuel convoys were being broken up, with only a few vehicles being allowed to pass. (NOTE: On September 22, a convoy of only 11 fuel tankers was allowed to travel to Nyala. END NOTE.) -------------- WITHDRAWAL CONTINGENCY PLANS -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Gomes said that withdrawal contingency plans were in progress. Asked about the disposition of joint assets such as vehicles and ammunition, Gomes said that Commissioner Djinnit was seized with the issue. The AU felt that for assets given to the AU, the AU, not partners, should determine their disposition; distribution of such assets to either troop contributing countries or the African Standby Force (ASF) was being considered. More information was needed from Commodore Mesfin. On preparations for handover to the UN, Gomes said the AU and UN had met on September 14 and that meetings with the UN were ongoing: "when the time comes, it will not be difficult to happen." -------------- AMIS FORCE COMMANDER AWAITS VISA -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Incoming AMIS Force Commander Major General Luke Aprezi (introduced the previous week) said he hoped to be in El Fasher by September 25, and expected to pick up his visa for Sudan. (NOTE: As of September 25, Aprezi remained in Addis Ababa, but had reportedly received his visa the previous day. END NOTE.) ¶19. (SBU) Colonel Masumba noted that the new FC's arrival should support the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ). Officers from El Fasher had briefed DITF on resistance to the FJMHQ and lack of support from the outgoing FC, who thought the FJMHQ an unnecessary structure. The agreement to hire a retired Zambian brigadier general as head of the Joint Operations Center (JOC) was "still in the pipeline." -------------- - AU AWAITS EC CONTRIBUTIONS OF 40 MILLION EUROS -------------- - ¶20. (SBU) EC POLAD discussed the status of European Commission financial contributions to the African Union. AU note verbale 2778 of September 13 requested that the EC: (1) expedite transfer of 50 million Euros under the current contribution agreement, to address current bills presented by contractor PAE; and (2) address the prepayment requested by PAE (for the extension of food services from October-December 2006). According to Brussels: --under the second contribution agreement, 4 million Euros for AMIS II remained outstanding and not yet paid by the EC; -- two weeks earlier, the EC paid 15.6 million Euros to the AU; -- the EC still had to make payment of 20 million Euros for October 2004-October 2006; -- the sixth contribution agreement, covering August 7 to mid-October, remained to be worked on; -- the EC could not engage in direct payments to contractors (i.e., and therefore cannot pay PAE directly, as the UK does for fuel); -- as noted at the July 18 AMIS pledging conference in Brussels, the EC made additional pledges for AMIS for October 2006; the Netherlands and the UK had indicated that they would cover AMIS beyond October 2006. -------------- DARFUR-DARFUR DIALOGUE AND CONSULTATION -------------- ADDIS ABAB 00002610 005 OF 005 ¶21. (SBU) Dr. Gomes had no announcements regarding the DDDC. DPA non-signatories still sought to make contact with the AU, and were awaiting the return of AU Commission Chairperson Konare. Konare would also decide between two possible candidates to replace Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe as AU Special Representative for Sudan. (NOTE: Post has learned that Ethiopian national Abdul Mohammed, a consultant to the AU on Sudan who is also an employee of UNICEF as well as a director of the Addis-based NGO, InterAfrica Group, has been selected to chair the DDDC preparatory committee. Official announcement of his appointment has been delayed pending his release from UNICEF. END NOTE.) -------------- REQUEST FOR "LESSONS LEARNED" EXPERTS -------------- ¶22. (SBU) LG sought clarification of a September 19 AU note verbale to partners requesting a "comprehensive 'Lesson Learned' exercise as soon as possible," and noted that the request for 2-3 people was not realistic given the scope of the task. Gomes replied that a team of 10 had worked on UNMEE lessons learned, and that partners could decide how many experts they could provide. "You decide what you can do." He said Commissioner Djinnit had been pleased with the earlier lessons learned report from Canada. LG noted that NATO had previously submitted a note verbale with an outstanding offer to embed one lessons learned expert with the AU. -------------- APPOINTMENT OF USG ENVOY WELCOMED -------------- ¶23. (SBU) Upon being informed of the USG's appointment of a Special Envoy for Sudan, Dr. Gomes said Commissioner Djinnit had earlier received a proposal to appoint two special envoys for Sudan: one from the AU, and the other from partners. Another special envoy would be useful, to bring greater pressure on the GOS, especially given President Compaore's remarks that the GOS was willing to engage the UN. Gomes expressed optimism that transition to the UN could occur; President Bashir needed to be briefed on the enhancement of AMIS, and on the replacement of "green berets with blue" who were there to help Sudan, not to overthrow him. Some 10,000 foreign troops were already in Sudan. Sustained, collective pressure was needed, particularly as December was not far away. HUDDLESTON